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ABSTRACT 
 
Information security policy compliance is one of the key concerns that face organizations 
today. Although, technical and procedural securities measures help improve information 
security, there is an increased need to accommodate human, social, and organizational factors. 
While employees are considered the weakest link in information security domain, they also 
are assets that organizations need to leverage effectively. Employees’ compliance with 
Information Security Policies (ISPs) is critical to the success of an information security 
program. This study adapts the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) to examine users’ behavioral intention to comply with ISPs.  
Compliance and systems misuse has been investigated heavily in the last couple of years. 
However, there are still huge gaps in this area, and more investigation is needed as the 
systems abuse dilemma is more likely to persist in the future. Different theories were 
borrowed from criminology, sociology, and other social and behavioral sciences to help 
understand the factors motivating either compliance or non-compliance behavior, or systems 
misuse intentions and behaviors. This study identifies the antecedents of employees’ 
compliance with the information security policies (ISPs) of an organization. Specifically, the 
impact of structured and unstructured information security awareness on behavioral intentions 
to comply with an organization’s ISP was investigated. Drawing on TAM and TPB, the study 
posits that along with perceived behavioral control (self-efficacy and controllability) and 
subjective norms, an employee’s intention to comply with the requirements of the 
organization’s ISP is associated with the degree to which s/he believes or perceives 
compliance to be difficult to understand, to learn or operate (perceived complexity; PC), 
and/or to the extent that safeguarding the organization’s information technology resources 
will enhance his/her job performance (PUOP).  
Data was collected using a survey instrument that captured employees’ perceptions and 
intention regarding compliance with the organizations’ ISPs. A sample of 878 employees 
working in nine different banks in Jordan was used to test the research model. Results 
indicated that employees’ intention to comply is significantly influenced by PC, PUOP, and 
subjective norms. Employees’ awareness of security countermeasures was found to 
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significantly affect perceived usefulness of protection and perceived complexity, and they, in 
turn, affect their intentions to comply with the requirements of organizations ISPs. General 
information security awareness and technology awareness were also found to significantly 
influence employees’ intention to comply through PUOP and PC. Controllability was found 
to have no significant impact on PC and PUOP. 
Overall, this study presents significant contributions toward explaining the role of Information 
Security Awareness (ISA) and employees’ perceptions of the usefulness and complexity of 
the requirements of the organization’s ISP to boost compliance behavior. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Background and Motivation 
Information security and data protection has become one of the most important concerns and 
challenges facing organizations and users today. Despite the effort and money these 
organizations spend to secure their assets, many incidents of data breaches and information 
loss continue to happen every year (CSI, 2009). Today, organizations realize that securing 
information is a continuous and complex task. The burden of keeping information secure is 
not only the responsibility of the IT department; it lies on the shoulders of all people of the 
organization (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Kraemer & Carayon, 2005; Thomson & von Solms, 
1998; Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2008). In view of that, users must be aware of their 
roles and responsibilities in protecting information assets and how to respond to any potential 
threat (NIST 800-16 R1). From here came the security awareness programs to focus on 
addressing the needs to enlighten users on how to effectively protect information assets 
(Aytes & Conolly, 2003; Bray, 2002; Chen, Shaw, & Yang, 2006; Hansche, 2001; Kruger & 
Kearney, 2006; McCoy & Fowler, 2004).  
To secure information assets and to reduce the risk associated with these systems, 
organizations typically concentrate on technical and procedural security measures (e.g. 
Besnard & Arief, 2004; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). 
Although these solutions help improve information security (Straub, 1990), relying on them 
alone is not enough to eliminate risk (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010a; Siponen, 
2005). Even though organizations are investing more in information security technology-
based solutions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a), evidence from empirical surveys found that 
respondents reported large increases in information security incidents in 2009 (Richardson, 
2009). Organizations need to effectively manage and control security threats, beyond reliance 
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on the deployment of security technologies software and hardware such as anti-virus, 
firewalls, intrusion detection, etc. (Aytes & Conolly, 2003; Bernard, 2007; Dinev & Hu, 
2007; Zhang, Reithel, & Li, 2009). In addition human, social and organizational factors must 
be considered as well (Beznosov & Beznosova, 2007; Werlinger et al., 2008). Technology is 
an important factor but inadequate to the success of security. Technology is dependent on the 
users’ behavior (Ng & Xu, 2007). In a study aimed at mapping the current information 
systems and security research, Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) found that the use of socio-
organizational factors to understand information systems security is still at the theory building 
stage. 
Recently, information security researchers realized that management’s attention to secure 
information resources is required (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002) to design effective security 
policies (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2007; Whitman, Townsend, & Aalberts, 2001), and 
to motivate human and organizational factors to enhance users’ security awareness to comply 
with information security policies (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009). 
Information security policies must be designed to provide employees with guidelines on how 
to address the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information resources while they 
use information systems in performing their jobs (Straub, 1990; Whitman et al., 2001). 
Despite creating comprehensive information security policies and guidelines that govern and 
control employees’ behavior to implement secure practices in an organization being a first 
priority matter, compliance with these policies is still lacking. Therefore, defining the factors 
that motivate employees’ awareness to comply with an organization’s information security 
policies is an important step in helping information security managers to understand and solve 
individual behavioral issues in information security management. 
Most of the security awareness programs available to date may not be effective to fill the gap 
between perception and behavior as most of security awareness programs failed to prepare 
users with the ability of projecting potential security risks (Shaw, Chen, Harris, & Huang, 
2009), some researchers believe this gap is due to the lack of a pre-defined methodology to 
deliver these programs (Valentine, 2006). In order to fill this gap, attention has been directed 
toward deploying behavioral theories to understand and change users’ behavior to be more 
security-conscious (e.g. Dinev & Hu, 2007; Layton, 2005; Ng & Xu, 2007; Rhee, Kim, & 
Ryu, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009). 
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Information Security Policy Compliance 
Studies showed that the majority of security problems are caused by employees’ non-
compliance behavior or violation of security policies of their organizations (Myyry, Siponen, 
Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009; Trevino, 1986), which may be due to the fact that 
information security policies (ISPs) fail to impact the users on the ground, or to address the 
ignorance of users of the policies existence (Mason, 1986). Protecting an organization’s IT 
assets against theft of proprietary information and from other forms of crimes and destruction 
begins with developing comprehensive ISPs (Whitman et al., 2001). However, creating best 
security systems, guidelines, and policy focusing on the basic security goals of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, will ensure maximum protection in return for the 
organization's security investment (Cohen & Cornwell, 1989; Whitman et al., 2001), but are 
not enough to ensure employees' compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao, 2009b), 
and will not eliminate threat if these policies are not used properly. 
Information security policies are designed to provide employees with the appropriate rules 
and guidelines for the protection of the information assets of the organization while they 
utilize information systems to perform jobs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Whitman, 2008). 
According to Kwok and Longley (1999), ISP includes a definition of information security; a 
statement of management intention supporting the goals and principles of information 
security; an explanation of the specific security policies, standards and compliance 
requirement; a definition of general and specific responsibilities for all aspects of information 
security, and an explanation of the process for reporting suspected security incidents. ISP sets 
the strategic direction, scope, and tone for all security efforts within the organization, and it 
also assigns responsibilities for the various areas of security and addresses the legal 
compliance (Whitman, 2008). The ISP typically addresses compliance in two areas; general 
compliance to ensure meeting the requirements to establish a program and the responsibilities 
assigned therein to various organizational components, and the use of specified penalties and 
disciplinary actions (Schou & Shoemaker, 2007). Accordingly, a person is said to comply 
with the ISPs if she/he acts according to the behavior, guidelines, rules, and procedures 
specified by the security policy (Verizon, 2009). 
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Compliance with ISPs incorporates activities related to the initial execution of the policy to 
comply with its requirements; it is defined as the “process of ensuring that security policies 
are being followed” (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & Van Oppen, 2009, p. 24). This will 
include working with organizational personnel and staff to best implement the policy in 
different situations and ensure that the policy is understood by all who are required to 
implement, monitor and by those required to enforce the policy through monitoring, tracking, 
and reporting (Molok, Chang, & Ahmad, 2010). In contrast to compliance, researchers 
investigated system abuse and misuse (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Harrington, 1996; 
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990). Various definitions have been utilized to describe 
inappropriate or illegal activities involving information systems. Straub (1990, p. 257) used 
the term computer abuse to comprise “the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the 
local organizational information system by individuals, including violations against hardware, 
program, data, and computer services”. Hu, Xu, Dinev, and Ling (2010, p. 1379) focused on 
internal computer offense and defined it as “any act by an employee using computers that is 
against the established rules and policies of an organization”, which include “unauthorized 
access to data and systems, unauthorized copying or transferring of confidential data, or 
selling confidential data to third party for personal gains, etc…”.  
Thus, achieving effective information security requires that employees are not only aware of, 
but also comply with information security policies and guidelines (Pahnila, Siponen, & 
Mahmood, 2007). Few definitions of information security compliance were introduced in the 
literature, so for the purpose of this study we define ISP compliance as the activities 
incorporated to the execution of the policy to ensure that employees act according to the 
behavior, guidelines, rules, and procedures specified by the security policy. 
Problem of the Study 
Various studies have investigated employees’ compliance behavior from different 
perspectives. In a newly published study, drawing from the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB), Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) have identified antecedents of employee compliance with 
information security policy. They traced employees’ attitudes toward compliance with ISP 
back to its underlying set of compliance-related beliefs rooted in the rational choice theory 
(RCT). The role of information security awareness and its effect on employees’ attitudes 
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toward compliance is also examined. Herath and Rao (2009b) investigated motivational 
factors rooted in protection-motivation theory (PMT), deterrence theory, and organizational 
behavior to examine the adoption of information security practices and policies. Siponen and 
Vance (2010) suggest a model for policy compliance drawn from neutralization theory and 
deterrence theory. They argue that neutralization techniques influence employees’ intentions 
to violate ISP. This study will complement the work of others and extend the knowledge 
about employees’ compliance with ISPs by examining the role of information security 
awareness in enhancing employees’ compliance with ISPs. 
Research Questions 
Drawing on the technology acceptance model (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) it is 
proposed that an employees’ intention to comply with the organization’s Information Security 
Policies (ISPs) is influenced by perceived complexity (PC) and Perceived Usefulness of 
Protection (PUOP). Perceived behavioral control (PBC); self-efficacy and controllability, was 
traced back to its set of compliance perceptions, which are rooted in the theory of planned 
behavior. Also the role of information security awareness has been investigated and it is 
postulated that it will influence employees’ PU and PC toward compliance. This model will 
help identify factors that shape an employee’s decision to comply with ISPs and the process 
leading to this action. Specific hypothesis that identify relationships between each of the 
constructs are empirically tested. Data was collected using a survey instrument designed 
specifically to test this model. The study will try to answer the following questions 
1. How can employees’ security behavior toward compliance with ISPs be improved in 
order to reduce security incidents? 
2. What is the role of information security awareness in forming employees’ behavior 
toward compliance with ISPs? 
3. What are the employees’ perceptions about their roles and responsibilities, as set in the 
ISPs, in safeguarding an organization’s information resources toward compliance with 
ISPs? 
4. What are the employees’ perceptions about the degree of difficulty in complying with 
ISPs? 
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Significance and Contribution 
The results of this study will help senior management understand the factors that influence 
employees to comply with Information Security Policies (ISPs), and encourage positive 
behaviors and decrease the human errors which will eventually reduce the cost of security. 
The results will also be very helpful in developing appropriate information security training 
and education programs to enhance positive behaviors based on different socio-technical and 
organizational variables that were used in this model, and in employing satisfactory 
technology and better utilizing the benefits of current technology within the organization. 
This study will contribute to the understanding of the theoretical background of the existing 
IS security awareness approaches, and will also point out to what extent IS security awareness 
approaches incorporate empirical evidence on their practical effectiveness. Eliciting such 
information will benefit practitioners, since approaches based on empirical evidence can be 
considered more credible in terms of their practical usefulness and efficiency than approaches 
lacking such evidence. IS security practitioners would benefit from concrete guidance on how 
to implement the approaches in their organizations. 
From an academic perspective, this study will contribute to the library of security awareness 
research. The field of security awareness research is lacking in studies that look at this 
concept from a behavioral perspective and that employ behavioral theories, such as TRA, 
TPB, TAM, and others. This study will be the first to research the behavioral intention of 
users toward the adoption of security measures using the original TAM with the effect of 
external variables included as predictor variables. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is arranged as follows. The next chapter presents a review of the 
relevant literature and highlights this study’s contributions. The third chapter presents the 
research theoretical foundation; and discusses the research model and develops research 
hypotheses to be tested. The fourth chapter describes the research methodology, survey 
instrument, sample, and data collection method. The fifth chapter presents and discusses the 
results of the study. The final chapter concludes the dissertation and discusses the limitations 
of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter reviews the information security compliance literature that is relevant for the 
development of the study’s research model. It begins with a definition of the information 
security then an overview of information security evolution in the last few decades is 
presented. Different kinds of threats and vulnerabilities are defined concentrating on the 
insider threat to information security. A review of behavioral information security literature 
was categorized based on the dependent variable; systems misuse/abuse studies, information 
security policy compliance studies, and protective and preventive technologies studies. The 
chapter concluded by defining the gap in the literature review and explaining how this study 
will bridge this gap. 
Information Security 
Definition 
The terms information security and information systems security were used interchangeably 
by some researchers, while others differentiated between them. Hill and Pemberton (1995) 
describe information security as “… systems and procedures designed to protect an 
organization's information assets from disclosure to any person or entity not authorized to 
have access to that information, especially information which is considered sensitive, 
proprietary, confidential, or classified” (p. 15). In the same context, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) defined information security as “the protection of 
information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability” 
(NIST, 2009, p. B4). The principle of information security is to ensure business continuity 
and to minimize business damage by preventing and minimizing the impact of security 
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incidents (von Solms, 1998). To overcome problems inherent in other definitions and to 
create a firm foundation for further practical work in the measurement of information 
security, Anderson (2003, p. 310) defines information security as “a well-informed sense of 
assurance that information risks and controls are in balance”. 
The core concept of information security is to establish and maintain programs that ensure 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the organization’s information resources 
(Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2004). Other research took a different perspective on information 
security by focusing on “behavioral information security” which is defined as “the complexes 
of human action that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information 
systems” (Stanton, Stam, Guzman, & Caldera, 2003, p. 4). Based on the goal of information, 
Parker (1998) sees that information security base should be set to meet an organization’s need 
to maintain the security of information from intentional and unintentional misuse and abuse.  
Most of the widely used definitions of information security signify the importance of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, which is known as the CIA triad 
(Hansche et al., 2004; McCumber, 2005; Swanson, Hash, & Bowen, 2006). This triad has 
been criticized because it fails to relate information security in an organizational and business 
context, it is insufficient in response to the new challenges that are emerging for information 
security, and it lacks the adequate emphasis on the organizational actors’ roles in working 
with information security (Kolkowska, Hedström, & Karlsson, 2009). Therefore, new 
definitions and new concepts were introduced to replace the information security concepts. 
According to von Solms & von Solms (2005), security is not merely preserving and 
protecting information and sensitive data of the organizations, but protection of the business 
itself. On the other hand, Dhillon (1997) views the entire information system as a protection 
object. Information security is considered an important division of information security that 
includes all forms of information storage and processing (Schweitzer, 1990), and in whatever 
form the information is exchanged or stored, it should always be properly protected 
(ISO/IEC17799, 2005). In this context, Schweitzer (1990, p. 62) defines information security 
as “the protection of the operations and data in process in an organization’s computing 
systems.” 
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All of these have introduced a description and definition of information security that involve 
protecting the availability, integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of information. 
Definitions of these four elements are presented in Table 2.1 (McCumber, 2005). 
Table 2.1: Security Elements 
Security Elements Description 
Confidentiality Making information available only to those people who need it, when they need it, 
and under the appropriate circumstances. 
Integrity Ensuring the information is accurate, complete, and robust. 
Availability Having the information when it is needed. 
Authenticity The quality of being genuine or original, rather than reproduction or fabrication. 
 
Evolution 
Information security has been a management concern since the introduction of computer to 
the business world. Early studies of computer security discussed the consequences of poor 
security to organizations. Allen (1968) described the kinds of threats a security system must 
deal with, and indicated the directions security measures ought to take. Management should 
take appropriate actions for security; controlled access, production control, duplicates files, 
and internal security group. Wasserman (1969) proposed different security controls and audits 
for electronic data processing activities that include; punched cards, magnetic tapes, and disks 
which help companies create significant procedures to guard computer programs and data 
against error, malice, fraud, disaster, or system breakdowns. The computer environment of the 
1960s and 1970s consisted of stand-alone mainframes computing that were used when 
computers were first introduced in business (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). These computers 
were extremely large and vulnerable to environmental conditions and hence, had to be housed 
in a completely separate building. Securing these computers was needing to access the 
computer building was kept under physical security control. Although the system only 
allowed one user to work on it at a time, and did not grant access to the data, making it nearly 
impossible for unauthorized users to have access to the data. Environmental issues were the 
major threats to a computer; i.e., floods, earthquakes, fires, and civil disorders, so it was 
relatively easy to take precautions to minimize these threats (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). 
Information security was very basic in its early days, mostly comprised of simple document 
classification schemes, and due to the primary idea that the main threat to security was 
physical theft of equipment, no application classification projects for computers or operating 
systems were found (Whitman & Mattord, 2009). 
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Then along came a multi-users computing environment that brought with it new threats, 
specifically, more people were able to work on the machine outside the confines of the 
computer center at the same time (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). In addition, as workstations 
were situated in the users’ work environment, access control was no longer sufficient to verify 
users’ validity; users were electronically granted access to computer systems, and system 
components were shared, e.g. memory, databases, printers, etc. (Whitman & Mattord, 2009). 
Elimination of these threats was surmounted by the implementation of security controls such 
as a user authentication system that is embedded within mainframe operating systems. 
Consequently, information security from the senior executives was mainly viewed as the 
management of log-in IDs and passwords, and therefore it was located within the IT 
departments and typically buried somewhere within the data center operations management 
(Fitzgerald, 2007). In this computing stage, workstations used were considered dumb 
terminals (all intelligence resided on the central computer) and restricting users to work in 
certain areas was relatively easy. Therefore, physical and technical security measures were 
adequate to ensure effective information security (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). Information 
technology (IT) at this stage was considered an overhead expense to support organization 
functions; also it was considered a technical theme and hardly understood by the senior 
management, yet still important (Fitzgerald, 2007). In this “Zone Security” stage, as 
(Shimazu, 2007) called it, security meant a wall surrounding entire company systems and 
forcefully controlling the gates of the wall so the data and machines behind those walls was 
secure. 
In the early 1980s, with the introduction of the personal computer, a significant change 
occurred to information security (Fitzgerald, 2007); information was now an asset to be 
valued, traded, and, most of all, protected (Hurd, 2001). The introduction of the personal 
computer and the growth of end user computing (EUC) brought new security concerns for 
organizations; end-users control their own inputs, processing, outputs, and even software 
development (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). Contrasted to the stand-alone computing 
environment where knowledgeable IS professionals were controlling the computing 
environment, computer security partly shifted to end users themselves (D'Arcy, 2005), which 
was found to be the sixth most critical issues facing IS executives (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 
1987). The proliferation of end-user computing offers the promise of improved productivity, 
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but also entails risks; e.g. inadequate data integrity, “orphan” applications, and fragmented 
systems. Alavi and Weiss (1985) identify data integrity, unauthorized access, and data 
security as the main risks associated with EUC. Little or lack of security training for end users 
was another concern (Leitheiser & Wetherbe, 1986). Benson (1983) considered lack of data 
security and integrity, database access control, significant training to users, inadequate 
documentation, and poor data backup procedures as critical issues associated with EUC. 
Despite the increased number of threats to information systems as a result of the growth of 
EUC, management still underestimated the importance of information security at this stage. In 
a study conducted by Ball and Harris (1982), among eighteen management issues that MIS 
management might address, data security was ranked in the twelfth place and information 
privacy was in fourteenth place. According to Brancheau and Wetherbe (1987), information 
system executives did not rank security and control among the top twenty critical issues of 
management. While out of eight problem areas, Hackathorn (1987) found that general 
executives ranked security of data in fourth place and they thought of it as less important than 
the incompatibility of hardware and software, while MIS executives thought that data security 
was the most important issue. Hoffer and Straub (1989) indicated that an estimated 60% of 
organizations assigned full or part-time members to administer security, but still legislators 
have paid more attention to computer crime and abuse reports in the media than to managers, 
as evidenced by laws dealing with computer crimes in all fifty states. 
The advent of the personal computer (PC), and the increasing complexity and reliability of 
networks environment, has brought about a great challenge in the area of information security 
(Thomson & von Solms, 1998). The systems that used to be protected by a data center have 
been moved to a shared network environment; wide area networks (WAN) and local area 
networks (LAN) were utilized, and recently the Internet, extranets, and intranets all 
accelerated the multi-user and EUC environment (D'Arcy, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2007). While it is 
still considered as mainly an IT issue, it is during this stage that information security came to 
the forefront, since information systems are becoming the central hub to the successful of 
many organizations’ daily operations (Fitzgerald, 2007; Thomson & von Solms, 1998). 
Despite the fact that many organizations have become heavily dependent on computer-based 
and information systems, and that the interruption of either may lead to outcomes ranging 
from inconvenience to disaster (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992), information security 
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continues to be ignored by top managers, middle managers, and employees (Straub & Welke, 
1998). 
With the low cost of producing PCs and portable computers, along with networking resources 
“the Internet” was made available to the public in the late 1990s for accessing internal 
systems remotely, and new security concerns were introduced (Fitzgerald, 2007). Due to the 
competitive nature of business, users’ profiles changed significantly and developed into a 
situation where managerial people often needed access to information on a “must have now” 
basis. This situation, along with other similar situations, resulted in people gaining access to 
or modifying data that they were not supposed to have, whether intentional or unintentional 
(Thomson & von Solms, 1998). The growing computer literacy has created increasingly 
sophisticated users of technology, who are becoming more skillful at committing different 
types of computer abuse (Straub & Nance, 1990). 
Today network and computer attacks have become pervasive. The exponential growth in 
network-centric connectivity brought different kinds of threats to information systems; any 
computer at home or business that is connected to the Internet is under threat from viruses, 
worms, hackers attacks, theft, defacement, and other forms of internal and external security 
threats (D'Arcy, 2005; Hansman & Hunt, 2005). Although countermeasures, such as anti-
viruses, firewalls, security patches, and passwords control systems, and other technologies 
and techniques that can be automated, are available to improve information security, they are 
not well utilized by users even if they are freely available (Workman, 2007; Workman, 
Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Threats cause different damages to the information systems; a 
denial-of-service can result in stopping an organizations’ operations for a period of time, 
which might cause a financial loss to these companies (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2003). Damages due 
to security incidents such as the Code Red virus in 2001 was estimated at $2.1 billion and at 
$1.1 billion due to the Melissa virus in 1999 (Telang & Wattal, 2007). 
Recent industry research indicates the importance of security threats to information systems, 
although, security breaches have become very common in today’s network environment. In a 
recent survey by Ernst and Young (2010), results show that many organizations recognize the 
risks associated with current trends and new technologies; 46% of respondents indicated that 
their annual investment in information security is increasing. The Symantec Global Internet 
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Security Threats Report specifies that more than 16 million new malicious code threats were 
reported in 2008, (265% increase over 2007). The 2009 CSI Computer Crime and Security 
survey reported big jumps in incidence of financial fraud (19.5 percent an increase of over 12 
percent from last year); malware infection (64.3 percent and increase of over 50 percent from 
last year); denials of service (29.2 percent, an increase of over 21 percent from last year), 
password sniffing (17.3 percent, an increase of over 9 percent from last year); and Web site 
defacement (13.5 percent an increase of over 6 percent from last year) (Richardson, 2008). 
The 2009 Ponemon Institute benchmark study (2010) found that data breach incidents cost 
U.S. companies $204 per compromised customer record in 2009, compared to $202 in 2008. 
Despite an overall drop in the number of reported breaches (498 in 2009 vs. 657 in 2008 
according to the Identity Theft Resource Center), the average total per-incident cost in 2009 
was $6.75 million, compared to an average per-incident cost of $6.65 million in 2008. 
Financial losses were not the only consequence facing organizations as a result of security 
threats, other detrimental impacts included negative publicity, competitive disadvantage, and 
even reduced organizational viability (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003). 
The increased numbers of information security incidents stimulated academic and practitioner 
interests in information security. In today’s information intensive society, the secure 
management of information systems has become critically important (Herath & Rao, 2009b). 
In defining the 10 key issues for IT executives, Luftman and Ben-Zvi (2010) found that 
security and privacy is still one of the top 10 IT management concerns; it was ranked ninth in 
2009, eighth in 2008, and second in 2005. On the other hand, security technology lags behind 
IT management expectations, having traditionally been ranked in the top 10, but in 2009, it is 
not even in the top 20 (Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2010). Although 90 percent of organizations 
view information security as a highly important factor for achieving their overall objectives 
(Ernst & Young, 2010), only 53 percent of the surveyed organizations allocated 5 percent or 
less of their overall IT budget to information security (Richardson, 2008). 
In summary, as organizations became more and more dependent on computer-based and 
telecommunications intensive information systems and with the evolution of information 
technology, this created a panacea of threats to information systems assets. Today 
organizations in both the public and the private sectors are aware of the needs of information 
security to protect their information systems and corporate systems (Hawkins, Yen, & Chou, 
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2000). In essence, management's concern with information security has changed over years 
making it one of the top 10 issues of IT management. 
Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Every day the world witnesses new information security incidents, which cost millions of 
dollars annually, as a result of computer theft, fraud, abuse, and other security threats. In its 
1.6 dictionary release (2011), Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC) introduced 460 different attacks to information systems classified into 15 categories 
based on the attack mechanism. The 2008 Computer Security Institute (CSI) survey on 
Computer Crime and Security Survey found that 43% of respondents detected computer 
security incidents in the last 12 months; 47% of them reported 1-5 security incidents, and 26% 
did not know the number of security incidents they had. Studies showed neglect of 
information security in the past by management created a less secure system that led to more 
frequent and damaging security breaches (Straub & Welke, 1998; Whitman & Mattord, 2008). 
Management, practitioners, and employees alike must understand the threat facing their 
organization’s information systems and examine the vulnerabilities inherent in those systems 
because of such threats (Whitman, 2004). 
The literature shows a paucity of empirical research in information security threats 
classifications, effects, types, management strategies, and determinants. Some of this research 
is summarized in Table 2.2. The results of Whitman (2004) study illustrate the need for 
increased levels of awareness, education, and policy in information security to address the 
threats. A security threat taxonomy is essential to the threat inventory process because it helps 
to keep the threat inventory complete and representative (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Different 
security threats classifications were introduced to help with managing risk and setting the 
appropriate controls. Peltier (2005) classified threats into two categories; common and 
accidental. CAPEC (2011) classified risk into 15 categories based on the attack mechanism. 
In an empirical study Whitman (2003) found that, deliberate software attacks, technical 
software failures or errors, acts of human error or failure, deliberate acts of espionage or 
trespass, and deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism are the top security threats to 
information systems. 
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Table 2.2: Information Security Threats 
 Type of threats Identified 
Peltier (2005) Common and accidental threats 
CAPEC (2011) Data Leakage Attacks, Resource Depletion, Injection, Spoofing, Time and 
State Attacks, Abuse of Functionality, Probabilistic Techniques, 
Exploitation of Authentication, Exploitation of Privilege/Trust, Data 
Structure Attacks, Resource Manipulation, Physical Security Attacks, 
Network Reconnaissance, Social Engineering Attacks, and Supply Chain 
Attacks 
Whitman and Mattord (2008) Acts of Human Error, Compromises to Intellectual Property, Deliberate 
Acts of Espionage, Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion, Deliberate 
Acts of Sabotage, Deliberate Acts of Theft, Deliberate Software Attacks, 
Deviations in Quality From ISP, Forces f Nature, Technical Hardware 
Failures or Errors, Technical Software Failure or Errors, and 
Technological Obsolescence 
McCumber (2005) Environmental, Internal; Hostile and Non-Hostile, and External 
Schou and Shoemaker (2007)  Outsider and Insider Threats 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) Threats that use a single attack vector and threats that do not use an attack 
vector or are too trivial such as Viruses, Worms, Trojans, Buffer overflow, 
DOS, Network attack, Physical attack, Password attack, and Information 
gathering attack 
Target of the attack; Hardware and Software (Operating System, 
Application and Network). 
Vulnerabilities and exploits that the attack uses. 
Loch et al. (1992) Sources (Internal and External), 
Perpetrators (Human and Non-human), 
Intent (Accidental and Intentional) and 
consequences (Disclosure, Modification, Destruction and Denial of Use) 
Workman et al. (2008) Unauthorized Interception of Information; 
Unauthorized Modification of Information; 
Exposure of Information to Unauthorized Individuals; 
Destruction of Hardware, Software and/or Information 
Mármol and Pérez (2009) Attack intent 
Attack target 
Required knowledge 
Attack cost 
Algorithm dependence 
Detectability 
 
Markus (2000) argued that IT-related risk is fragmented, and the appropriate IT security 
management considerations are through IT-related risk rather than security by itself. To 
capture the view of IT management about threats to information systems and resident data, 
Loch et al. (1992) classified threats to information systems based on the source (internal vs. 
external), perpetrators (human vs. non-human), intent (accidental vs. intentional), and 
consequence (disclosure, modification, destruction, and denial of use). To better understand 
the numerous threats facing organizations, Whitman and Mattord (2008) developed a scheme 
that group threats based on their respective activities. Their model consisted of 12 general 
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threat categories; acts of human error, compromises to intellectual property, deliberate acts of 
espionage, deliberate acts of information extortion, deliberate acts of sabotage, deliberate acts 
of theft, deliberate software attacks, deviations in quality from ISP, forces of nature, technical 
hardware failures or errors, technical software failure or errors, and technological 
obsolescence. 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) classify threats into three categories, first based on the means by 
which the attack reached its target; threats that use a single attack vector and threats that do 
not use an attack vector or that are too trivial, such as viruses, worms, Trojans, buffer 
overflow, DOS, network attack, physical attack, password attack, and information gathering 
attack, second based on the attack target; hardware and software, and finally attacks based on 
vulnerabilities and exploits. On the other hand, Mármol and Pérez (2009) classified threats 
based on the attack intent, targets, required knowledge, cost, algorithm dependence, and 
detectability. 
Human Threats and Information Systems Misuse 
In a very simple classification, threats to information security were classified as internal and 
external threats (e.g. McCumber, 2005; Schou & Shoemaker, 2007). All of the previous 
classifications rest under this taxonomy. One of the most important classifications is human 
error (insider threats), either intentional or unintentional, which is a vital internal threat 
category. It is recognized by information security researchers that insider threats represent one 
of the most critical threats to information security (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Dhillon, 
1999; Whitman, 2003). Verizon (2009) reported that the results of 600 incidents over five 
years showed that insiders are behind the majority of breaches, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally. Human attack is not a new issue for organizations, but might be of less 
concern than external threats for an organization (Stanton, Caldera, Isaac, Stam, & 
Marcinkowski, 2003). Human threats are often ignored (Wood & Banks, 1993), but are 
always present and evident in many ways and should be examined in the context of changing 
technical, social, business, and cultural factors (Colwill, 2009). The legitimate and privileged 
access to an organization’s information assets lends a strong power to the insiders to have the 
highest potential risk to cause damage to the organization (Colwill, 2009; Dugo, 2007). 
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People are recognized to be the weakest link in information security (Bresz, 2004; Thomson 
& von Solms, 2005; Zhang et al., 2009), but they also can be great assets in the effort to 
reduce information security threats (Bresz, 2004; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a). Human threats have 
been ongoing concerns for organizations as the literature shows; Wasserman (1969) was one 
of the earliest researchers to discuss the importance of human errors and its effect on the 
company. Insiders can accidently or intentionally compromise information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (Colwill, 2009), which can cost millions of dollars without criminal 
intent on anyone’s part (Wasserman, 1969). The 2010/2011 CSI Computer Crime and 
Security survey reported that 40.9 percent of respondents stated that at least some of their 
losses were attributable to malicious insiders, but clearly non-malicious insiders are the 
greater problem, since 14.5 percent of respondents estimated that nearly all their losses were 
due to the non-malicious careless behavior of insiders, and 46 percent estimated between 20 
to 80 percent of their losses were due to careless behavior of non-malicious insiders 
(Richardson, 2011). Organizations usually are reluctant to disclose security incidents fearing 
negative publicity that might destroy their image, and only a fraction of security incidents are 
actually discovered and reported, suggesting that the magnitude of the problem might be 
underestimated (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Hoffer & Straub, 1989). 
Recently, more attention was directed toward the human side of computer abuse (Lee, Lee, & 
Yoo, 2004), as a more important step toward effective information security management (Hu 
et al., 2010). A plethora of research has been conducted to explore “negative” or improper 
computing behavior in the last years. The majority of the information security research to 
understand employees’ misconduct or misuse, and even criminal acts toward the 
organization’s IT systems, has been conducted from different theoretical lenses (Hu et al., 
2010). General Deterrence Theory (GDT) was one of the most used theories to study 
employees’ behavior since their misconduct or misuse against information systems is related 
to criminal behavior (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2010; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub, 
1990). In light of the turbulent future, security managers hold the key to the success or failure 
of a company’s well-being, and since systems are used by people, information security is an 
organizational and social issue (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). Thus, people who use the 
systems are responsible for them, and play a key role in the security of individual and 
organizational systems (Lee et al., 2004). 
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Behavioral Information Security Literature 
Behavioral information security research has become an important component of the 
information security literature. Stanton, Caldera, et al. (2003, p. 3) defined behavioral 
information security as “the complexes of human action that influence the availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity of information systems”. Industry research helped to signify the 
importance of human factors in securing organizations’ information assets. Information 
security success depends in part upon the effective behavior of the people involved in its use 
(Stanton, Caldera, et al., 2003). Thus, the development of effective protective information 
technologies is not enough strategy to fight the threats, but understanding user attitudes, 
intention, and behavior, in addition to policies, are also important to successfully defend 
against information security threats (Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2009). Appropriate 
(compliance) and improper (abuse) use of information systems has been explored in the 
existing behavioral information security literature (D'Arcy, 2005). The literature shows 
different approaches to studying employees’ behavior toward information security; some 
studies employed behavioral theories to examine information system abuse (e.g. Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010b; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Harrington, 1996; Hu et al., 2010; 
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Straub, 1990), while other studies employed 
behavioral theories to examine employees’ compliance with ISPs (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010; Greene & D’Arcy, 2010; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010), and other studies 
examined a protective approach (e.g. Boss et al., 2009; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010; Workman et al., 2008). 
Information System Misuse Studies 
 Since computer abuse and employee misconduct against IS are considered criminal behavior, 
IS scholars have been attracted to the field of criminology to understand employees’ 
misconduct behavior and criminal acts against organizational IT systems (Hu et al., 2010). A 
number of studies adopted GDT to examine the impact of security countermeasures on 
information systems abuse or misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009; 
Harrington, 1996; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Hu et al., 2010; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Lee 
et al., 2004; Pahnila et al., 2007; Straub, 1990), since it provide a theoretical explanation for 
the use of security countermeasures as a process to reduce IS misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav, 
19 
 
2009). Other studies adopted other theories such as fairness theory, neutralization theory and 
organizational justice theory, to examine the misuse behavior (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, & 
Bennett, 2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Warkentin, Willison, & Johnston, 2011). Table 2.3 
presents a summary of these studies. 
Straub (1990) was the one of the first IS scholars to use GDT in IS security. He argued that 
information security procedures can deter potential computer abusers from violating 
organizational policy. A survey of 1,211 randomly selected IS managers from different 
organizations indicated that different preventive and deterrent techniques were found to be 
effective in lowering computer abuse; such as weekly and overall weekly hours dedicated to 
data security, use of multiple methods to disseminate information about penalties and 
acceptable system usage, a statement of penalties for violation, and the use of security 
software. Moreover, the more that preventive security software is used, fewer abusers are 
expected as they become aware that IS security is actively monitoring their systems activity, 
preventing actual abuse and deterring possible violations of others. D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
suggested that security countermeasures; encompassing security policies; Security, Education, 
Training, and Awareness (SETA) programs; and computer monitoring, to be effective tools to 
reduce users’ IS misuse. A sample of 269 computer users from different companies was used 
to test the model. Results showed that users’ awareness of security controls has an impact on 
sanctions perceptions, which in turn reduced IS misuse intentions. It was also found that 
perceived severity of sanctions is more effective than perceived certainty of a sanction in 
reducing IS misuse intentions. Regarding users’ awareness of SETA programs, the study 
provides evidence that these programs help to reduce IS misuse because they increase 
perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment for such behavior. It was found that 
users’ awareness of security policies reduce users’ perceptions of the possibility of getting 
caught for misusing the system. Users’ awareness of computer monitoring has a significant 
effect on users’ perceived certainty and severity of sanctions that help deter IS misuse. 
Hu et al. (2010) tested a model of computer offences that adopted three popular criminology 
theories; general deterrence theory, rational choice theory, and individual propensity. A 
sample of 207 employees from five large Chinese companies was used to test the research 
model. The study found that when an individual is ruminating whether to abuse (offence) the 
computer systems, the perceived benefits dominate the perceived risks in the rational decision 
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making process. Deterrence was found to have a limited impact on the offensive intentions 
through increased perceived risk. The study results suggested that computer offences are a 
result of overestimating the benefits and underestimating the risk by employees when the 
situations for committing the offences are present and they have the means to conduct the 
offensive acts. 
Harrington (1996) employed deterrence theory from an ethical perspective, and assessed 
whether general and IS-specific codes of ethics affect computer abuse judgments and 
employees’ intentions to abuse information systems. Computer abuse was defined as any 
action of writing or distributing viruses, cracking, computer fraud, illegal software copying, 
and corporate sabotage. The study found that general codes of ethics had no effect on 
computer abuse judgments and abuse intentions of all employees, but it was found to affect 
those IS personnel who tend to deny responsibility. As compared to general codes, IS-specific 
codes of ethics had a direct effect on computer sabotage judgments and intentions, but had no 
contrasting effect on those high in denial of responsibility. Based on the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB), Lee et al. (2004) tested the effectiveness of an integrative model of GDT and 
Social Control Theory (SCT) to address computer abuse intention by insiders. Security policy, 
security awareness, and security programs were hypothesized to impact intention by acting as 
deterrent factors. In addition, organizational trust factors; attachment, commitment, 
involvement, and norms, were also assumed to have impact on intention and were expected to 
reduce computer abuse. A sample of 182 MBA students and middle managers from six 
Korean companies were used to test the model. The study found that security policies and 
security systems had no impact on the computer abuse behaviors. Results also showed that 
involvement (participation in informal meetings, personal relationships with many people, 
and loyalty to the company) was found to be effective in reducing computer abuse intention, 
as was the belief by employees that computer abuse is unacceptable and reduce computer 
abuse. 
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Table 2.3: Computer abuse empirical studies 
Author (s) Dependent 
Variable 
Predictors Theories Findings and Comments 
Straub (1990) Computer 
abuse 
Deterrents and preventive 
security software 
GDT Deterrents and preventive 
security software lower level 
of computer abuse 
D'Arcy et al. 
(2009) 
IS misuse 
intention 
Security countermeasures 
(security policies, SETA 
programs, and computer 
monitoring), severity and 
certainty of sanctions 
GDT User awareness of security 
countermeasures reduced IS 
misuse intention through 
perceived certainty and 
severity of sanctions  
Hu et al. (2010) Intention to 
commit 
computer 
offense 
Low self-control, perceived 
deterrence, perceived 
extrinsic benefits, perceived 
intrinsic benefits, perceived 
informal risks, and perceived 
formal risks 
GDT, RCT, 
SCT 
Rational choice framework 
has strong effect on intention 
to commit computer offense. 
Deterrence was less effective 
in predicting intention to 
commit computer offense. 
Harrington 
(1996) 
Computer 
abuse 
intention 
Codes of ethics, Denial of 
Responsibility 
GDT General codes did not affect 
the computer abuse 
judgments and intentions. IS-
specific codes had a minor 
effect on computer abuse 
judgments and intentions. 
Lee et al. 
(2004) 
Computer 
abuse 
Security policy, security 
awareness, physical security 
system, attachment, 
commitment, involvement, 
norms, self-defense, and 
induction control 
GDT, SCT Deterrence factors  
(security system) have a 
significant effect on Self 
Defense Intention  
related to computer abuse 
D'Arcy and 
Hovav (2009)  
IS misuse 
intention 
Security policies, SETA 
programs, and computer 
monitoring 
GDT SETA and computer 
monitoring has low effect on 
intention to system misuse. 
Posey et al. 
(2010) 
Internet 
Computer 
Abuse 
Advanced Notification, 
Organizational SETA 
Efforts, 
Explanation Adequacy 
Organizational Trust 
Fairness 
Theory 
Advance notification, SETA 
programs, organizational 
trust, and explanation 
adequacy significantly 
decreases internal computer 
abuse incidents. 
Siponen and 
Vance (2010) 
Intention to 
violate IS 
security 
policies 
Neutralization techniques, 
formal and informal 
sanctions, shame 
Neutralization 
theory, 
GDT 
Neutralization and informal 
sanction are excellent 
predictors of intention to 
violate ISPs. 
Dugo (2007) INFOSEC 
violation 
intention 
PBC, SN, attitude, perceived 
punishment certainty, 
perceived punishment 
severity, organizational 
commitment, and security 
culture 
TPB 
GDT 
Attitude, SN, perceived 
punishment certainty, and 
severity are good predictors 
of behavioral intention to 
violate. INFOSEC 
Organizational commitment 
and security culture are not 
significant predictors of 
violation intention. 
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of 
Planned Behavior 
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Researchers in criminology and social psychology suggested that the security 
countermeasures deterrent effect is not uniform across individuals due to personal and 
organizational differences that impact the perceived strength of sanctions. To investigate this 
issue, D'Arcy and Hovav (2009) presented a model grounded in GDT to explore the 
moderating impact of computer self-efficacy and virtual status on sanction perceptions. Their 
model contains user awareness of security policies, the SETA program, and computer 
monitoring, and is built on the assumption that the deterrence mechanism of security 
countermeasures depends on the actions and awareness of end users, and therefore it is not 
important to understand the impact of these controls from the user’s perspective. Researchers 
also assume that end users are not fully aware of the existence of many security 
countermeasures. Total samples of 507 participants were used to test their model; 238 MBA 
students and 269 employees. Two IS misuse scenarios, unauthorized access and unauthorized 
modification, were designed to capture respondent’s intentions. Study results found that the 
moderating influence of computer self-efficacy has a significant negative affect on the 
relationships between computer monitoring and IS misuse intention. The results showed that 
deterrent effectiveness of SETA programs and computer monitoring is not consistent across 
all individuals; computer savvy individuals are less deterred, and these countermeasures are 
also less effective on employees that spend more working days outside of the office. As a 
result , the study recommended that security education and training programs should take into 
consideration the employee’s level of computer understanding. 
Posey et al. (2010) used fairness theory to explain why security policy sometimes backfires, 
and actually increases security violations. Fairness theory assumes that employees have an 
immanent need to blame the decision maker or have accountability to the decision maker 
when they experience a negative organizational event (Posey et al., 2010). The study expected 
explanation adequacy to increase employees’ trust in their organization, and this trust should 
also increase internal computer abuse incidents following the security changes 
implementation. A sample of 397 full time employees from banking, financial, and insurance 
industries was used to obtain data for testing the study model. The study found that giving 
employees advance notification for future information security changes positively influenced 
employees’ perceptions of organizational communication efforts. The adequacy of these 
explanations is also maintained by SETA programs, and explanation adequacy and SETA 
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programs worked in harmony to foster organizational trust, which significantly decreased 
internal computer abuse incidents. The findings show how organizational communication can 
influence the overall effectiveness of information security changes among employees, and 
how organizations can avoid becoming a victim to their own efforts. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) argued that employees’ violation of IS security policies, based on 
research in criminology, is not always best deterred by fear of sanctions, since employees may 
use neutralization techniques which allow them to reduce the perceived harm of their policy 
violation. Therefore, they proposed a theoretical model in which the effects of neutralization 
techniques could be tested with those of sanctions described by deterrence theory. The study 
used six techniques of neutralization; denial of responsibility, denial of injury, metaphor of 
the lodger, condemns the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, and defense of necessity. 
They also used informal and formal sanctions and shame from the deterrence theory to 
examine employees’ intention to violate IS security policy. A hypothetical scenario method 
was used to assess the research model, and a sample of 1449 administrative personnel from 
three organizations in Finland was used. The study found that neutralization is an excellent 
predictor of employees’ intention to violate IS security policies. Intention was considered as a 
measured reflection of a predisposition to commit an act, so neutralization significantly 
affected the predisposition to violate IS security policy. As for the deterrence effect of 
sanctions, the study found that informal sanctions are insignificant predictors of intention to 
violate IS security policies in the presence of neutralization, and formal sanctions were also 
found to be insignificant predictors of IS security policy violation intention. 
Drawing on the TPB and GDT, as well as organizational commitment, Dugo (2007) 
developed a model to examine information security (INFOSEC) violation intention. The study 
examined the effect of organizational security culture on violation intention. A sample of 113 
participants (mostly students) from a professional government school was used to test the 
study model. The study found that the greater the attitude and subjective norm toward 
intentional INFOSEC policy violations, the greater the intention is to commit intentional 
INFOSEC policy violations. Perceived punishment certainty and perceived punishment 
severity were found significant in reducing intention to violate the INFOSEC policy. 
Organizational commitment and security culture were not significant predictors of INFOSEC 
policy violation intention. 
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Information Security Policy Compliance Studies 
Employees’ compliance with Information Security Policies (ISPs) is an important concern for 
organizations (Puhakainen, 2006) to prevent and reduce information system resources misuse 
and abuse by insiders (Straub, 1990). Taking different perspectives, various studies (see Table 
2.4) employed behavioral theories to examine employees’ compliance with ISPs to reduce 
systems misuse and abuse. Drawing on TPB, Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) argue that along with 
normative belief, self-efficacy, information security awareness (ISA), an employee’s attitude 
toward compliance will determine compliance intention with the ISP. Building on that, they 
trace employee attitude toward compliance with ISP back to its underlying set of compliance-
related beliefs rooted in the rational choice theory (RCT); benefits of compliance, cost of 
compliance, and cost of noncompliance. The role of information security awareness also 
investigated. A sample of 464 employees, who used the IT resources of their organizations 
and had access to the Internet, was used to test the study model. It was found that attitude, 
normative belief, and self-efficacy has a significant effect on employee’s intention to comply 
with the ISP. Also, it was found that outcome beliefs significantly affected the beliefs about 
overall assessment of consequences, which in turn significantly affected an employee’s 
attitude. Information security awareness also was found to have significant effects on both 
attitude and outcome beliefs. 
Likewise, Li, Zhang, and Sarathy (2010) employed the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) to 
examine the factors that influence Internet Use Policy (IUP) compliance. The study 
concentrated on defining the major costs and benefits that factor into employees’ intention to 
comply with the IUP and the relationships among these factors, and the mechanisms that 
could facilitate IUP compliance. The study developed a model in which IUP compliance is 
examined as a cost-benefit-based behavior influenced by personal norms and organizational 
context factors. A sample of 246 employees from different organizations with IUPs was used 
to test the research model. The study found that employees are more likely to comply with the 
IUP when perceived benefits are outweighed by potential risks from formal sanctions and 
security threats. Sanction severity was found to be an ineffective mechanism for the majority 
of employees, except for employees with very low personal norms against Internet abuses. 
Also, social influence from subjective norms was not a significant predictor of an employee’s 
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intention to comply with the IUP. Besides the cost–benefit analysis, compliance intention was 
also influenced by employees' personal norms or moral standards against Internet abuses.  
To explore the aptitude of moral reasoning and values to encourage compliance with IS 
security policies, Myyry et al. (2009) developed a theoretical model that combines the Theory 
of Cognitive Moral Development (TCMD) (Which consists of three levels; Preconventional 
level: Focus is on self, Conventional level: Focus is on relationships, and Postconventional 
level: Focus is on personally held principles) and the Theory of Motivational Types of Values 
(TMTV) (which consists of a two-dimensional continuum; Openness to Change versus 
Conservation.). They argue that theories of moral reasoning are related to information security 
policies (ISPs) as the intention or decision to violate an ISP can be interpreted in terms of 
moral conflict. To test their model, data from a sample of 132 individuals in Finland, 
technical service center employees and part-time master students with work experience, was 
collected. In regard to moral reasoning, the study found that preconventional moral reasoning, 
which focuses on fear of sanctions and ‘What’s in it for me?’ thinking, is positively related to 
both hypothetical and actual compliance in the information security context, while 
conventional moral reasoning, which focuses on acts to please others and on following the 
laws and norms for their own sake, correlates negatively with compliance behavior. Of the 
value dimensions, the study found that openness to change was negatively related to 
behavioral choice in the information security context, while conservation was found to be 
positively related to behavioral choice in the information security context.  
Siponen et al. (2007) combined the PMT with the modern GDT and TRA to explain how 
employees’ compliance with information security policies and guidelines can be improved. 
The study argued that the stronger the intention is to comply with ISPs, the more likely it is 
that the individual will actually comply with the ISPs. It was hypothesized that threat 
appraisal, self-efficacy, and response efficacy would positively affect employees’ intention to 
comply with the ISPs, and also it was hypothesized that intention to comply with ISPs and 
sanctions would positively affect actual compliance with ISPs. A sample of 917 employees 
from four Finnish companies was collected to test the research model. The results showed that 
threat appraisal, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and sanctions had a significant effect on 
employees’ intention to comply with an organization’s ISP. Talib and Dhillon (2010) have a 
different view, suggesting that emancipation leads to better protection of information. Their 
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study suggests that emancipating employees with respect to information access would make 
them more likely to comply with an organization's security policies. The higher the privilege 
granted to employees to access information, the higher the commitment toward the 
organization, and the tendency to comply with the ISP. 
Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009b) adopted PMT, GDT, and organizational behavior to 
develop and test an integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence model of security policy 
compliance under the umbrella of Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior (DTPB). 
Drawing upon PMT the study incorporated an evaluation of threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal to identify attitudes toward security policies. The study also assessed the effect of 
employees’ organizational commitment on security policy compliance intentions, and the 
influence of environmental factors such as deterrence, facilitating conditions, and social 
influence. A sample of 310 employees from 78 organizations was used to test the research 
model. The study found that employees’ understanding of the severity of the threat 
significantly affected their concern regarding security breaches, but certainty of security 
breaches was found to have no significant impact on the security concern. Results suggest that 
if employees believe that complying with policies is an obstacle to their day to day job 
activity, they are less likely to comply with ISPs. It was also found that resource availability, 
self-efficacy, and perceived effectiveness of employee actions played a significant role in 
behaviors related to ISP compliance, while the impact of attitude on employees’ compliance 
intention was found insignificant. In another study which builds upon Principal Agent Theory, 
Herath and Rao (2009a) investigated the impact of extrinsic incentives (penalties and social 
pressures) and intrinsic incentives (perceived value or contribution) on policy compliance 
intention. Using responses from 312 employees, the study found that intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivators have a strong influence on policy compliance intention. Severity of penalty was 
found to have a negative effect on compliance intention. 
Greene and D’Arcy (2010) incorporated elements from moral development research models, 
the TRA and TPB, as well as criminological perspectives including Social Bond Theory 
(SBT), differential association, and neutralization theory, to examine the influence of 
security-related and employee organization relationship factors on users’ IS security 
compliance decisions. Specifically they presumed that security culture, job satisfaction, and 
perceived organizational support have a positive effect on users’ IS security. Data were 
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collected using two online surveys, and a sample of 127 computer-using professionals located 
in various organizations in the US. The results found that the relationship between security 
culture and security compliance intention supported the notion that security culture is an 
important factor for supporting and guiding information security programs, while perceived 
organizational support, was not found to be a significant predictor of compliant behavior 
intention. Using Social Learning Theory (SLT), Warkentin, Johnston, and Shropshire (2011) 
examined the influence of an informal social learning environment on individual compliance 
outcomes. The study argued that self-efficacy mediates the effect of external cues (situational 
support, verbal persuasion, and vicarious experience) on employees’ behavioral intentions to 
comply. A sample of 202 healthcare professionals from nine separate and diverse healthcare 
organizations was used to test the research model. The study found strong evidence of the 
influence of an informal social learning environment on employees’ perceptions of 
information privacy policy compliance intentions.  
Based on compensation theory, Zhang et al. (2009) combined perceived technical security 
protection into the TPB to examine the impact of technical protection mechanisms on end-
user security behavioral intentions to comply with security policies. The study was built on 
the assumption that the attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms (SN), and perceived 
behavioral control (PBC), determine an individual’s intention to comply. An online survey 
was conducted, and a sample of 176 computer end-users from various industrial organizations 
in the United States was used to examine the research model. Both PBC and attitude were 
found as significant predictors of users’ intention to comply with ISPs, and perceived 
technical protection was also found to have a significant impact on intention to comply with 
the ISPs. Regarding subjective norms, the study found that it plays a larger role with users 
who have less experience. In addition, the existence and effectiveness of technical support 
enhanced users’ compliance intentions. To study individual intentions to engage in security-
related behavior, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) employed PMT, along with TRA and TPB, to 
examine the behavioral intentions of individuals who are motivated to take the necessary 
precautions under their direct control to secure their own computer and Internet in a home 
setting. They theorized that intentions are determined by attitudes toward security related 
behavior, social influence in the form of subjective and descriptive norms, and psychological 
ownership of the relevant object. A survey and an experiment were conducted to test the 
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research model. A sample from subscribers of a locally based ISP and undergraduate students 
enrolled in an introductory business course at a large university were collected. The study 
found that home computer users’ intentions to perform security-related behavior are formed 
by a combination of cognitive, social, and psychological components. 
Developing their fear appeals model based on the PMT, and fear appeal theory, Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) examined the influence of fear appeals on end users’ intention to perform 
recommended individual computer security actions, specifically compliance behavior. A 
sample of 275 experienced computer users (faculty, staff, and students) from multiple sites at 
a large university was used to examine the research model. The study found that fear appeal 
has an inconsistent impact on end users’ behavioral intention to comply with recommended 
individual security acts. Behavioral intention was found to be determined in part by 
perceptions of self-efficacy, response efficacy, threat severity, and social influence. Similarly, 
Chenoweth, Minch, and Gattiker (2009) developed a model that applies PMT to the spyware 
domain. The model hypothesized that maladaptive coping is mediating the relationship 
between behavioral intention and threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Based on data 
collected from 204 undergraduate students, the study found that perceived vulnerability, 
perceived severity, response efficacy, and response cost were found to be significant 
predictors of users’ intention to adopt antispyware protective technology. 
Siponen et al. (2010) took a different approach, by building a model based on PMT, GDT, 
TRA, innovation diffusion theory (IDT), and rewards to understand why some employees 
comply with their organization’s ISPs and why other do not. The study argues for clear 
language in ISP documents, and for overall visibility of information security. Data from a 
sample of 917 employees was collected from four Finnish companies in the area of 
information and communications technology business operations, information security, 
logistics, and supermarket chains. The results showed that threat appraisal, self-efficacy, 
normative beliefs, and visibility of information security policies are significant predictors of 
intention to comply with organizations’ ISPs. Deterrence was found to have a significant 
impact on actual compliance with ISPs, whereas rewards did not have a significant impact on 
actual compliance. In another study also aimed to understand why one would or would not 
follow a well-specified ISP, Pahnila et al. (2007) developed a theoretical model that combines 
GDT, PMT, TRA, Information Systems Success, and Triandis’ Behavioral Framework and 
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Rewards. Based on a sample of 245 employees from a Finnish company, the study found that 
information quality has a strong effect on actual compliance with ISPs; while employees’ 
attitude, normative beliefs, and habits have a significant effect on intention to comply with IS 
security policy. Sanctions were also found to have no significant effect on intention to 
comply, and rewards had no significant effect on actual compliance. 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2008) focus on demotivational factors (burden of 
compliance), and motivational factors (ISP awareness, fairness of the ISP, and facilitating 
conditions), to investigate its influence on employees’ attitudes toward ISP compliance 
intention. They argue that demotivational factors have a negative impact on employees’ 
attitude toward ISP compliance. They developed their study model based on the TPB to 
understand how employees perceived ISP compliance as a burden. An online survey 
administered by a professional market research company was conducted to collect data, and a 
sample of 464 employees from US companies, which have written ISPs that their employees 
are aware of, was collected. The study found that the perceived burden of compliance has a 
significant negative impact on employees’ attitudes toward ISP compliance, whereas 
motivational factors (ISP awareness, ISP fairness, and facilitating conditions) were found to 
have a positive significant impact. In another study which also drew on TPB, Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2009) investigated the role of employees’ ISA and perceived 
fairness of the requirements of the ISP in shaping their attitude toward their compliance 
intention with the organization’s ISP. Their study argued that employees’ willingness to 
comply with the rules is motivated by intrinsic desires that stimulate internal motivation to 
comply/not to comply with ISP. The study found that ISA had a significant positive influence 
on an employee’s perceived fairness of the ISP, which in turn leads to a higher positive 
attitude and intention toward compliance. 
To investigate the impact of the characteristics of the ISP on employees’ compliance 
intention, Bulgurcu et al. (2010b) proposed two factors ,ISP fairness and ISP quality (clarity, 
adoptability, and consistency), as predictors of employees’ compliance intention with the ISP. 
The study argues that employees’ perceived ISP Quality has a positive impact on their 
compliance perceptions. An online survey was conducted by a third party and a sample of 464 
employees who are aware of the existence of written ISPs in their organization was used to 
test the research model. The study found that both ISP fairness and ISP quality were shown to 
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positively affect employees’ compliance intention. Taking another approach, Xue, Liang, and 
Wu (2010) examined the relationship between punishment and IT compliance in mandatory. 
The study extended TAM by drawing on punishment research and justice theory to 
investigate how punishment affects employee compliance intention in mandatory settings. 
Their model suggests that compliance intention is affected by PU, satisfaction, punishment 
expectancy, perceived justice of punishment, and actual punishment. Perceived ease of use 
was hypothesized to affect compliance intention indirectly; through satisfaction and through 
PU. A sample of 118 accounting professionals from one of China’s top 500 companies that 
implemented a large-scale ERP system was used to test the research model. Perceived justice 
of punishment was found to be a strong predictor of IT compliance intention in mandatory 
settings. Punishment expectancy and PU were found insignificant determinants of compliance 
intention. Actual punishment and PEOU were found to significantly affect compliance 
intention indirectly. 
Chan, Woon, and Kankanhalli (2005) examined the effects of social contextual factors on 
employees’ compliance intention. The study developed a model based on the social 
information processing approach, and posits that organizational climate (information security 
climate) will mediate the relationship between compliance behavior and social contextual 
factors (management practices, supervisory practices, and coworker socialization). Self-
efficacy was also hypothesized to affect compliance behavior. The study found that all social 
contextual factors (management practices, supervisory practices, and coworker’s 
socialization) indirectly had positive impacts on compliance behavior, but self-efficacy was 
found to be a strong predictor of employees’ behavioral compliance intention. 
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Table 2.4: Information security policy compliance empirical studies 
Author (s) Dependent 
Variable (DV) 
Predictors Theories Findings and Comments 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010a) 
Intention to 
comply 
ISA, Belief about outcomes, 
Belief about overall 
assessment of consequences, 
Attitude, self-efficacy, and 
normative belief 
TBP and RCT Attitude, normative belief, 
and self-efficacy have a 
significant effect on 
employee’s intention to 
comply. Outcome of beliefs 
significantly affected the 
employee’s attitude 
Li, Zhang, et al. 
(2010) 
Internet use 
policy 
compliance 
intention 
Organizational norms, 
organizational identification, 
perceived risk, perceived 
benefits, and personal norms 
RCT Perceived benefits, formal 
sanctions, and security risk 
are significant predictors of 
compliance intention with 
IUP. 
Myyry et al. 
(2009) 
Hypothetical 
and actual 
compliance 
with ISP 
Preconventional reasoning, 
conventional reasoning, 
postconventional reasoning, 
openness to change, and 
conversation. 
TCMD and 
TMTV 
Preconventional moral 
reasoning, openness to 
change, and conversation are 
positively related to 
compliance with ISP. 
Siponen et al. 
(2007) 
Actual 
compliance 
with ISP 
Threat appraisal, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and 
sanctions 
PMT, GDT, 
and TRA 
Threat appraisal, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, and 
sanctions positively affect 
actual compliance with ISP. 
Herath and Rao 
(2009b) 
Security 
policy 
compliance 
intention 
Punishment severity, 
detection certainty, 
perceived probability of 
security breach, perceived 
severity of security breach, 
security breach concern 
level, response efficacy, 
response cost 
PMT, GDT, 
and DTPB 
Severity of breach, social 
influence, resource 
availability, response 
efficacy, organizational 
commitment, and self-
efficacy has a positive effect 
on attitudes toward 
compliance with ISP. 
Herath and Rao 
(2009a) 
Policy 
compliance 
intention 
Severity of penalty, certainty 
of detection, normative 
beliefs, peer behavior, and 
perceived effectiveness 
Principal 
Agent Theory 
Severity of penalty 
negatively affects policy 
compliance intention, 
whereas certainty of 
detection, normative beliefs, 
peer behavior, and perceived 
effectiveness have a positive 
effect. 
Greene and 
D’Arcy (2010) 
Security 
compliance 
intention 
Security culture, job 
satisfaction, and perceived 
organizational support.  
TRA, TBP, 
and SBT 
Security culture and 
perceived organizational 
support are significant 
determinants of compliance 
intention with ISP. 
Warkentin, 
Johnston, et al. 
(2011) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
comply 
Situational support, verbal 
persuasion, and vicarious 
experience 
SLT Self-efficacy mediates the 
effect of external cues on 
employees’ intentions to 
comply with ISP. 
Zhang et al. 
(2009) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
comply 
Perceived security protection 
mechanism, SN, PBC, and 
attitude 
Compensation 
Theory and 
TPB 
PBC, attitude, and perceived 
technical protection were 
found as significant 
predictors of intention to 
comply with ISP 
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Table 2.4: Information security policy compliance empirical studies (Continued) 
Author (s) DV Predictors Theories Findings and Comments 
Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) 
Intention to 
perform 
security-
related 
behavior 
Concern regarding security 
threats, perceived citizen 
effectiveness, self-efficacy, 
attitudes, SN, descriptive 
norm, and psychological 
ownership 
PMT, TRA, 
TBP 
Computer users’ intentions to 
perform security-related 
behavior are formed by a 
combination of cognitive, 
social, and psychological 
components. 
Johnston and 
Warkentin 
(2010) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
comply 
Perceived threat severity, 
perceived threat 
susceptibility, response 
efficacy, social influence, 
and self-efficacy 
PMT and Fear 
Appeal 
Theory 
Perceived threat severity and 
susceptibility, response 
efficacy, social influence, 
and self-efficacy positively 
affect intention to comply 
with ISP. 
Chenoweth et 
al. (2009) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
comply 
Perceived vulnerability, 
Perceived severity, fear 
appraisal, response efficacy, 
elf-efficacy, response cost, 
and maladaptive coping 
PMT Perceived vulnerability and 
severity, fears appraisal, 
response efficacy and cost, 
and maladaptive coping are 
significant determinants of 
compliance behavior. 
Siponen et al. 
(2010) 
Actual 
compliance 
with ISP. 
Normative beliefs, threat 
appraisal, and self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, visibility, 
deterrence, and rewards 
TRA, PMT, 
IDT, and 
GDT 
Threat appraisal, self-
efficacy, normative beliefs, 
deterrence, and visibility of 
information security policies 
are significant predictors of 
intention to comply. 
Pahnila et al. 
(2007) 
Intention to 
Comply 
Negative reinforcement (i.e., 
sanctions, normative beliefs), 
positive reinforcement (i.e., 
information quality and 
habit), and attitude. 
GDT, PMT, 
and TRA 
Negative and positive 
reinforcement have a 
significant effect on actual IS 
security policy compliance. 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2008) 
Intention to 
comply 
Burden of compliance, ISP 
awareness, fairness of the 
ISP, and facilitating 
conditions 
TPB Perceived burden of 
compliance negatively 
impacts employees’ attitude 
towards ISP compliance, and 
motivational factors and 
facilitating conditions have a 
positive impact. 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2009) 
Intention to 
comply 
Information security 
awareness, fairness, and 
attitude 
TPB ISA positively influences 
employees’ perceived 
fairness of the ISP, which in 
turn leads to compliance. 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010b) 
Intention to 
comply 
ISP quality and ISP fairness. TPB ISP fairness and ISP quality 
positively affect employees’ 
compliance intention. 
Chan et al. 
(2005) 
Compliance 
behavior 
information security climate 
(coworker specialization, 
direct supervisory practices, 
upper management 
practices), and self-efficacy 
 Social contextual factors 
(management practices, 
supervisory practices, and 
coworker’s socialization) 
positively impact compliance 
behavior. 
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of 
Planned Behavior, TCMD- Theory of Cognitive Moral Development, TMTV- Theory of Motivational Types of 
Values, DTPB-Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior, SBT- Social Bond Theory, SLT- Social Learning 
Theory, IDT-Innovation Diffusion Theory, PMT-Protection Motivation Theory. 
33 
 
Protective and Preventive Technologies Studies 
Preventive and protective technologies are used to protect systems, and data and information 
from viruses, spywares, unauthorized access, disruptions, and many other threats which have 
become very important to secure information assets (Dinev et al., 2009). The use of protective 
information technologies has attracted the attention of researchers, and many studies (see 
Table 2.5) that present theoretical insight into the users’ behavior toward these technologies 
have emerged (Dinev & Hu, 2007). To examine the ability of security countermeasures to 
protect information assets against deliberate and unauthorized misuse by users, Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003) built a model based on GDT to test the effect of deterrent and preventive measures, 
in addition to organizational factors (organizational size, top management support, and 
industry type), on IS security effectiveness. A survey was conducted and data from 63 IS 
managers from different sectors was collected. The study found that greater deterrent efforts 
(measured in employee hours spent on IS security effort) and greater preventive efforts 
(measured in more advanced IS security software) appear to contribute to better IS security 
effectiveness, while enforcing more severe penalties for IS abusers does not seem to prevent 
IS abuses. 
Based on TPB and TAM, Dinev and Hu (2007) studied the factors that influence intentions to 
use protective technologies and how they contribute to the formation of this intention. The 
study integrated the role of technology awareness with TPB and TAM variables. A sample of 
332 IS professionals and students was used to test the research model. Results show that 
higher awareness leads to higher confidence in preventing negative technologies in the 
systems, and also enhances users’ belief that they have the necessary skills and tools, by using 
protective technologies, to successfully combat the effect of negative technologies. Regarding 
PU and PEOU, results showed that they are not significant predictors of users’ intention to 
use protective technologies, and computer self-efficacy was also insignificant in the context of 
protective technologies. In another study aimed at examining the effect of cross-cultural 
differences between the US and South Korea in user behavior toward protective technologies, 
Dinev et al. (2009) tested a model built on TPB that integrated cultural effects as a moderator 
variable of the key relationships. A sample of IS professionals and students from the US and 
South Korea was collected to examine the research hypothesis. The study found that cultural 
factors moderate the key relationships and play a significant role in the formation of user 
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attitude and behavior toward using protective technologies. South Korean computer users 
were found to exhibit a stronger relationship between the subjective norm and behavioral 
intentions than American users. 
Boss et al. (2009) examined employees’ security preventive behavior from an organizational 
control perspective. The study argued that organizational control elements (specification of 
sets of ISPs, evaluation of compliance with ISPs, and reward for compliance) are associated 
with individuals’ perceived mandatoriness, which will influence the security precautions 
behavior. A sample of 1682 computer users working at a large medical center in the US was 
collected to test the research model. The study found that specifying policies and evaluating 
behaviors significantly influenced the perceived mandatoriness of security policies. 
Perception of mandatoriness was also found to be an effective motivator to individuals to take 
security precautions. Along the same lines, Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009) established a 
model based on Health Belief Model (HBM) to study users’ preventive security behavior and 
to measure self-reported actual behavior. The study argued that individuals’ behavior depends 
on their perceptions of security threats (perceived susceptibility to the threat and perceived 
severity of the threat), and evaluation of behavior to resolve the threat (perceived benefits of 
the security behavior, and perceived barriers to performing the preventive security behavior). 
A sample of 134 employees from different organizations was used to test the hypothesis. 
When applied to exercising care with email attachments, the study found that perceived 
susceptibility, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy are strong determinants of individuals’ 
computer security behavior, while perceived severity, perceived barriers, cues to action, and 
general security orientation are not significant predictors of users’ behavior. Results also 
indicated that cues to action, such as awareness programs, are not significant in triggering an 
individual to behave in a secure manner. 
To investigate how personal computer users cope with an IT threat, Liang and Xue (2009) 
proposed a theoretical model that helped to explain individual IT users’ behavior of avoiding 
the information security threats. Drawing on Cybernetic Theory and Coping Theory, 
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) defines the avoidance behavior as a dynamic 
positive feedback loop in which users go through two cognitive processes; threat appraisal 
(perceived susceptibility and perceived severity) and coping appraisal (perceived 
effectiveness, perceived costs, and self-efficacy). Later Liang and Xue (2010) derived a model 
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based on Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) to elucidate how individuals develop 
threat perceptions, evaluate safeguard measures, and engage in avoidance behavior. The study 
argues that individuals’ IT threat avoidance behavior is determined by avoidance motivation, 
which, in turn, is affected by perceived threat, which is influenced by perceived severity and 
susceptibility as well as their interaction. The model also suggests that avoidance motivation 
is directly affected by safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy. A sample of 
152 business students in a major American university was used to test the hypothesis. The 
study found that avoidance motivation is a strong predictors of users’ IT threat avoidance 
behavior, which is determined by perceived threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, 
and self-efficacy. The study found that users develop a threat perception when they believe 
that the malicious IT is likely to attack them (perceived susceptibility) and the consequences 
will be severe if they are attacked (perceived severity). When threatened, users are more 
motivated to avoid the threat if they believe that the safeguarding measure is effective 
(safeguard effectiveness) and inexpensive (safeguard cost), and if they have confidence in 
using it (self-efficacy). 
In an environment where employees who are trained and aware of security threats and 
countermeasures, but choose not to comply with ISPs and implement security protections, 
Workman et al. (2008) developed a Threat Control Model (TCM) based on PMT and social 
cognitive theory, as an explanation for the gap between knowing and doing, and to test why 
individuals omit security precautions. The study hypothesized that threat assessment and 
coping assessment are predictors of individuals’ behavior. They argued that people with either 
high perceived severity or high perceived vulnerability, or who have high self-efficacy or an 
internal locus of control, are less likely to omit security precautions than people who have 
either lower perceived severity or perceived vulnerability, or lower self-efficacy or an external 
locus of control, to cope with an IS security threat. A field study using a sample of 612 people 
from a large technology-oriented services corporation was conducted to investigate the TCM . 
The study found that both threat assessment and coping assessment have a large influence on 
the individual’s subjective and objective omissive behavior, and that factors drawn from 
social cognitive theory (self-efficacy and locus of control) also have a significant influence on 
omissive behavior. 
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Table 2.5: Protective and Preventive Technologies Studies 
Author (s) Dependent 
Variable 
Predictors Theories Findings and Comments 
Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003) 
IS 
effectiveness 
Organizational size, top 
management support, 
industry type, deterrent 
efforts, deterrent severity, 
and preventive effort 
GDT Deterrent efforts, 
organizational size, top 
management support, 
industry type, and preventive 
efforts contribute to better IS 
security effectiveness. 
Dinev and Hu 
(2007) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
use protective 
technology 
Technology awareness, PU, 
PEOU, self-efficacy, 
controllability, attitude, SN, 
and PBC 
TPB and 
TAM 
Technology awareness, 
controllability, attitude and 
PBC are significant 
determinant of intention to 
use protective technologies. 
Dinev et al. 
(2009) 
Behavioral 
intention to 
use protective 
technology 
Technology awareness, PU, 
PEOU, self-efficacy, 
controllability, attitude, SN, 
and PBC 
TPB and 
TAM 
Cultural factors moderate the 
key relationships and play a 
significant role in the 
formation of user attitude and 
behavior towards using 
protective technologies. 
Boss et al. 
(2009) 
Precautions 
taking 
behavior 
Control element 
(specification, evaluation, 
and reward), and perceived 
mandatoriness. 
 Specifying policies and 
evaluating behaviors 
significantly influence the 
perceived mandatoriness of 
security policies. 
Perception of mandatoriness 
is an effective motivator to 
individuals to take security 
precautions. 
Ng et al. (2009) Computer 
security 
behavior 
Perceived susceptibility, 
perceived benefits, perceived 
barriers, cues to action, 
general security orientation, 
self-efficacy, and perceived 
severity. 
Health Belief 
Model 
Perceived susceptibility, 
perceived benefits, self-
efficacy, and perceived 
severity are strong 
determinants of individuals’ 
computer security behavior. 
Liang and Xue 
(2010) 
Avoidance 
behavior 
Perceived severity, perceived 
susceptibility, perceived 
threat, safeguard 
effectiveness, safeguard cost, 
self-efficacy, and avoidance 
motivation 
Cybernetic 
Theoryand 
Coping 
Theory 
Perceived severity, perceived 
susceptibility, perceived 
threat, safeguard 
effectiveness, safeguard cost, 
self-efficacy, and avoidance 
motivation all found to have 
a significant influence on 
avoidance behavior. 
Workman et al. 
(2008) 
Omissive 
behavior 
Perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, locus of 
control, self-efficacy, 
perceived response efficacy, 
and response cost-benefit 
Social 
Cognitive 
Theory and 
PMT 
Threat assessment and 
coping assessment have high 
influence on the individual’s 
subjective and objective 
omissive behavior, also self-
efficacy and locus of control 
have significant influence on 
omissive behavior. 
GDT-General Deterrence Theory, RCT-Rational Choice Theory, SCT-Self-Control Theory, TPB-Theory of 
Planned Behavior, PMT-Protection Motivation Theory 
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Security awareness education and training was and is still one of the most important 
fundamentals to information security practices (Furnell, Gennatou, & Dowland, 2002; 
Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Shaw et al., 2009). Unfortunately, security awareness is often 
poorly managed due to the fact that it is descriptive in nature; organizations’ approaches for 
delivering security awareness take the form of “informing” their employees of their security 
policies, guidelines, and procedures (Layton, 2005). This approach only informs users that 
they must act in accordance with policies and procedures because the management desires 
them to do so (Layton, 2005). Information security awareness programs should be designed to 
change users’ attitude and behavior to be more security-conscious (Ng & Xu, 2007; Thomson 
& von Solms, 1998). 
A few studies took a different approach, other than prohibition and sanctions, to study 
employees’ compliance with ISPs by concentrating on education and training to encourage 
desirable behavior. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) proposed a training program, based on the 
universal constructive instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model, to promote 
information security policy compliance. They found that in order to enhance employees’ IS 
security policy compliance, information system security communication processes and 
training programs are needed. These programs are assumed to utilize methods and learning 
tasks that motivate employees to process information in accordance to policy. Karjalainen and 
Siponen (2011) contended that IS security training needs a theory that lays down elementary 
characteristics and explains how these characteristics shape IS security training principles in 
practice. They developed a theory that suggests that IS security training has certain 
elementary characteristics that distinguish it from other types of training, and needs to be 
understood before educational principles for IS security training can be selected. To enforce 
compliance with information security policy, Gupta and Zhdanov (2006) suggested a 
compliance bonus, and found that providing employees with proper economic incentives and 
building trust between organizational entities are good incentives for compliance. Choi, Kim, 
Goo, and Whitmore (2008) examined the influence of managerial information security 
awareness (MISA) on managerial actions toward information security (MATIS). The study 
argued that creation of ISPs, execution of information security training and education, 
implementation of information access control, updating information security systems, and the 
retainment of an information security team will have a significant positive effect on MISA. A 
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sample of 1773 Korean enterprises participated in the study, which found that MISA is one of 
the major constructs influencing managerial actions, and the subsequent security performance 
of the organization. 
Limitations and Gaps in the Previous Literature 
A thorough analysis of the previous literature showed the various behavioral theories that 
have been employed to study employees’ attitudes toward compliance with information 
security policies or to prevent systems misuse and abuse. While these studies have highlighted 
either the deterrent effect of sanctions or the role of incentives in encouraging employees’ 
desirable behavior, none of the studies have addressed this problem as a system that 
employees must accept first, as Davis (1986) did with the ordeal of accepting the technology . 
Based on the analysis of the existing literature, it is evident that these theories have been 
effective in defining the factors that enhance compliance behavior or prevent system abuse. 
However, the limitation of previous literature is that it addresses the research problem only 
from an organizational perspective, without considering the users’ perspective. 
Information security researchers adapted different behavioral theories to study compliance 
behavior with ISPs or systems abuse or misuse. Theories such as TRA, TPB, RCT, PMT, 
GDT, SCT, TAM, and others were adopted as a theoretical foundation for their studies in 
order to predict behavioral intention. Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB), and its extension, is a general model per se that does not specify the 
beliefs that are operative for a particular behavior (Davis et al., 1989). Rational Choice 
Theory (RCT) posits that an individuals’ decision to engage in a criminal behavior is a 
function of their perceptions of cost and benefits of deviant behaviors in deciding whether or 
not to offend (Hu et al., 2010; McCarthy, 2002; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). RCT’s 
criticism stems from the confusion accompanied with its key concepts, premises, and 
predictions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; McCarthy, 2002). General Deterrence Theory (GDT) 
posits that individuals choose to go into crime when the benefits outweigh the costs (Forsyth, 
1980; Siponen & Vance, 2010), and while they may not be completely rational, they are 
reasonably aware of the benefits and potential costs associated with criminal behavior 
(Agnew, 1993). GDT is criticized as being salient because of its implicit and explicit embrace 
by lawmakers aimed at solidifying the punishments for virtually all types of crime (Agnew, 
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1993). At the macro-level, Alder, Schminke, Noel, and Kuenzi (2008) found that many of the 
variables specified to test the deterrence perspective were regularly among the weakest 
predictors of crime rates across nearly all levels of aggregation. The results of studies that 
adopt GDT are inconclusive, and many authors have called for further research to better 
understand what factors influence the effectiveness of security countermeasures (D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2009). Although the literature shows that employees’ perceptions of sanctions 
produce a decrease in internal systems abuse by employees (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al., 
2004; Straub, 1990), different researchers found that deterrent factors are less effective in 
predicting or reducing system abuse (Hu et al., 2010),while others point to an increased 
frequency of computer abuse after changes to security policies and procedures are made 
(Moore, Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). These conflicting findings indicate there are likely 
scenarios where increased deterrence measures may create negative results and a paradox of 
increased internal system abuse. 
Researchers argued that people make decisions based on simplifying strategies and heuristics, 
which often lead to biases and errors in the resulting decision. In addition, they argue that 
RCT is inadequate to explain how individuals make decisions in real life, and because of their 
limited information-processing capacities, people tend to rely on some heuristic principles, 
which enable them to reduce the complexity of problems (McCarthy, 2002; Shumarova & 
Swatman, 2006). In contrast, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is specifically 
designed for modeling user acceptance of information systems, and more importantly, it 
provides a basis for tracing the impact of external factors on internal beliefs and intentions 
(Davis et al., 1989), The TAM is also reported to be easy and simple to use, has the ability to 
predict, and posits the power of explanation, which gives practitioners and researchers the 
ability to recognize why certain systems might be acceptable or unacceptable (Davis et al., 
1989; Hubona & Cheney, 1994; Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003). Specifically, my study is 
different than the work of Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) in the primary focus which is built on how 
the inherent characteristics of the policies, as perceived by the users, affect their intention to 
comply, while the primary focus of the Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) is on how the incentive 
structures (e.g., rewards, benefits, cost, and sanctions) affect the users' intention to comply. 
Moreover, my Security Acceptance Model (SAM) captures the complexity of the ISPs while 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) did not, and from an abstract point of view, and regardless of rewards, 
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SAM is driven by acceptance of the intrinsic characteristics of the ISPs, and therefore is 
expected to be easy to understand. 
Based on the above arguments, the TAM was adopted as the foundation for my model as it is 
better than TRA in explaining the acceptance intention of users (Davis et al., 1989; Lee et al., 
2003), simpler and easier to use, more powerful than TPB and RCT (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; 
Hubona & Cheney, 1994; Lee et al., 2003), and TAM’s instrument is reliable and valid, which 
will enhance the value of research (Lee et al., 2003). Moreover, TAM is designed to be used 
with voluntary and mandatory systems (Davis et al., 1989), and is valid for application in 
different cultures and with different systems (Lee et al., 2003; Straub, 1994). It is also 
designed to be used alone, without needing another theory to support it, to understand why 
people accept or reject using a system, unlike previous studies which adopted more than two 
theories to build their models (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Dinev 
& Hu, 2007). Therefore, SAM can be used to understand users’ compliance behavior, and is 
expected to possess all of TAM’s distinctiveness, as well as being easy, simple, valid, and 
applicable in different cultures and with all ISPs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Employees can impose excessive damage to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
information security (IS) through deliberate activities (e.g., espionage), or they may present a 
potential threat through passive noncompliance with security policies, laziness, poor training, 
or lack of motivation to intensely ensure information security (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). 
In order to foster employees’ rule adherence, Tyler and Blader (2005) classified studies in 
organizational behavior that classify employees’ rule-following behavior into two motivation 
approaches of human behavior. The first is the command-and-control approach, which is 
linked to extrinsic motivational models of human behavior, where individuals respond to 
external contingencies such as reward and punishment, and breaking the rules. The second 
approach is the self-regulatory approach, which is linked to intrinsic motivational models, and 
which emphasizes that individuals’ follow the rules as connatural drivers of behavior. The 
intrinsic motivational model of human behavior was found to explain employees’ rule-
following behavior better than the extrinsic motivational model, which has been built on 
GDT, RCT, PMT, and other extrinsic behavioral theories (Son, 2011). 
The command-and-control model symbolizes a conventional approach to animate rule-
following; it is based on the idea that people abide by the rules as a function of the costs and 
benefits they associate with doing so (Blair & Stout, 2001; McCarthy, 2002). This approach is 
well represented in different theories such as GDT (e.g. D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990), RCT (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Hu et al., 2010; Li, Zhang, et 
al., 2010), and PMT (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen et al., 
2007). The approach contends that employees are materialistically motivated and will be 
basically interested in the resources and outcomes they obtain from their organizations, and 
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therefore in order to enforce policies, rules, and procedures, organizations must take an active 
role by providing incentives (to encourage desired behavior) and sanctions (to discourage 
undesirable behavior) (Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007). 
The question to ask at this point is do such techniques work? Studies indicated that these 
strategies often help shape employees’ behavior (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2009; Li, Sarathy, & Zhang, 2010; Straub, 1990). But such strategies also come with 
significant costs. For example, in order for sanctions and deterrence systems to work, 
organizations must be able to dedicate substantial resources to the surveillance needed to 
detect systems misuse or abuse so that people are deterred (Tyler et al., 2007). 
In this study I focused on the self-regularity approach which represents an alternate approach 
to encouraging rule-following behavior, which is concentrated on employees’ intrinsic 
motivations. This method identifies rule-following as an individual’s innate desire to follow 
organizational rules, and not with external contingencies in the environment that are linked to 
rule-following, such as rewards, penalty, fear, outcomes, or social pressure (Tyler & Blader, 
2005). Therefore, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) works to investigate employees’ 
innate behavior toward complying with organizations’ ISPs, since it concentrates on 
employees’ desire and willingness to follow the rules, as described in the ISPs, for the sake of 
protecting the organization’s security, and not to maximize any outcomes for themselves. 
Consequently, this study developed a Security Acceptance Model (SAM), analogous to the 
TAM. 
Chapter Three introduces the study’s research model, along with its theoretical base, and a 
description of each construct and its foundation in the information security (IS) literature. 
Specific hypotheses were identified, and related prior research that contributed to the 
development of these hypotheses is presented. 
Theoretical Framework 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) vs. Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TBP) are two of the 
most widely researched and popular conceptual frameworks for the study of human behavior 
(Ajzen, 2002b; Armitage & Conner, 2001). These theories are widely used in information 
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systems; they were adapted by Davis (1986) to develop the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM). Both theories are built on the assumption that human behavior is determined by 
behavioral intentions, and behavioral intentions are a function of an individual’s attitude 
toward the behavior and subjective norms surrounding the performance of the behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991). A meta-analysis study conducted by Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) 
to investigate the effectiveness of the TRA found strong evidence for the utility of the model 
in predicting behavioral intentions, and actions appropriate for detecting where and how to 
target strategies for changing behavior. 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Figure 1) assumes that “since much human behavior 
is under volitional control, most behaviors can be accurately predicted from an appropriate 
measure of the individual’s intention to perform the behavior in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975, p. 380). The theory posits that explicit behavior can be predicted from the individual’s 
intention, where intentions are an indicator of how much time and effort people are willing to 
devote and planning to put forth to perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Under volitional 
control, the theory postulates that "a person’s intention to perform (or not perform) a behavior 
is the most important immediate determinant of that action” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 117), and 
intention alone is a sufficient predictor of the actual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) under 
circumstances where there are no constraints on action. Antecedents to behavioral intentions 
were divided into behavioral (personal in nature) and normative (social influence) factors; the 
personal factors are assumed to be the individual's attitude toward performing the behavior, 
whereas the normative beliefs influence the individual's subjective norm about performing the 
behavior (Ajzen, 1988; Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). As explained by Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975), external variables to the model are expected to influence intentions only to the extent 
that they affect either attitudes or subjective norms. 
 
Figure 1: Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen, 1988) 
Attitude 
Subjective 
Norms 
Intention Behavior 
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Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model was developed to deal with behaviors that are under 
volitional control and not outcomes or events that result from behaviors. This model holds 
well within the constraints they defined; however, researchers identify some situations that do 
not fit neatly within this framework (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Some behaviors are 
involitional, so intention alone is not a sufficient predictor of the future behavior (Sheppard et 
al., 1988). A behavioral criterion always contains an action element; intention implies that an 
individual will work forward to perform a certain behavior. However, the degree of success of 
achieving the required behavior depends not only on the person’s intention, but also on other 
factors that are beyond the person’s direct control. Thus, the volitional assumption restricted 
the applicability of the TRA to volitional behaviors (Ajzen, 2005). 
Ajzen (2005) acknowledged that “complications are encountered, however, when we try to 
apply the theory to behaviors that are not fully under volitional control” (p. 127). To 
overcome this limitation, an extension of this model was developed, the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB) (Figure 2), to address the possibility of incomplete volitional control by 
adding an additional construct, perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991), which received a 
great deal of attention in different fields, including compliance with information security 
policy (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Warkentin, Johnston, et al., 2011; 
Zhang et al., 2009). Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) is defined as “people’s perceptions 
of the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior of interest” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 183). As the 
theory assumes, PBC has a direct and indirect effect on behavior through intentions (Ajzen, 
1991, 2005), and it aims to allow prediction of behaviors that were not under complete 
volitional control. In general this theory stands on the idea that “people intend to perform a 
behavior when they evaluate it positively, when they experience social pressure to perform it, 
and when they believe that they have the means and opportunities to do so” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 
118). 
In summary, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) could sufficiently predict the behavior 
under volitional control under certain constraints, but the simple array of an intention is not 
enough to predict behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). TRA does not deal directly with the 
amount of control a person has in a given situation, and it considers the possible effects of 
perceived behavioral control (PBC) on achieving the behavioral goal (Ajzen, 2005). PBC has 
a different influence on intention. For instance, in some situations where attitudes are strong, 
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PBC’s prediction power of intention might be low. Ajzen (1991, p. 188) state that “The 
relative importance of attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control in the 
prediction of intention is expected to vary across behaviors and situations”. Accordingly, PBC 
will have lower predictive utility of intentions in situations where attitudes or normative 
influences are strong. Therefore, the magnitude of the PBC–intention relationship is 
dependent upon the type of behavior and the nature of the situation (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). 
 
Figure 2: Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1988) 
Technology Acceptance Model 
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) proposed by (Davis, 1986) is one of the most 
frequently used models of IT adoption (Agnew, 1985, 1991). According to the TAM (Figure 
3), actual adoption of technology is influenced by two perceptions; perceived usefulness (PU) 
and perceived ease-of-use (PEOU). PU is defined as “the degree to which a person believes 
that using a particular system would increase his or her performance”, whereas PEOU refers 
to “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free of 
effort” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 320). TAM is an adaptation of TRA, specifically modified for 
modeling user acceptance of information systems (Davis et al., 1989). TAM is developed to 
provide a clarification of the general determinants of computer acceptances, which is capable 
of describing users’ behavior. Beside the ability to predict, TAM posits the power of 
explanation, which gives the practitioners and researchers the ability to recognize why certain 
systems might be acceptable or unacceptable (Davis et al., 1989). 
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Figure 3: Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) adopted from (Davis et al., 1989) 
The TAM consists of four variables; Perceived Usefulness (PU), Perceived Ease of Use 
(PEOU), Behavioral Intention (BI), and Behavior or Actual Usage (B). PU is an independent 
variable as it predicts BI, and it is a dependent variable as predicted by PEOU. Studies show 
that there are strong relationships between these variables ; PU and PEOU are strong 
predictors of BI (Lee et al., 2003). This model assumes that BI is a strong determinant of 
computer usage, but differs from TRA in that BI is determined by a person’s attitude toward 
using a system (A) and PU (Davis et al., 1989). TRA postulates that any other factors which 
influence behavior do so only indirectly by influencing Attitude (A) and Subjective Norms 
(SN); these factors are referred to as external variables (Peguero, Popp, Latimore, Shekarkhar, 
& Koo, 2011). This indicates that TRA mediates the impact of uncontrollable variables and 
controllable interventions on user behavior (Davis et al., 1989). 
According to the TAM, PU can be affected more than PEOU by a variety of external 
variables, as well; PEOU is also hypothesized to be determined by external variables. Thus, 
the objective design of a system can have a direct and indirect effect, through PEOU, on PU 
(Davis et al., 1989). Studies show that when different external variables were introduced into 
TAM, the most frequent variables used as external variables, as Lee et al. (2003) found, are 
system quality, training, compatibility, computer anxiety, self-efficacy, enjoyment, computing 
support, and experience. 
After the brief analysis of the TRA, TBP, and TAM, the question arises here is, which theory 
is better to explain and predict behavior? And what is the criterion for selecting the 
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appropriate theory? Ajzen (2005) stated that: “Volitional control is best defined as a 
continuum; … purely volitional act … and behavioral events which are completely beyond 
volitional control… Toward the volitional side of the continuum, it is possible to predict 
behavior with a great deal of accuracy on the basis of intentions to perform the behavior in 
question. Intentions also contribute to the attainment of behavioral goals that are only partly 
under volitional control …. Perceived behavioral control can reflect the presence of such 
factors and, to the extent that it does so accurately, contributes to the prediction of behavioral 
achievement” (p. 140). This statement implies that intention is a sufficient predictor of 
behavior under volitional control; therefore, TRA is preferred over TPB, but compliance with 
ISPs is not volitional, and therefore TRA will not be able to predict behavioral intention 
toward compliance if it is mandatory. The TAM is designed to explain and predict the 
behavior while TRA is designed merely to predict the behavior .TAM includes the external 
variables as a tested predictor, tools for explaining and predicting the behavior, and it was 
found to be an appropriate model in mandatory sittings (e.g. Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; 
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) . Therefore, TAM is a better model to predict and 
explain the users’ behavior toward the compliance with ISPs. 
The Role of Attitude in the TAM 
Davis et al. (1989) distinguished between TAM and TRA. They are similar because they both 
posit that attitude is determined by one’s own belief, but they differ on two significant issues. 
First the TRA contends that beliefs are extracted further for each new context, while the TAM 
contends that PU and PEOU’s are based on theory and meant to be determinants of user 
acceptance. Second, the TRA is the sum of all the beliefs multiplied by weight into a single 
construct, whereas TAM deals with PEOU and PU as two separate constructs. Davis et al. 
(1989) stated that “TAM treats [P]U and [P]EOU as two fundamental and distinct constructs. 
Modeling beliefs in this disaggregated manner enables one to compare the relative influence 
of each belief in determining A[attitude], providing important diagnostic information…. From 
a practical standpoint, this enables an investigator to better formulate strategies for 
influencing user acceptance via controllable external interventions that have measurable 
influences on particular beliefs.” (p. 988).  
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Since its introduction, many empirical studies have been done on behavioral intentions to use 
different applications that give support for the TAM; communication systems such as email 
(Straub, 1994), general purpose systems such as e-commerce (Gefen & Straub, 2000), office 
systems such as spreadsheets (Venkatesh & Davis, 1996), specialized business systems such 
as case tools (Xia & Lee, 2000), and Decision Support Systems (DSS), Group Support 
Systems (GSS) and Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS) (Sambamurthy & Chin, 1994). 
The original model of TAM validated attitude as a mediator variable, while later studies 
eliminated attitude from the model (e.g. Adams, Nelson, & Todd, 1992; Davis & Venkatesh, 
1996; Koufaris, 2003; Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Thus, a direct path, 
without attitude as a mediating construct, from PU and PEOU to BI, was proposed. The 
elimination of attitude as a mediating construct contradicts TRA and TPB which posit that 
attitude mediates the relationship between beliefs and intention. Davis et al. (1989) stated that 
“within organizational settings, people form intentions toward behaviors they believe will 
increase their job performance, over and above whatever positive or negative feelings may be 
evoked toward the behavior per se” (p. 986). These direct paths of PU-BI and PEOU-BI imply 
that even if employees may dislike the technology, they may still use it if they perceive it will 
enhance their job performance (Dinev & Hu, 2007). In addition, Venkatesh et al. (2003) 
eliminated the role of attitude in their Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 
(UTAUT). They argued that attitude toward using technology is not to be a direct determinant 
of intention, and found that it is a significant predictor only when performance and 
expectancies constructs are not present in the model. Therefore, they assume any observed 
relationship between attitude and intention to be spurious and resulting from the exclusion of 
the other key construct. 
Different empirical studies validated the original TAM in which attitude mediates the 
relationships between PU and PEOU, and behavioral intention. In studies that validated the 
complete mediation of attitude between PU and PEOU, and behavioral intention, results show 
that attitude was a significant mediator (e.g. Agarwal & Prasad, 1997; Karahanna, Straub, & 
Chervany, 1999; Taylor & Todd, 1995). 
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Research Model and Hypotheses 
Based on the TAM developed by Davis et al. (1989), a Security Acceptance Model (SAM) 
(Figure 4) is proposed, which will help explain employees’ intention to comply with ISPs. 
TAM is built on the premise that the greater the readiness of the users to accept a new system, 
the more likely they are to make changes in their practices, and the more willing they are to 
spend the time and effort to actually start using the system. About 30 different types of IS 
were used as target systems in TAM studies (Lee et al., 2003). Analogous to this approach, 
SAM is based on similar premises, with recognition that information security policies are not 
a technology, but a system that users will use and comply with. In that regard, we draw on 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010a, p. 527) definition of information security policy as a “statement of the 
roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the information and technology 
resources of their organizations”. 
This study will examine the effect of external variables, namely users’ awareness of security 
protection mechanisms (security policies, Security Education, Training and Awareness 
(SETA) programs, and monitoring practices) proposed and tested by Straub (1990), D'Arcy et 
al. (2009), and D'Arcy and Hovav (2009); controllability (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Rhee et al., 
2009); information security awareness (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a); and self-efficacy (Dinev & 
Hu, 2007; Workman et al., 2008), on perceived usefulness of protection and perceived 
complexity of ISPs. Information security awareness general security awareness, and 
technology awareness, is hypothesized to directly influence employees’ perceived usefulness 
toward compliance with ISPs. The original relations in the TAM model are posited to hold in 
the context of ISPs too; perceived complexity and perceived usefulness of protection of ISPs 
are postulated to impact behavioral intention to comply.  
As for the IT usage in the original TAM, I focused on intention to comply rather than 
intention to use, since it is more realistic in mandatory settings, and fits better in the sense of 
compliance. Users perceived compliance with organizations’ ISPs as a compulsory action by 
the organization. The literature review raised a number of issues related to mandatory vs. 
volitional usage behavior; some suggest a continuum of voluntariness (e.g. Hartwick & Barki, 
1994; Karahanna et al., 1999; Moore & Benbasat, 1991) in which individuals may perceive 
voluntary differently. Also usage can be variable in mandatory settings, but that depends on 
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how much the system/technology is integrated into one’s job, producing a high correlation 
with job function but not necessarily with effect toward the system (Brown, Massey, 
Montoya-Weiss, & Burkman, 2002). Accordingly, and as the system (compliance with ISPs) 
must be used to complete one’s own job that is also integrated with other employees’ jobs, 
this study proposes that employees do not have a decision regarding use or not. Discussed 
below are the operationalization of the research constructs and the formation of the study 
hypotheses. 
 
 
Figure 4: Research Model - Security Acceptance Model (SAM) 
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320), and perceived ease of use is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using 
a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989, p. 320), whereas intention to 
comply is defined as an “employee’s intention to protect the information and technology 
resources of the organization from potential security breaches” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, p. 
529). 
In accordance with the existing literature, particularly TAM, it is assumed that an employee’s 
intention to comply with the requirements of the organization’s ISPs is associated with the 
degree to which the employee believes that using ISPs’ roles and responsibilities to safeguard 
the organization’s information technology resources will enhance his/her job performance 
(PUOP). PU is a key determinant of IT usage (acceptance) and it is described as the most 
prominent belief driving IT (Bhattacherjee & Premkumar, 2004). PU has always been shown 
to be a significant and strong determinant of behavioral intention, with predicted standardized 
coefficients typically around 0.6 (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). The effect of PU on behavioral 
intention toward compliance with ISPs or using protective technologies to secure information 
assets was investigated by (Dinev & Hu, 2007), (Dinev et al., 2009), (Jones, 2009), and (Xue 
et al., 2010). Congruent with the original TAM, these studies proposed that PU positively 
affects behavioral intention to comply or to use protective technologies. The use of PU in this 
study is consistent with the literature (Davis et al., 1989; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Venkatesh & 
Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Xue et al., 2010). 
Based on the previous literature that has investigated the effect of PU on behavioral intention 
in the IS domain, and principally in information security compliance, the following is 
hypothesized in the context of ISP compliance: 
Hypothesis H1: An employee’s PU about complying with the organization’s ISP positively 
affects intention to comply with the requirements of the ISP. 
An employee’s intention to comply with the requirements of the organization’s ISP is 
associated with the degree to which an employee believes that using the ISP in practice, and 
undertaking related roles and responsibilities, is difficult to understand, learn, or operate. 
Perceived ease of use and perceived complexity (the opposite of ease of use) have been used 
interchangeably in innovation diffusion literature (Davis, 1989; Igbaria, Parasuraman, & 
Baroudi, 1996). Due to the nature of ISPs, this study will investigate perceived complexity of 
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compliance with ISPs rather than perceived ease of use. Perceived complexity was identified 
by (Rogers, 1995) as one of five perceived characteristics of an innovation that influences 
adoption; trialability, observability, compatibility, relative advantage, and complexity. 
According to (Rogers, 1995, p. 257), perceived complexity is defined as “the degree to which 
an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use”. 
Perceived complexity has been widely investigated in human computer interaction literature 
and captures users’ personal interpretations of the systems and their interaction with it 
(Nadkarni & Gupta, 2007). A meta-analysis study by Tornatzky and Klein (1982) found that 
out of the 25 innovation characteristics, complexity was one of the most frequently studied by 
researchers, and was always found to be a significant factor. Users’ involvement is expected 
to be more critical where task and/or system complexity are higher (Mahmood, Burn, 
Gemoets, & Jacquez, 2000). Studies found that the higher the complexity the less the 
intention or the behavior toward using the system. For example, Chang and Cheung (2001) 
found that complexity negatively affected intention to use the Internet, and Igbaria et al. 
(1996) found that perceived complexity negatively affected system usage and perceived 
usefulness. Thompson, Higgins, and Howell (1994) found that as individuals become more 
experienced, they perceive they can handle the complexity of a computer. In an earlier study 
Thompson, Higgins, and Howell (1991) also reported a strong negative affect of perceived 
complexity on utilization of PCs. The TAM also proposed an indirect relationship between 
PEOU and behavioral intention through PU (Davis, 1989), and this relationship is 
hypothesized the same except the direction of the affect will be negative since complexity is 
the opposite of PEOU.  
Based on the previous literature that has investigated the effect of PEOU (opposite of PC) on 
behavioral intention in an IS domain and principally in information security compliance, and 
the discussion above, the following is hypothesized in the context of ISP compliance: 
Hypothesis H2a: An employee’s PC of ISPs will negatively affect intention to comply with 
the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H2b: An employee’s PC about complying with the organization’s ISPs 
negatively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
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Constructs Adapted from the Theory of Planned Behavior 
Subjective Norm 
Under the assumptions of TPB, an intention to perform a behavior is guided by three factors: 
beliefs about the likely consequences or other attributes of the behavior (behavioral beliefs), 
beliefs about the normative expectations of other people (normative beliefs), and beliefs about 
the presence of factors that may further or hinder performance of the behavior (control 
beliefs) (Ajzen, 1988, 2002b). Normative beliefs result in perceived social pressure or 
subjective norms (SN) (Ajzen, 2002a) which are defined as “the person’s perception of social 
pressure to perform or not perform the behavior under consideration” (Ajzen, 1988, p. 117). 
Davis et al. (1989) did not include subjective norm (SN) in the TAM as it is the least 
understood aspect of TRA, and it was also assumed that computer use was voluntary. Despite 
that, many studies incorporate the construct thereafter, where it was found to have a 
significant effect on intention in mandatory settings but not voluntary ones (Hartwick & 
Barki, 1994; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) refer to the causal mechanism underlying this effect as 
compliance. They posit that the direct compliance effect of SN on intention is theorized to 
operate whenever a person perceived that an important referent(s) wants him/her to perform a 
specific behavior, and that referent(s) has the ability to reward behavior or punish non-
behavior. 
Based on TRA and TBP, the direct relationship between subjective norm and behavioral 
intention is established on compliance, while TAM does not include SN. Technology 
Acceptance Model 2 (TAM2) incorporates two additional theoretical correlations by which 
SN has an influence on intention directly and indirectly through PU (Venkatesh & Davis, 
2000). Under this theoretical base, if a superior suggests that a particular system is useful, a 
person might believe it is actually useful and then form an intention to use it. Venkatesh and 
Bala (2008) found that the effect of subjective norm on behavioral intention was stronger in a 
mandatory setting and SN was a significant determinant of PU. In the information security 
domain, subjective norm was found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention to 
comply or use protective security measures (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010a; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b). Therefore based on the literature that has 
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investigated the relationships among the TBP, TAM2, and Technology Acceptance Model 3 
(TAM3) constructs, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
Hypothesis H3: An employee’s subjective norm about complying with the organization’s 
ISPs positively affects intention to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H4: An employee’s subjective norm in complying with the organization’s ISPs 
positively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
Self-Efficacy and Controllability (Perceived Behavioral Control) 
Perceived behavioral control (PBC) can function as a surrogate for actual control and 
contribute to the prediction of the behavior in question to the degree that people are realistic 
in their judgments of a behavior’s difficulty, and under the condition they have actual control 
over the behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002b). The concept of PBC was introduced to the TPB to 
overcome situations where behavior is mandatory or nonvolitional (Ajzen, 1991, 2002b). 
Empirical evidence shows that self-efficacy (SE) and controllability (C) can be manipulated 
and distinguished across behaviors (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006), however Ajzen (2002b, p. 
678) asserts that “the fact that it is possible to distinguish reliably between two different types 
of control - SE and controllability - does not invalidate the unitary nature of the [PBC] 
construct”. C and SE are separable components of Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) 
(Ajzen, 2002b), which will allow for a more detailed examination of external control beliefs 
(Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). These beliefs can reflect internal as well as external factors 
(Ajzen, 2002b). 
Self-efficacy (SE) is a construct that has been examined in an exploratory sense in studies 
pertaining to an individual’s use of IS (Rhee et al., 2009). Studies found that SE is a 
significant predictor of behavioral intention (e.g. Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Rhee et al., 2009; 
Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh & Davis, 1996). In the information security domain, SE was 
found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention to comply with ISPs or to use 
protective security measures (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Dinev & 
Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007). Self-
efficacy (SE) is defined as a “subjective probability that one is capable of executing a certain 
course of action” (Ajzen, 1988, p. 105). Consistent with this definition, this study defines SE 
as an employee’s confidence in their ability, skills, and knowledge about satisfying the 
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requirements of ISPs. Previous studies have empirically validated that SE has a significant 
positive effect on the PEOU (e.g. Agarwal, Sambamurthy, & Stair, 2000; Venkatesh, 2000), 
and on PU (Lai, 2009; Ong, Lai, & Wang, 2004; Ong & Lai, 2006). The confidence in one’s 
security related knowledge and abilities can be expected to serve as the basis for judgment 
about how easy or difficult compliance with an organization’s ISP will be, meaning that 
individuals with a high computer SE magnitude might expect themselves to be able to 
accomplish more difficult tasks or to complete them with less support and assistance 
(Venkatesh, 2000). In the same vein of TAM, PU reflects the person’s beliefs or expectations; 
therefore, SE might be an important factor affecting PU (Chau, 2001). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H5: An employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the organization’s ISPs 
positively affects PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H6: An employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the organization’s ISPs 
negatively affects PC to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
Controllability (C) is defined as "individual judgments about the availability of resources and 
opportunities to perform the behavior" (Ajzen, 2002b, p. 672; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006, p. 
119). The definitions of self-efficacy and controllability revealed that SE reflects internal 
personality factors, while C reflects beliefs about external factors (Dinev & Hu, 2007), 
however, there is no evidence to support this view (Ajzen, 2002b). According to Ajzen 
(2002b), some studies employed either one item or a mixture of both items, and debate 
surrounding the conceptualization of SE and C , and their relationship to PBC, still exists 
(Trafimow, Sheeran, Conner, & Finlay, 2002). Previous studies have demonstrated the 
combined set to be a better predictor of intentions (Ajzen, 2002b). Pavlou and Fygenson 
(2006) viewed PBC as a formative two-dimensional construct formed by two underlying 
indicators; SE and C. Controllability was found to be significant in predicting behavior but 
not intentions, while SE was found to be significant in predicting intentions (Ajzen, 2002). 
Relationships between C and PU and PEOU have been examined in previous studies. Kim, 
Park, and Oh (2008) found C to have an indirect impact on a respondent’s continued intention 
to use through its impact on PEOU. Trafimow et al. (2002) argue that if a behavior is not 
controllable, then there is not much need to consider performing it, suggesting that a higher 
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degree of controllability is an indication of a higher degree of certainty (Hu & Dinev, 2005), 
making individuals feel more comfortable to comply. Therefore, the following is 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H7: An employee’s controllability positively affects PUOP to comply with the 
requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H8: An employee’s controllability negatively affects PC to comply with the 
requirements of ISPs. 
Information Security Awareness 
User Awareness of Information Security  
Goodhue and Straub (1991) were the first scholars to denote the importance of awareness as a 
a factor in users’ beliefs about information security. They believed that computer abuse is a 
key problem that will not dwindle on its own, because “a lack of awareness of the danger may 
lead to weak vigilance by users and greater potential for abuse” (p. 14). They also argued that 
“… people who are more aware of the potential for abuse would be sensitized to the dangers 
of inadequate security and would more likely feel that security was unsatisfactory” (p. 15). 
Information Security Awareness (ISA) is defined as an “employee’s overall knowledge and 
understanding of potential issues related to information security and their ramifications” 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, p. 532). Employees are expected to be aware and knowledgeable of 
information security and cognizant of security technology, and should be able to formulate a 
general perception of what it entails. This definition is coherent with the belief that ISA is 
used to “refer to a state where users in an organization are aware of and ideally committed to 
their security mission” (Siponen, 2000, p. 31). 
An individual’s awareness and knowledge of information security is built from life 
experiences, such as having been attacked by a virus, opening unknown emails, being 
penalized for not complying to security policies and regulations, or obtaining information 
from external resources such as the Internet, newspapers, or security journals (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010a; Goodhue & Straub, 1991). Goodhue and Straub (1991) associated awareness to 
computer literacy and define awareness as years of experience, managerial level, and 
user/systems staff status. However, results reveal weak support of their hypothesis that users’ 
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awareness of the technology will cause them to have higher concern for security, and they 
attributed that to the fact that years of experience with information systems is a weak measure 
of security awareness. Fishbein (2008) argues that there are an infinite number of variables 
that may directly or indirectly influence the performance (or nonperformance) of any 
behavior. TPB posits that background factors (e.g., social, demographic, experience, 
knowledge, and values) may be related to or influence behavior indirectly by affecting 
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs (Ajzen, 2005). In this context, it can be argued that 
employees’ ISA, conceived of as a background factor, may play a role in the development of 
their outcome beliefs, along with compliance behavior. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H9a: An employee’s general ISA positively affects PUOP toward complying 
with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H9b: An employee’s general ISA negatively affects PC toward complying with 
the requirements of ISPs. 
Technology Awareness 
The second component of information security awareness (ISA) is users’ awareness of 
technological issues. Dinev and Hu (2007) define technology awareness as a “user’s raised 
consciousness of and interest in knowing about technological issues and strategies to deal 
with them” (p.391). It sounds very logical for employees to be aware of all issues surrounding 
compliance with ISPs before they form either negative or positive beliefs about that. 
Employees must make themselves aware of all potential threats and how compliance with 
ISPs help protect information assets, and they also must be aware of the consequences of 
noncompliance, and of the availability and effectiveness of protective technology (Dinev & 
Hu, 2007). As the concept of awareness first appeared in the innovation diffusion theory 
(Rogers, 1995), general information security awareness and technology awareness was 
explained in the framework of an innovation-decision process, in which knowledge influences 
persuasion, which in turn influences decisions. In this context, ISA can be viewed as 
knowledge, perceptions (usefulness and complexity) as persuasion, and intention to comply as 
a decision. Building on this process, employees can gain significant “awareness knowledge” 
about different information security threats and protective technologies, along with 
knowledge about how and what they are supposed to do with regard to information security, 
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which will subsequently lead to compliance behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a). Accordingly, 
knowledge of information security threats can be viewed as general information security 
awareness, and knowledge about what employees are supposed to do can be viewed as 
technology awareness. 
Based on this argument, as ISA (knowledge) influences perceptions of usefulness and 
complexity (persuasion) which, in turn, influences the decision to comply with the ISP, the 
following is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H10a: An employee’s Technology Awareness positively affects PUOP toward 
complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H10b: An employee’s Technology Awareness negatively affects PC toward 
complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
User’s Awareness of Security Countermeasures 
Security policies 
According to Straub (1990), security countermeasures include both deterrent and preventive 
controls. Security policies, SETA programs, and monitoring practices were identified as 
deterrent controls that can be used by organizations to prevent information systems misuse 
(Straub, 1990). The direct effect of these countermeasures on IS misuse intention has been 
reported by D'Arcy and Hovav (2009) and D'Arcy et al. (2009). Information security policy is 
defined as a “state of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the 
information and technology resources of their organizations” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a, pp. 526-
527). Organizations develop security policies to ensure the security of information assets and 
to encourage end-user behavior that helps protect information assets from threats posed to 
them. Accordingly, if an organization’s end-users are not eager or are unwilling to comply 
with security policies, then these efforts are useless (Herath & Rao, 2009b). Literature in 
information security policies shows a need for empirical studies on security compliance 
(Herath & Rao, 2009b). 
Previous studies have shown that awareness of ISPs will decrease the behavioral intention to 
systems misuse (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub, 1990). Herath and Rao 
(2009b) found that if users perceive that their compliance has a positive effect on the 
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organization, they are more likely to have a positive attitude toward the security policies. 
Security policy can be best utilized by making sure that users understand it and accept 
necessary precautions (D'Arcy et al., 2009). So in order to improve security efforts, policies 
regarding proper and improper use of IS should be established, and then should be taught to 
the users. The more detailed these policies are, and the more the users are aware and educated 
about acceptable system use (Straub, 1990), the greater the employees’ perceptions about the 
usefulness of protecting the IS, and the less their perception of complexity. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H11: An employee’s awareness of IS security policies positively affects PUOP 
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H12: An employee’s awareness of IS security policies negatively affects PC 
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
SETA Program 
Organizations develop different measures to manage and control systems misuse; SETA 
programs are a form of security countermeasure that educating users about has significant 
security benefits (Dhillon, 1999; Straub & Welke, 1998). Awareness campaigns and 
education help modify certain behaviors such as illegal drunk driving and shoplifting (D’Arcy 
et al., 2009). Such training and awareness programs are extremely important in developing 
“trusted” members of the organization (Dhillon, 1999). In the same context, the ongoing 
SETA programs convey knowledge about threats in the organizational environment; they help 
reduce system abuse and promote compliance with the ISPs by providing information about 
the appropriate use of IS, as well as the disciplinary actions taken by the firm, including 
policies and sanctions for violations. They also provide the necessary knowledge of 
enforcement activities, and reveal threats to local systems and their vulnerability to attack 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998; Wybo & Straub, 1989). According to Straub and 
Welke (1998, p. 445), the wisdom behind SETA programs is to “convince potential abusers 
that the company is serious about security and will not take intentional breaches of this 
security lightly”. 
To increase users’ awareness, ongoing education and training programs should be developed 
and maintained (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). According to Whitman and Mattord (2009), 
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SETA programs are designed to improve an organization’s information security by improving 
employees’ awareness of the needs to protect information resources, and developing users’ 
knowledge and skills to perform more secure tasks. SETA programs are rooted in information 
security policy (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Peltier, 2005) and can take many forms, such as 
reviewing an organization’s code of conduct (Harrington, 1996), or more general strategies 
that promote awareness of day-to-day security issues (Furnell et al., 2002). Based on that, and 
on the fact that SETA programs are designed to enhance employees’ awareness, knowledge, 
and education of all security issues that will help them to comply with the requirements of the 
ISPs, we posit that SETA programs will increase employees’ perceptions about the usefulness 
of compliance with ISPs and help overcome the hurdles and complexity with compliance. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H13: An employee’s awareness of SETA programs positively affects PUOP 
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H14: An employee’s awareness of SETA programs negatively affects PC 
toward complying with the requirements of ISPs. 
Monitoring Practices 
Mangers seek to reduce the sources of noncompliance behaviors with ISPs and look for 
solutions to help with this quest. In response to that, organizations use monitoring practices to 
increase and enforce employees’ compliance with rules and regulations (Urbaczewski & 
Jessup, 2002) and distribute information about organizational guidelines for acceptable 
system usage (Straub, 1990). Monitoring practices has two basic uses; providing feedback and 
implementing control. The feedback function intends to monitor employees so as to provide 
them with necessary suggestions for improvement. Monitoring for control is aimed at 
employee observation in order to foster compliance with rules and regulations (Urbaczewski 
& Jessup, 2002). When monitoring was used to give employees feedback on productivity 
while ignoring the control scenario, Chalykoff and Kochan (1989) found that for some 
employees the negative effects of monitoring are inherent, while for others its negative impact 
can be mitigated by attention to feedback processes. Another study found that employee task 
performance improved when they were monitored; either by a person or through computer 
monitoring (George, 1996). A question to be asked here is; can monitoring be conducted to 
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increase employees’ perceived usefulness of protection and eventually form a desirable 
behavior toward compliance with ISPs? 
To gain conformity with rules and regulations, organizations adopt monitoring practices 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002) using different techniques to achieve this, 
including security audit, tracking users’ internet usage, and recording network activities 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009). Studies have found that monitoring practices lead to a decrease in 
information resource misuse as it enables the detection of serious and deliberate misuse 
incidents that are likely subject to severe punishment (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Nance, 
1990).  
In this study, monitoring practices have been investigated as a security countermeasure ; 
“policing” in order to gain compliance with rules and regulations, such as monitoring email 
traffic and Internet use, as well as other network activities (Panko & Beh, 2002; Urbaczewski 
& Jessup, 2002). Accordingly, in this study, it is argued that the use of monitoring practices 
from a policing perspective will increase the difficulty and complexity of compliance with the 
ISPs, and will affect employees’ perceived usefulness of protection since they have no 
immediate benefits for them in terms of job performance and satisfaction Therefore, we 
hypothesized: 
Hypothesis H15: An employee’s awareness of monitoring practices negatively affects 
PUOP to comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
Hypothesis H16: An employee’s awareness of monitoring practices positively affects PC to 
comply with the requirements of ISPs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter addresses the methodology of the study, and begins by discussing the research 
design, followed by the presentation of the instrument design and a validation of the survey 
instrument. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the sampling and data collection 
procedure.  
Research Design 
The current study model, the Security Acceptance Model (SAM), is based on the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The basic premise 
of these theories is that behavioral intention is a function of perception, attitude, and 
perceived behavioral control. Such constructs are hard to observe and measure directly as they 
represent an internal state, and therefore are “measured through indirect indicators, such as 
verbal expressions or overt behavior” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 308). Considering it “is difficult to 
get accurate information about internal states, such as attitudes or emotions, with anything 
other than self-reports” (Spector, 2006, p. 229), and since “self-reports of participants via 
surveys, questionnaires, and interviews are a very common way to gather data in almost all of 
the social sciences” (Kline, Sulsky, & Rever-Moriyama, 2000), self-reports were utilized to 
measure all study constructs. People are expected to be able to report many internal states, 
including attitudes, emotions, perceptions, and values (Spector, 2006). 
A field study approach was used to test the research model over a controlled experimental 
design since it was argued that experimental and case researchers were less likely to validate 
their instruments than field study researchers (Straub, 1989). Field studies according to 
Kerlinger (1973) are described as strong in realism, significant, and encompassing heuristic 
quality. Field study can be defined as "any scientific studies, large or small, that 
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systematically pursue relations and test hypotheses, that are ex post facto, and that are done in 
life situations like communities, schools, factories, organizations, and institutions" (Kerlinger, 
1973, p. 405). Unlike controlled designs where experimental treatment and manipulation of 
the independent variables can happen, field studies are “non-experimental inquires occurring 
in natural systems where researchers cannot manipulate independent variables or control the 
influence of confounding variables” (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001, p. 3). 
For data collection techniques in field studies, a questionnaire is the most common method 
used (Boudreau et al., 2001), as it provides a “quick, inexpensive, efficient, and accurate 
means of assessing information about the population” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 175), and findings 
can be generalized to the population studied (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993). However, 
different shortcomings are associated with this method, such as a weak questionnaire design, 
and potential issues with sampling procedures and sampling size, survey administration, and 
pretest of the questionnaires (Boudreau et al., 2001). To overcome these pitfalls, an extensive 
survey of literature regarding ISPs and compliance behavior was reviewed. In addition, 
having clearly defined independent and dependent variables, and a specific model of the 
expected relationships among these variables (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993), are important 
requirements to help enhance the research design. Finally, well-researched, known, and used 
theories [the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM)], have been utilized as a theoretical framework for this study. The research model 
depicted in Figure 4 contains strong a priori theoretical relationships as specified by these 
theories, and supported, when needed, with other theoretical frameworks. Constructs of the 
study were developed from previously validated instruments, which have been standardized 
and adapted to the context of this study. To ensure greater reliability and validity, the survey 
instrument was refined based on feedback obtained from information security faculty 
members in the United States and Jordan, as well as from a number of employees working at 
a variety of banks in Jordan. Based on the feedback, several items were reviewed and 
modified. A pretest of the refined questionnaire was conducted to evaluate the reliability and 
validity, using a confirmatory factor analysis (Al-Omari, El-Gayar, & Deokar, 2012). 
The study design can be classified as a non-experimental, cross-sectional survey design in 
which all data were collected at once. Using Campell and Stanley (1963), the research design 
is diagrammed as follows: 
64 
 
 X O 
Where X is the “treatment” and O is an observation. In the context of the current study, the 
treatment is having an information security policy at the organization. 
Survey Instrument Design 
An initial survey instrument was developed by identifying and creating appropriate 
measurements based on a comprehensive literature review. The survey instrument is based on 
constructs validated and tested in prior research (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy et al., 2009; 
Davis, 1989; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Rhee et al., 2009; Siponen et 
al., 2010), standardized and adapted to the context of this study. According Straub (1989) 
using validated and tested items will improve the reliability of results. The constructs include 
intention to comply, PUOP, PC, users’ awareness of general information security, technology 
awareness, subjective norm and users’ awareness of ISPs, SETA programs, and computer 
monitoring. The instrument also collected key demographic information. All constructs were 
measured reflectivity with multiple items on seven-point Likert scales. A pretest and pilot test 
were conducted to ensure the conceptual precision and face validity of the constructs. Table 
4.1 presents all of the study constructs along with the types, source, and number of their 
measurement items. A complete version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B. 
Table 4.1: Sources of Measurement Items 
Construct Type Source Items 
Intention to Comply Reflective Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and Siponen 
et al. (2010) 
7 
Perceived Usefulness of Protection Reflective Davis (1989) 13 
Perceived Complexity Reflective Davis (1989) 12 
Self-Efficacy Reflective Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and Herath 
and Rao (2009b) 
6 
Controllability Reflective Dinev and Hu (2007) and Rhee et 
al. (2009) 
4 
User Awareness of General Information Security    
General Information Security Awareness Reflective Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and  3 
Technology Awareness Reflective Dinev and Hu (2007) 4 
User Awareness of Information Security Policies Reflective D'Arcy (2005); D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
and Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) 
9 
User Awareness of SETA Program Reflective D'Arcy (2005), and D'Arcy et al. 
(2009) 
9 
User Awareness of Computer Monitoring Reflective D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al. 
(2009) 
7 
Subjective Norm Reflective  Herath and Rao (2009b) 5 
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Demographics: To identify and describe the characteristics of the participants, some 
demographic variables were collected, including gender, age, educational level, total years of 
experience, and years of experience in the current bank. Other demographic variables related 
to the work were collected as well, including the number of hours of using the computer at 
work, the organizational hierarchal level, and the type of software or databases used in the 
work site. Although some previous studies investigated the effect of demographic variables 
(control variables) on policy compliance or system abuse, no hypotheses were developed in 
this study regarding this; demographic information was merely used to describe the study 
sample. 
Intention to comply: Intention to comply is measured with seven items, five of which were 
adopted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) and two from Siponen et al. (2010). The items assess 
employees’ behavioral intention to comply with the requirements of the ISPs of their bank, 
and the employees’ intention to carry out their responsibilities as described in the bank’s ISP 
to protect information and technology resources. It also assesses their intention to recommend 
and assist others in complying with ISPs. Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) reported a reliability higher 
than .88 for the three items, and Siponen et al. (2010) reported values exceeding the suggested 
threshold of 0.60 for three items. Participants were asked to indicate the degree of their 
behavioral intention to compliance on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with higher scores indicating higher behavioral intention. 
Perceived usefulness of protection: Perceived usefulness of protection is measured with a 
thirteen-item scale adapted from Davis (1989). The items measure three main things 
pertaining to usefulness of compliance to enhance protection; compliance effectiveness, 
productivity and time savings, and importance of compliance to one's job. Perceived 
usefulness was investigated by three researchers in the security domain. Dinev and Hu (2007) 
reported a reliability of 0.81 for the three items, Xue et al. (2010) reported a reliability of .84, 
and finally, Jones (2009) reported a reliability of 0.95. In the IS field, this construct has been 
used extensively and validated, and it has been found to be a rigorous and reliable construct 
(Lee et al., 2003). Participants were asked to indicate their behavioral intention to compliance 
degree on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), 
with higher scores indicating higher perceptions of usefulness of protection. 
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Perceived complexity: Perceived complexity is measured with a twelve-item scale adapted 
from Davis (1989). The items measure three main complexities; physical effort, mental effort, 
and perceptions of how complex compliance is to learn and do. The majority of the studies in 
the information systems domain investigated the perception of ease of use, and the results 
always revealed a high reliability coefficient (Lee et al., 2003). In the security domain Dinev 
and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of 0.81 for the three items, Xue et al. (2010) reported a 
reliability of .90, and finally, Jones (2009) reported a reliability of 0.92. Participants were 
asked to indicate their behavioral intention to compliance degree on a seven-point Likert 
scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7), with higher scores indicating 
higher perceptions of complexity to comply with ISP. 
Self-efficacy: Self-efficacy is measured using six items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) 
and Herath and Rao (2009b). The first three items assessed employees’ confidence in their 
personal skills, knowledge, or competency about fulfilling the requirements of ISPs, whereas 
the other three items assessed their confidence in their ability to comply with the requirements 
of the ISPs on their own. This construct has been investigated in the IS field and is found to 
be a significant predictor of behavioral intention (Lee et al., 2003) Likewise, this construct 
was found to be a significant predictor of behavioral intention in the information security 
domain as well (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Siponen et al., 2007). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on 
a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
Controllability: Controllability is measured using four items, three of which were adapted 
from Dinev and Hu (2007), and the fourth from Rhee et al. (2009). Items assess respondents’ 
judgment about the availability and capability of resources, and opportunities to comply with 
the requirements of ISPs. Dinev and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of .92 for a three-item 
scale. Response options for the items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging 
from (1) strongly disagrees to (7) strongly agree. 
General information security awareness: General information security awareness is 
measured using three items adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a). The items assess 
respondents’ overall knowledge and understanding of all probable matters related to 
information security and their consequences and complications. Bulgurcu et al. (2008) and 
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Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) reported a reliability higher than 0.90 for the three item scale. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
Technology awareness: Four items were used to measure technology awareness adapted from 
Dinev and Hu (2007). The construct items measure respondents’ perception of and interest in 
knowing about technological issues and strategies that help them comply with the 
requirements of the ISP, so they can help protect the organization’s information assets. Dinev 
and Hu (2007) reported a reliability of .93 for this four-item scale. In another study, Dinev et 
al. (2009) investigated the effect of technology awareness on intentional behavior in different 
countries and reported a high reliability value of .86 in South Korea. Respondents were asked 
to indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
User awareness of information security policies: User awareness of information security 
policies is measured with nine items, seven of which were adapted from D'Arcy (2005), and 
the other from Bulgurcu et al. (2010a). The items measure respondents’ knowledge and 
understanding of the requirements established in the bank’s ISP and the aim of those 
requirements. Researchers reported a high reliability score for this construct; for example, 
D'Arcy (2005) reported a reliability of .89 for a seven-item scale. Respondents were asked to 
rate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the items on a seven-point scale, 
ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
User awareness of SETA program: The security, education, training, and awareness program 
is measured with nine items, eight of those adapted from D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al. 
(2009), with the ninth being developed for this study. These items measure respondents’ 
awareness of education and training programs at their organization that help improve their 
compliance behavior and enhance their awareness of information security issues. D'Arcy 
(2005) reported a reliability of .88 for the eight-item scale. Respondents were asked to 
indicate their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7). 
User awareness of computer monitoring: User awareness of monitoring practices is 
measured with seven items adapted from D'Arcy (2005) and D'Arcy et al. (2009). These items 
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assess the respondents’ awareness of monitoring practices that include, but are not limited to, 
tracking users’ internet usage and recording network activities. D'Arcy (2005) reported a 
reliability of .87 for the seven-item scale. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(7). 
Subjective norm: Five items were used to measure the subjective norm adapted from Herath 
and Rao (2009b). These items assess respondents’ perceptions of social pressure about 
compliance with the requirements of the bank’s ISP, which is a result of their beliefs about 
how important people would like them to behave in this regard. High reliability scores were 
recorded in the IS field and in information security; Herath and Rao (2009b) reported a 
reliability score higher than .88 for the five-item scale. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7). 
Survey Instrument Validation 
Face and Content Validity 
Boudreau et al. (2001) argued that each instrument must be pretested as a primary step to 
eliminate any unexpected future difficulties. Therefore, a pretest of the study instrument was 
conducted with a group of specialists from the United States and Jordan. The questionnaire 
was sent to a carefully selected group of information security researchers and faculty 
members in the United States and Jordan (Five MIS faculty members and researchers in the 
US and five MIS faculty members in Jordan), and to a number of employees working at 
variety of banks in Jordan (Five individuals), to see whether the items seemed like a good 
translation of the construct. Each one of these individuals received an electronic copy of the 
drafted questionnaire along with an explanation of the purpose of the study, study questions, 
and construct definitions. They were asked to respond to the survey by indicating the 
appropriateness of the item in measuring the construct, and if the item was not appropriate, 
they were asked to recommend changing or deleting it, or recommending other items. They 
were also asked to comment on the content and structure of the instrument as a whole. 
Employees were asked to focus and comment more on the understandability of the 
69 
 
questionnaire items, language issues, level of difficulty, and implication issues related to ISPs, 
than were the faculty and researchers. 
Unfortunately, only seven out of ten questionnaires were returned to the researcher from the 
faculty, and two from banks employees. The feedback focused primarily on language issues 
and suggested revising the wording of some of the questions to eliminate ambiguity. The 
survey instrument was refined based on the feedback obtained and several items were 
reviewed and modified. To make sure that all recommended feedback was taken into account, 
the questionnaire was sent to one MIS faculty member in the US and one faculty and one 
bank’s employee in Jordan to confirm that the changes enhanced the readability and 
understandability of the instrument, in addition to confirming if the items measured the target 
constructs. The result of the pretest suggested that the instrument possesses both types of 
translation validity; face and content. 
Construct and Discriminant Validity 
After the pretest, a pilot study was conducted on a convenience sample of 205 employees 
from four different banks in Jordan. The pilot test served several purposes. First, it helped 
ensure that the time needed for filling out the survey was reasonable. Second, the data 
collected from this pilot group were analyzed and used in calculating different validity 
measures. 
In order to assess the measurement quality of the eleven reflective scales, convergent validity, 
reliability, and discriminant validity were calculated. The distribution of all variables was 
analyzed, and it was found that all variables included in the model were normally distributed. 
Later, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted to calculate measurement quality of 
the constructs. The number of factors was left to be defined by the Eigenvalue, which 
produced 11 factors (all their Eigenvalues are greater than 1.00) which are the number of 
constructs included in the model. All 11 factors accounted for 63.2% of the total variance. 
To provide an adequate basis for proceeding to an empirical examination of adequacy for 
factor analysis at the overall level, as well as for each variable, an inspection of the correlation 
matrix was done. This revealed that most of the correlations are significant at 0.01 level. 
Bartlett’s test was used to assess the overall significance of the correlation matrix and found 
to be significant at the 0.0001 level. To assess the patterns between variables, the measure of 
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sampling adequacy (MSA) was computed. The overall MSA value was 0.788, which is higher 
than the acceptable range (above 0.50) (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2009). As 
for each variable, MSA values were also found to be higher than the acceptable threshold of 
0.50 (Hair et al., 2009). 
To measure convergent validity, factor analysis was performed using the principal component 
extraction method, followed by orthogonal varimax rotation. Convergent validity captures 
how well the measurement items relate to the construct, and it is acceptable if factor loadings 
of each measurement item with the one construct it is related to is at 0.70 or higher, and each 
item loads significantly on its latent construct (Gefen & Straub, 2005). The unrotated 
component analysis factor matrix revealed that some of the items did not load highly on their 
hypothesized factor or on any other factors. Varimax rotation was performed based on this 
observation, and most of the items loaded well on their latent constructs. Items that had low 
factor loadings or those that cross loaded on other factors were removed from the analysis. 
Results from the final rotated factor pattern matrix indicate that all items loaded with 
significant t-values on their respective latent constructs and have loading values above 0.70. 
Therefore, all these reflective scales exhibit sound convergent validity (Gefen & Straub, 2005; 
Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). 
To confirm the scale reliability and internal consistency, composite reliability (CR) and 
average variance extracted (AVE) for the pilot study was examined. A scale is deemed to be 
reliable if it has CR above 0.70 and an AVE of more than 0.50 (Gefen et al., 2000). Results 
show that all the reflective scales were reliable. To establish discriminant validity, both the 
loading and cross loading matrix and the correlation matrix were examined (see Al-Omari et 
al., 2012). All measurement items found to load more strongly on their respective construct 
than on other constructs, which were found to be less than 0.50 for all items in the study 
(Gefen et al., 2000). Second, Table 4.2 shows that the square root of AVE of each construct is 
higher than the correlations between that construct and any other construct (inter-correlations) 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in the table, all constructs in the model satisfy these 
criteria for discriminant validity. Consequently, the measurement tool demonstrates adequate 
reliability and validity required for further data collection for testing the hypotheses. 
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Table 4.2: Composite Reliability, AVE, and Latent Variable Correlations 
 CR AVE MPA Cont. GISA IC ISPA PC PUOP SE SETA SN TA 
MPA 0.876 0.780 0.883                     
Cont. 0.865 0.783 0.123 0.885                   
GISA 0.841 0.838 0.134 0.333 0.916                 
IC 0.823 0.787 0.123 0.150 0.394 0.887               
ISPA 0.826 0.796 0.201 0.276 0.415 0.266 0.892             
PC 0.832 0.775 0.168 0.242 0.443 0.260 0.374 0.880           
PU 0.892 0.683 0.124 0.253 0.358 0.253 0.368 0.376 0.826         
SE 0.905 0.767 0.136 0.268 0.325 0.352 0.294 0.259 0.161 0.876       
SETA 0.837 0.880 0.246 0.058 0.122 0.217 0.225 0.170 0.117 0.133 0.938     
SN 0.837 0.769 0.030 0.043 0.009 0.041 0.075 0.036 0.098 0.050 0.035 0.877   
TA 0.865 0.798 0.202 0.254 0.269 0.301 0.379 0.474 0.310 0.339 0.083 0.051 0.893 
CR = Composite reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; MP = Monitoring Practices; Cont. = 
Controllability; GISA = General Information Security Awareness; IC = Intention to Comply; ISPA = Information 
Security Awareness; PC = Perceived Complexity; PU = Perceived Usefulness of Protection; SE = Self-Efficacy to 
Comply; SETA = Security, Education, Training and Awareness; SN = Subjective Norms; TA = Security 
Awareness. 
Diagonal elements in bold display the square root of AVE. 
 
Finally, a paper presenting the pilot test results was published (Al-Omari et al., 2012). Results 
revealed that all constructs in the model satisfy the criteria for discriminant validity, and that 
all the reflective scales were reliable. 
Sampling and Data Collection 
Sample Size 
Representativeness of the sample and correctly choosing the appropriate sample size is very 
critical as it can significantly weaken the generality of the findings (Boudreau et al., 2001) 
and influence the detection power of the significant relationships and interactions. Statistical 
tests with larger sample sizes are more likely to be overly sensitive, whereas for a small 
sample size, statistical tests will be insensitive and fail to detect even large effects (Hair et al., 
2009; Straub, 1989). However, the smaller the sample size the less its precision (Boudreau et 
al., 2001), and the harder to determine whether findings are generalizable or peculiar to the 
case (Poole & DeSanctis, 2004). Since statistical significance reflects sample size and effect 
size, two studies might have different results and conclusions using the same model, as a 
result of having two different sample sizes (Biddle & Marlin, 1987; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
Therefore, an appropriate sample size should be selected; not so small that only large effects 
are detectable, nor so large that it is overly sensitive and detects small effects of little 
scientific importance. 
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Inferences in cross-sectional self-report survey studies are made from a sample which is 
believed to be representative of the population. The precision of the inference is highly 
dependent on the degree to which the information available in a sample reflects population 
information. The general rule is that the larger the sample size the “more information is 
available and, therefore, more confidence can be expressed for the model as a reflection of the 
population process” (Tanaka, 1987, p. 134). The question is how large of a sample is required 
to be representative, or more specifically, to deduce research findings back to a population? 
Unfortunately, there is no precise answer for this question as recommendations vary 
drastically. Gorsuch (1983) proposed a ratio of 5 participants per measured variable and that 
the sample size should be higher than 100. Hair et al. (2009) suggested that sample size 
should be a minimum of 200 participants and recommended that researchers should always 
try to obtain the highest cases-per-variable ratio. Everitt (1975) suggested a ratio of 10 
participants per measured variable. Bentler and Chou (1987) provide a rule of thumb that 
under normal distribution the ratio of sample size to number of variables should be 10:1 to 
obtain significant tests. 
 Obviously there is no consensus between researchers and methodologists on a “rule of 
thumb” that can be relied upon to determine the best sample size. Hair et al. (2009) argued 
that these “previous guidelines … are no longer appropriate” (p. 635); they suggested model 
complexity and basic measurement model characteristics should determine the sample size. 
Partial Lease Square (PLS) was used to analyze the data. One guideline for setting sample 
size in PLS according to Gefen et al. (2000) requires a sample size of ten times the most 
complex construct in the model. Accordingly, if the most complex relationship involved a 
construct with six formative indicators, the required minimum sample size would be 60. 
Based on the previous discussion, and with a fairly complex model with ten or more 
constructs, most with seven or more observable items, and following Hair et al. (2009) 
recommendation, a minimum sample of 800 was needed to test the study model. 
Data Collection 
Most of the previous IS literature on ISP compliance or misuse has focused solely on IS 
employees (Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Li, Zhang, et 
al., 2010; e.g. Siponen et al., 2007; e.g. Straub, 1990). This study reflects a large number of 
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bank employees who are required to comply with their bank’s ISPs. The population for the 
current study is all employees, who speak and understand English, and who are working at 
any bank in Jordan that already has a developed ISP that they are currently using The target 
sample was a large mix of employees from different banks working in different departments 
(i.e., tellers, research and design, marketing and sales, and information technology) at 
different hierarchal levels (i.e., non-managerial, line management, senior, and CEOs), with 
various years of experiences at a bank. 
The study participants were bank employees for several reasons. First, banks are a prime 
target for hackers, given that they maintain important information about customers, and have 
access to large amounts of monetary assets. Second, banks employ individuals with a diverse 
range of ages, education levels, and job titles, which allows for a representative sample. 
Finally, banks are heavy users of information technology, networks, and the Internet. 
The data were gathered from Jordan for a few reasons. First, Jordan is the home country of the 
researcher, giving him access to different sectors such as banking and education. Second, 
Jordan is considered one of the largest computer user countries in the Middle East after UAE. 
Third, Jordan has a strong banking system that started to employ technology quite a while 
ago. Finally, Jordan is now starting to be a prime target for hackers because of the current 
absence of detailed regulations and laws in place to protect information resources in banks. 
A list of all banks in Jordan that have ISPs in action were developed based on the researcher’s 
personal contact, and through various contacts obtained from Dr. Aleassa, at Yarmouk 
University in Jordan, who also administered the questionnaire distribution. An email was sent 
to about twenty large bank administrators (either CEO or chief information officer or human 
resource department), which described the benefits and costs involved in participating in this 
research. Approximately one week after the email, each executive/manager was contacted by 
the researcher or by the survey administrator, and their willingness to participate in the 
research was determined. Thirteen large banks agreed to participate, but the rest declined for 
various reasons, such as time constraints and security concerns. Of the thirteen banks, nine 
were found to have a written and clear ISP under action, with most of their employees being 
fluent in English. The executive/manager from the nine banks was asked to provide a name of 
the contact person who would serve as a liaison with the researcher and the survey 
administrator, and facilitate the survey administration. Each designated contact person was 
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given an abstract description of the purpose of the study and the questionnaire, along with 
instructions for survey distribution. Specifically, the contact persons were instructed on the 
concept of random sampling and asked to randomly select a sample of employees from 
different departments, at different hierarchal levels, and with different years of experience and 
educational levels. They were also asked to equally survey both males and females.  
Although a paper-based survey is expensive, and slow and difficult to deliver to respondents 
at different geographical locations, it was still selected as a method for collecting data because 
banks do not have business emails for their employees for security reasons, most 
communication with employees is done on paper or by phone, and most importantly, the 
researcher was told by some banks’ CEOs that they do not have a list of personal emails for 
their employees, also for security reasons. In July – October of 2010, the researcher provided 
the instrument to the survey administrator who made copies with a “cover letter” attached to 
each copy. The survey administrator delivered about 150 copies for each contacted person at 
the nine banks, who then personally distributed the questionnaire to the randomly selected 
employees in the different bank branches. The cover letter emphasized the anonymous nature 
and confidentiality of the survey, and explained that participation was voluntary and 
withdrawing from the study was possible at any time without any consequences. The survey 
administrator contacted the liaison person within each bank approximately every week and 
collected the completed questionnaires and provided him with more copies when needed. As a 
primary screening process, participants were asked about their awareness of the existence of 
the ISPs and about their fluency in the English language. Only those participants that 
indicated some awareness with ISPs and those that were fluent in English were included in 
the survey study. 
Two thousand one hundred and seventeen (2117) employees received the questionnaire, and 
nine hundred and thirty seven (937) filled it out, for an initial response rate of 44 percent. The 
researcher went over every questionnaire and deleted incomplete or unusable entries from the 
dataset. Every questionnaire that was less than 90 percent completed (Meaning that it was 
missing at least one question from each construct) was discarded. Of the questionnaires that 
were completed, a check question was used to see if the respondents fully read and 
understood the questionnaire. If the answers were contradictory, the questionnaire was 
discarded. A total of 878 questionnaires were found to be usable, for a response rate of 41 
percent. 
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A random sample of employees at different job levels and in different departments at nine 
banks was taken. Usually a sample size of 10 to 20 percent of all employees is used with this 
type of sampling technique. According to Hair et al. (2009), a general rule is to have at least 
five times as many observations as the number of variables to be analyzed, and a more 
acceptable sample size would have a 10:1 ratio. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) requires 
a larger sample relative to other multivariate approaches; Hair et al. (2009) stated “when the 
number of factors are larger than six, some of which use fewer than three measured items as 
indicators, and multiple low communalities are present, sample size requirements may exceed 
500” (p. 742).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter presents the data analysis and results of the hypotheses tests. The chapter begins 
with a description of the study sample, along with the initial instrument validation. The Partial 
Least Square (PLS) is used to test the validity and reliability of the instrument, and a 
description of the hypothesized relationships in the research model is presented. Finally, 
results of the PLS analysis is presented for the structural model. 
Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics 
Employees at banks in Jordan which have developed ISPs in action represented the study 
population. A random sample was collected from employees working in nine different banks. 
Table 5.1 contains the demographic profile of the survey participants. 
As shown in table 5.1, of the 878 respondents in the final sample, 44% were female, 68.9% 
were in the 20-29 age range, 62.8% held a bachelor’s degree, and more than 16% held 
advanced degrees. The majority of the sample (54.6%) had 1 to 5 total years of experience. 
The table also shows a diverse distribution of jobs in various departments at different 
organizational levels; 25.9% were in middle management and 3.4% were CEO/president. The 
average length of computer usage was 9.93 years, the average use of the computer at work 
was 6.29 hours per days, and the average period of speaking English was 10.44 years. 
Participants reported using different computer software such as spreadsheets, word processing 
packages, e-mail, programming languages, database applications, and their bank’s special 
tailored software. The sample was quite evenly distributed in terms of the responsibilities of 
the respondents and in terms of the managerial level. The data collected represents a diverse 
employee population since it includes employees from local as well as international banks in 
Jordan. 
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Table 5.1: Sample Characteristics 
Variable Category Frequency Percentage 
Sex Male 492 56.0% 
Female 386 44.0% 
Age 20-29 ears 605 68.9% 
30-39 years 175 19.9% 
40-49 years 66 7.5% 
≥ 50 years 32 3.6% 
Educational level High School 61 6.9% 
Collage 122 13.9% 
Bachelor's Degree 551 62.8% 
Master's Degree 119 13.6% 
Doctoral Degree 25 2.8% 
Experience 1-5 years 479 54.6% 
6-10 years 181 20.6% 
11-15 years 72 8.2% 
16-20 years 95 10.8% 
More than 20 years 51 5.8% 
Years of experience with 
the current bank 
Less than 6 months 142 16.2% 
6 months to 1 year 62 7.1% 
1 to 2 years 146 16.6% 
2 to 4 years 128 14.6% 
4 to 6 years 147 16.7% 
6 to 10 years 141 16.1% 
10 to 15 years 60 6.8% 
More than 15 years 52 5.9% 
Functional area of work Teller 160 18.2% 
Administration/Clerical 171 19.5% 
Information Technology 257 29.3% 
Audit 76 8.7% 
Marketing and Sales 132 15.0% 
Credit Department 82 9.3% 
Organizational level Non-management 238 27.1% 
Line Management (supervising non-management personnel) 188 21.4% 
Middle Management 227 25.9% 
Senior Management 142 16.2% 
Executive/Senior Vice President 53 6.0% 
CEO/President 30 3.4% 
Computer software used 
for job-related work 
Spreadsheets (e.g., Microsoft Excel) 564 64.2% 
Word processing (e.g., Microsoft Word) 589 67.1% 
E-mail 638 72.7% 
Programming languages (e.g., C++, Java, Visual Basic) 244 27.8% 
Application packages (e.g., accounting or payroll software) 201 22.9% 
Database applications 236 26.9% 
Bank’s special tailored software 398 45.3% 
Computer use at work 
(hrs./day) 
Mean 6.29 
Std. Deviation 2.67 
For how long you have 
been using the computer 
Mean 9.93 
Std. Deviation 5.73 
For how long you have 
been speaking English 
Mean 10.44 
Std. Deviation 7.53 
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Initial Assessment of Validity and Reliability 
As a first step in the analysis, and before proceeding with testing the research model and 
hypotheses, the validity and reliability of the constructs were assessed. A construct will be 
considered valid if both convergent and discriminant validity are achieved (Straub, Boudreau, 
& Gefen, 2004; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). Convergent validity means that “each 
measurement item correlates strongly with the one construct it is related to, while correlating 
weakly or not significantly with all other constructs, while discriminant validity is shown 
when each measurement item correlates weakly with all other constructs except for the one to 
which it is theoretically associated” (Gefen & Straub, 2005, p. 92). Reliability is concerned 
with measurement accuracy, and is "the extent to which the respondent can answer the same 
questions or close approximations the same way each time" (Straub, 1989, p. 151). To assess 
convergent validity, both item loading on constructs and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
need to be calculated. AVE measures the variance captured by the latent construct. As a rule 
of thumb, AVE should be more than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005). 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
As recommended by Heck (1998), EFA was conducted as an essential first step in data 
analysis when relationships among observed indicators and underlying factors are not tested 
or investigated beforehand. EFA basically classifies the essential latent variables that explain 
the pattern of correlations within a set of measurement items (Gefen & Straub, 2005). This 
study adopted different factors from different studies and built relationships between those 
variables that have never been tested or examined. Although most of the items for measuring 
the constructs were developed and tested in different studies in the information security policy 
compliance or misuse domain, some of these items adopted from the literature are being 
studied for the first time in the security domain. The most important reason for us to conduct 
this analysis is the fact that these items and relationships will be tested for the first time in 
Jordan. According to the SPSS manual, EFA objectives are “to establish that the measurement 
items converge into the appropriate number of theoretical factors, and that each item loads 
with a high coefficient on only one factor” (Gefen & Straub, 2005, p. 92). 
To provide an adequate basis for proceeding to an empirical examination of adequacy for 
factor analysis at the overall level as well as for each variable, an inspection of the correlation 
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matrix as recommended by Hair et al. (2009) was done, and results revealed no substantial 
number of correlations higher than 0.30 inspected between items of different constructs, in 
other words, correlations between items of the same factor found to be high, and low 
correlations, were recorded with other factors items. This initially could give an indication 
that they are not explained to any great extent by the other variables, but do explain each 
other. Bartlett’s test was used to assess the overall significance of the correlation matrix and 
found to be significant at the 0.0001 level. To assess the patterns between variables, the 
measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) was computed. The overall MSA value was 0.937; 
categorized as “meritorious”, it is higher than the acceptable range (above 0.50) (Hair et al., 
2009). As for each variable, MSA values were also found to be higher than the acceptable 
threshold of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2009). 
Using SPSS version 17, an EFA with principle components analysis and varimax rotation 
method was conducted. The setup option regarding selecting the number of factors was left to 
be determined by the eigenvalue which is supposed to exceed 1.0. According to Hair et al. 
(2009) the choice of the rotation method, either orthogonal or oblique, should be based on the 
assumption and study needs of a given research problem. Since the goals of this study are to 
identify the underlying latent variables, and to signify that these factors are independent of 
each other, and to improve the interpretation by reducing some of the ambiguities that often 
accompany the preliminary analysis, varimax orthogonal rotational method was used. The 
result produced theoretically meaningful factors and the simplest factor structure (Hair et al., 
2009). 
For the factor loading acceptable level, guidelines from Hair et al. (2009) were adopted to 
assess the factor loadings. According to Hair et al. (2009) and Chin (1998) a .30 loading 
accounts for nearly 10 percent of the variance, while a .50 loading indicates that 25 percent of 
the variance is accounted for by the factor, and in order to account for 50 percent of the 
variance, a variable loading must exceed .70 . Based on these guidelines any item loaded less 
than .70 on an assigned factor, or loaded high on two factors (cross-loading), was deleted. As 
shown in table 5.2, EFA produced eleven factors with eigenvalues greater than 2.0, which is 
exactly the same number of factors investigated in the study. The eleven factors accounted for 
76.71 percent of the total variance, which is higher than the generally accepted level of 60 
percent (Hair et al., 2009).  
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Table 5.2: Measurement Items and Item Loadings 
Items Dimensions/Questions Mean STD Loading 
IC Intention to Comply    
I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization  5.450 1.645 .863 
I intend to protect information resources according to the requirements of the ISP 
of my organization. 5.539 1.528 .859 
I intend to protect technology resources according to the requirements of the ISP 
of my organization. 5.527 1.607 .845 
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization 
when I use information resources. 5.579 1.545 .830 
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization 
when I use technology resources. 5.569 1.505 .825 
I intend to recommend that others comply with ISP. 5.591 1.470 .785 
I intend to assist others in complying with ISP. 5.541 1.463 .740 
Eigenvalue = 9.579 Variance Explained = 12.773 
PUOP Perceived Usefulness of Protection    
My job would be easier to perform without complying with my organization’s ISP 5.330 1.653 .747 
Complying with my organization’s ISP gives me greater control over my work. 5.460 1.612 .799 
Complying with my organization’s ISP does not hinder my job performance.  5.385 1.590 .784 
Complying with my organization’s ISP addresses my job-related security needs. 5.375 1.688 .821 
Complying with my organization’s ISP saves me time. 5.382 1.646 .833 
Complying with my organization’s ISP enables me to accomplish tasks more 
securely. 5.443 1.590 .789 
Complying with my organization’s ISP supports critical security aspects of my job 5.351 1.614 .812 
Complying with my organization’s ISP reduces unproductive activities. 5.432 1.640 .782 
Complying with my organization’s ISP enhances my effectiveness on the job. 5.375 1.591 .806 
Complying with my organization’s ISP improves the quality of the work I do. 5.470 1.575 .796 
Complying with my organization’s ISP improves my productivity. 5.409 1.571 .804 
Complying with my organization’s ISP makes it easier to do my job. 5.396 1.585 .772 
Overall, I find complying with my organization’s ISP useful in my job. 5.423 1.603 .770 
Eigenvalue = 7.370 Variance Explained = 9.827 
PC Perceived Complexity    
I often become confused when complying with the requirements of my 
organization’s ISP. 
2.456 1.417 .946 
I make errors frequently when complying with the requirements of my 
organization’s ISP. 
2.483 1.445 .839 
Complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is often frustrating. 2.634 1.592 .887 
Learning to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is hard for me 2.665 1.605 .872 
Compliance with the requirements of my organization’s ISP requires a lot of 
mental effort. 
2.498 1.503 .718 
I find it easy to comply with my organization’s ISP. 2.270 1.266 .846 
It is easy for me to remember how to perform tasks while complying with my 
organization’s ISP. 
2.531 1.484 .935 
My organization’s ISP provides helpful guidance in performing tasks. 2.605 1.559 .718 
Eigenvalue = 7.152 Variance Explained = 9.536 
SE Self-Efficacy    
I have the necessary skills to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 5.117 1.735 .774 
I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 5.163 1.781 .807 
I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 5.052 1.741 .805 
I would feel comfortable following my organization’s ISP on my own. 5.136 1.723 .806 
If I wanted to, I could easily comply with my organization’s ISP on my own. 5.028 1.741 .781 
I would be able to follow most of ISP even if there was no one around to help me. 5.077 1.767 .746 
Eigenvalue = 6.373 Variance Explained = 8.497 
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Table 5.2 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued) 
Items Dimensions/Questions Mean STD Loading 
Cont. Controllability    
I have the resources (like antivirus, firewall, brochures) to help me comply with 
the requirements of my organization’s ISP. 5.588 1.509 .837 
I have the resources to protect my organization’s information and technology 
assets from potential threats.  5.557 1.458 .785 
Threats to information security in my work are under control. 5.645 1.455 .793 
In general, technology used at my organization is advanced enough to prevent 
information security threats. 5.581 1.546 .747 
Eigenvalue = 5.478 Variance Explained = 7.304 
GISA General Information Security Awareness    
Overall, I am aware of the potential security threats and their negative consequences 5.489 1.502 .804 
I have sufficient knowledge about the cost of potential security problems. 5.335 1.655 .765 
I understand the concerns regarding information security and the risks they pose 
in general. 5.564 1.551 .882 
Eigenvalue = 5.355 Variance Explained = 7.140 
TA Technology Awareness    
I follow news and developments about the security related technologies. 5.390 1.603 .746 
I discuss Internet security issues or anecdotes with friends and people around me 5.440 1.553 .785 
I read about the problems of malicious threats attacking users’ computers. 5.387 1.505 .775 
I seek advice about security issues through online discussion forums, magazines, 
and other media sources  5.397 1.591 .727 
Eigenvalue = 4.474 Variance Explained = 5.965 
ISPA User Awareness of Information Security Policies    
I am aware of my organization’s rules of behavior for use of computer resources. 2.869 1.764 .791 
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use 
of information systems. 2.875 1.815 .818 
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use. 2.916 1.755 .836 
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
installing their own software on work computers. 2.818 1.793 .822 
I am aware that my organization has specific guidelines that govern what tasks 
employees are allowed to perform on their work computers. 2.836 1.718 .808 
I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use 
of computer passwords. 2.790 1.733 .796 
I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way. 2.874 1.721 .823 
I understand the rules and regulations prescribed by my organization’s ISP. 2.821 1.748 .809 
I understand my responsibilities toward enhancing my organization’s information 
system security as prescribed in the organization’s ISP. 2.825 1.657 .778 
Eigenvalue = 3.798 Variance Explained = 5.064 
SETA User Awareness of SETA Program    
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees comply with 
the organization’s ISP. 5.248 1.696 .801 
I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees improve 
their awareness of computer and information security issues. 5.313 1.709 .816 
I am aware that my organization provides employees with education on computer 
software copyright laws. 5.236 1.707 .837 
I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of 
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way. 5.315 1.714 .841 
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their computer security 
responsibilities. 5.238 1.712 .833 
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Table 5.2 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued) 
Items Dimensions/Questions Mean STD Loading 
 I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of 
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use. 5.318 1.642 .836 
I am aware that employees in my organization are instructed in the appropriate 
usage of information technologies. 5.175 1.630 .829 
I am aware that my organization educates employees on their responsibilities for 
managing computer passwords. 5.297 1.620 .816 
I am aware that my organization educates employees on appropriate use of 
information technology resources (e.g. email). 5.265 1.683 .803 
Eigenvalue = 2.945 Variance Explained = 3.926 
MPA User Awareness of Monitoring Practices    
I am aware that my organization monitors any modification or altering of 
computerized data by employees. 5.173 1.691 .790 
I am aware that employees’ computing activities are monitored by my organization 5.352 1.630 .773 
I am aware that my organization monitors computing activities to ensure that 
employees are performing only explicitly authorized tasks. 5.286 1.687 .769 
I am aware that my organization reviews logs of employees' computing activities 
on a regular basis.  5.196 1.812 .835 
I am aware that my organization conducts periodic audits to detect the use of 
unauthorized software on its computers. 5.161 1.709 .830 
I am aware that my organization regularly monitors employee access to sensitive 
computerized information. 5.255 1.641 .803 
I am aware that my organization actively monitors the content of employees' 
work e-mail messages. 5.253 1.714 .809 
Eigenvalue = 2.741 Variance Explained = 3.654 
SN Subjective Norm    
Upper level management thinks I should comply with the requirements of my 
organization’s ISPs. 5.263 1.682 .803 
My boss thinks that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s 
ISPs. 5.292 1.706 .808 
My colleagues think that I should comply with the requirements of my 
organization’s ISPs. 5.259 1.683 .814 
The information security/technology department in my organization thinks that I 
should comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs. 5.240 1.644 .803 
Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should 
comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs. 5.213 1.655 .779 
Eigenvalue = 2.267 Variance Explained = 3.022 
 
First, we conducted EFA run on all items with the same procedures described before. Results 
showed that all items loaded high only on the target factor, and no cross loading were found. 
Only four items from perceived complexity (PC) were found not to satisfy the 0.70 loading 
requirements. Although confirmatory factor analysis (discussed later in the chapter) showed 
that maintaining these items was not problematic from a loading perspective, we still chose to 
stick to the 0.70 loading rule, hoping to concentrate the variance effect of the variable in the 
structural model. Furthermore, we found that the deletion of these items (PC6, PC7, PC9, and 
PC12) had no effect on the content validity since the PC construct consisted originally from 
12 items, leaving it with 8 highly loading items. 
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After the deletion of the low loading items, we conducted a second EFA on the remaining 
items. Results from the final rotated factor pattern matrix indicated that all items loaded high 
only on their respective latent constructs, and had loading values above 0.70. Therefore, all 
these reflective scales exhibited sound convergent and discriminant validity at this stage of the 
analysis. 
Assessment of Reliability 
Following the EFA analysis, refinement, and deletion of low loaded items, revised items 
reliability was calculated. The philosophical foundations of reliability according to Straub et 
al. (2004) submit that the researcher is endeavoring to find contiguous measures of the “true 
scores” that perfectly describe the phenomenon. An internal consistency measure was used to 
assess each construct inter-item correlations. Table 5.3 shows the Cronbach’s alpha values for 
each construct based on the results of the last EFA results. In order for the construct to 
demonstrate acceptable reliability, Cronbach’s alpha values should be 0.7 or greater (Gefen et 
al., 2000; Hair et al., 2009). As reported in Table 5.3 the Cronbach’s alpha values for all of 
the constructs in the research model were greater than 0.89, demonstrating that all constructs 
had adequate reliability assessment scores. 
Table 5.3: Reliability of Construct 
Construct Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Intention to Comply 7 0.948 
Perceived Usefulness of Protection 13 0.962 
Perceived Complexity 8 0.958 
Self-Efficacy 6 0.939 
Controllability 4 0.896 
General Information Security Awareness 3 0.908 
Technology Awareness 4 0.915 
User Awareness of Information Security Policies 9 0.963 
User Awareness of SETA Program 9 0.962 
User Awareness of Monitoring Practices 7 0.946 
Subjective Norm 5 0.936 
 
Common Methods Bias 
Common methods variance is one of the most prevalent problems in behavioral research 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) which happens when most of the variables 
cross-load across regular phases (Straub et al., 2004), as a result of using a single instrument 
that is obtained from one source, and not measured in a different context (Straub et al., 2004), 
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as in the case of TAM ( Gefen et al. (2000) . Since this study falls under the category of 
behavioral studies that adopted the TAM, common methods variance could be a problem. 
Several procedural steps were implemented in the instrument design phase to minimize the 
potential sources of common methods bias described by Podsakoff et al. (2003). Still these 
procedures are not enough to completely eliminate the potential of such an effect. Following 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommendations, we conducted Harmon’s single factor test to 
examine the existence of this problem. 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), Harmon test is the most widely used statistical 
technique to examine common methods variance. This technique involves subjecting all the 
study items to a single factor analysis and then analyzing the unrotated factor matrix. 
Common methods variance is assumed to exist if either (a) a single factor emerged from the 
factor analysis or (b) one factor accounted for the majority of the variance among variables. 
Results of this test as demonstrated in table 5.4 shows that multiple factors emerged from the 
factor analysis (11 factors) and no single factor accounted for the majority of the variance 
among the factors. These results indicate that common methods variance is not a significant 
problem in this study. 
Table 5 4: Harmon’s Single-factor Results 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 16.620 17.367 17.367 14.326 14.995 14.995 
2 8.829 11.945 29.313 8.559 12.035 27.030 
3 6.722 9.279 38.591 6.425 9.333 36.363 
4 4.652 6.658 45.249 4.395 6.763 43.126 
5 4.321 6.239 51.489 4.061 6.340 49.467 
6 3.521 5.227 56.716 3.257 5.322 54.789 
7 3.001 4.568 61.283 2.732 4.658 59.447 
8 2.813 4.330 65.614 2.547 4.424 63.870 
9 1.739 2.970 68.584 1.505 3.105 66.975 
10 1.428 2.577 71.161 1.158 2.666 69.641 
11 1.203 2.292 73.453 0.975 2.434 72.075 
12 .951 1.973 75.425    
13 .752 1.721 77.146    
 
Data Analysis and Results 
Following the recommendations of Barclay, Higgins, and Thompson (1995) , the model 
reliability and validity is assessed to ensure that the construct measures are valid and reliable 
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before assessing the correlations between the constructs in the structural model. the structural 
model is assessed. The measurement and the structural models were examined using structural 
equation modeling. 
Assessment of Measurement Model 
The component-based partial least squares (PLS) approach, a structural modeling technique, 
was used to test and evaluate the psychometric properties of the constructs and to test the 
study hypotheses. Currently, PLS is superior to traditional first generation statistical methods 
such as regression, LOGIT, ANOVA, and MANOVA as it tests the measurement model 
(relationships between constructs and measures) and the structural model (theoretical 
relationships among constructs) simultaneously. Initially, PLS estimates the items loading on 
constructs and then estimates casual relationships among construct iteratively (Gefen et al., 
2000). 
PLS is the most widely used statistical package in information system research (Rouse & 
Corbitt, 2008). PLS, as a component-based approach, is the most used as it allows the analysis 
of non-normal data, is less sensitive to sample size, is supportive of exploratory research 
(Gefen et al., 2000), does high quality theory testing, (Rouse & Corbitt, 2008), and processes 
each indicator separately, allowing each item to differ in the amount of influence on the 
construct estimate (Chin, Marcolin, & L., 2003). PLSs is the most appropriate for this study 
because of its focus on prediction of data, and it is best suited for exploratory research and 
theory building. The Smart-PLS software package (version 2.0.M3) (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 
2005) was used to assess the measurement model fit indices and to evaluate the validity and 
reliability. 
In order to assess the measurement quality of the eleven reflective scales, factorial validity 
(convergent validity and discriminant validity), individual item reliability, and composite 
reliability were calculated (Barclay et al., 1995; Gefen & Straub, 2005). A confirmatory factor 
analysis was produced using PLS to assess the quality of the measurement model. All of the 
items that resulted from the exploratory factor analysis, explained previously, were included 
in the model. Gefen et al. (2000) stated that PLS and EFA might produce different factor 
loadings; for example, an item loading of .50 in PLS could be below .40 in EFA. Therefore, 
we could have claimed higher loading of these items in PLS, but actually they created 
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different problems, some of which were related to the directions of the correlations, so we 
chose to eliminate them. 
Table 5.5 summarizes the items constituting the research model. The table shows the 
questionnaire items, as well as weight, factor loading, and t-value of each item. Even though 
PLS does not require the items to be normally distributed, the distribution of all variables 
were still analyzed, and it was found that all variables included in the model were normally 
distributed. The number of factors was set to 11, which are the number of constructs included 
in the model. All 11 factors accounted for 88.5% of the total variance. 
Table 5 5: Measurement Items and Item Loadings 
Constructs Item Weight Loading T-value 
Intention to Comply IC1 0.161 0.890 100.721 
IC2 0.161 0.890 81.519 
IC3 0.162 0.891 99.004 
IC4 0.168 0.880 77.272 
IC5 0.165 0.880 81.326 
IC6 0.161 0.853 60.444 
IC7 0.167 0.830 55.355 
Perceived Usefulness of Protection PUOP1 0.083 0.768 38.277 
PUOP2 0.100 0.850 71.378 
PUOP3 0.094 0.823 53.145 
PUOP4 0.092 0.850 68.214 
PUOP5 0.088 0.846 66.364 
PUOP6 0.095 0.831 48.694 
PUOP7 0.095 0.850 67.495 
PUOP8 0.100 0.838 57.763 
PUOP9 0.089 0.831 57.299 
PUOP10 0.094 0.836 63.735 
PUOP11 0.089 0.827 56.202 
PUOP12 0.094 0.814 46.697 
PUOP13 0.093 0.810 41.500 
Perceived Complexity PC1 0.127 0.937 111.186 
PC2 0.145 0.872 47.703 
PC3 0.165 0.941 169.689 
PC4 0.173 0.938 168.319 
PC5 0.134 0.785 41.033 
PC8 0.103 0.803 34.703 
PC10 0.139 0.950 176.761 
PC11 0.145 0.805 47.567 
Self-Efficacy SE1 0.186 0.862 69.703 
SE2 0.191 0.887 95.984 
SE3 0.181 0.881 75.753 
SE4 0.193 0.891 98.389 
SE5 0.197 0.872 80.163 
SE6 0.195 0.860 74.461 
Controllability CONT1 0.250 0.895 75.716 
CONT2 0.334 0.886 73.887 
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Table 5.5 Measurement Items and Item Loadings (Continued) 
Constructs Item Weight Loading T-value 
 CONT3 0.281 0.874 63.720 
CONT4 0.282 0.837 50.886 
General Information Security Awareness GISA1 0.348 0.885 71.593 
GISA2 0.371 0.916 91.949 
GISA3 0.369 0.955 205.336 
Technology Awareness TA1 0.275 0.893 82.578 
TA2 0.301 0.902 88.558 
TA3 0.258 0.888 65.075 
TA4 0.286 0.889 77.342 
User Awareness of Information Security 
Policies 
ISPA1 0.133 0.874 89.664 
ISPA2 0.121 0.887 105.782 
ISPA3 0.130 0.901 120.514 
ISPA4 0.131 0.906 121.848 
ISPA5 0.124 0.883 85.926 
ISPA6 0.121 0.868 73.585 
ISPA7 0.123 0.869 80.327 
ISPA8 0.122 0.858 75.911 
ISPA9 0.133 0.862 81.183 
User Awareness of SETA Program SETA1 0.133 0.865 79.371 
SETA2 0.126 0.875 87.401 
SETA3 0.130 0.881 93.488 
SETA4 0.120 0.887 94.152 
SETA5 0.133 0.880 91.381 
SETA6 0.138 0.889 96.799 
SETA7 0.116 0.873 78.226 
SETA8 0.115 0.865 74.858 
SETA9 0.130 0.867 83.409 
User Awareness of Monitoring Practices MPA1 0.149 0.863 79.691 
MPA2 0.163 0.864 68.932 
MPA3 0.167 0.853 66.398 
MPA4 0.160 0.876 91.917 
MPA5 0.161 0.878 87.151 
MPA6 0.175 0.875 75.389 
MPA7 0.176 0.876 84.233 
Subjective Norm SN1 0.226 0.893 90.175 
SN2 0.223 0.894 90.098 
SN3 0.221 0.896 95.866 
SN4 0.233 0.900 119.214 
SN5 0.217 0.875 87.589 
IC1 0.161 0.890 100.721 
 
First, to ensure convergent validity and reliability of every item, factor loading of each 
individual item on its underlying construct was examined, as well as the Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE). As shown in table 5.5, all item loadings exceeded the recommended 
minimum value of 0.70, indicating that at least 50 percent of the variance was accounted for 
by the construct (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2009). Results also showed that all items loaded 
significantly (p < 0.000) on their underlying constructs as evident from the t-values, which are 
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higher than 1.96 for all items. As shown in Table 5.6, the AVE was higher than the minimum 
recommended value of 0.5 for each construct, indicating that the items satisfied the 
convergent validity. 
To establish the discriminant validity of the constructs in the study model, the square root of 
the average variance extracted for each construct, with the correlation scores of that construct 
with other constructs, was compared. For each scale, the square root of the AVE of each 
construct, reported in the diagonal of the correlation matrix in Table 5.6, was higher than the 
correlations between that construct and any other construct (inter-correlations). The cross 
loading matrix from confirmatory factor analysis was also utilized as another requirement to 
assess discriminant validity of the constructs (see Table C1 in Appendix C). From the cross 
loading matrix it was found that, as recommended, all measurement items loaded higher than 
0.768 on their underlying construct, and loaded very low, less than 0.40, on other constructs 
(Gefen et al., 2000). As shown in Table 5.6 and Table C1 (Appendix C), all constructs in the 
model satisfied these criteria for discriminant validity. 
Table 5 6: Composite Reliability, AVE, and Latent Variable Correlations 
 CR AVE MPA Cont. GISA IC ISPA PC PUOP SE SETA SN TA 
MPA 0.956 0.756 0.869           
Cont. 0.928 0.762 0.314 0.873          
GISA 0.942 0.845 0.359 0.266 0.919         
IC 0.958 0.763 0.320 0.221 0.040 0.874        
ISPA 0.968 0.772 0.419 0.381 0.343 0.309 0.879       
PC 0.965 0.777 0.240 -0.154 -0.215 -0.203 -0.099 0.881      
PU 0.966 0.687 0.327 0.221 0.350 0.310 0.311 -0.254 0.829     
SE 0.952 0.766 0.408 0.396 0.253 0.284 0.359 -0.285 0.384 0.875    
SETA 0.967 0.767 0.343 0.329 0.227 0.360 0.359 -0.231 0.326 0.421 0.876   
SN 0.951 0.795 0.311 0.070 0.252 0.368 0.356 -0.251 0.365 0.354 0.315 0.892  
TA 0.940 0.797 0.322 0.243 0.210 0.302 0.447 -0.218 -0.093 0.297 0.319 0.288 0.893 
CR = Composite reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; MP = Monitoring Practices; Cont. = 
Controllability; GISA = General Information Security Awareness; IC = Intention to Comply; ISPA = 
Information Security Awareness; PC = Perceived Complexity; PU = Perceived Usefulness of Protection; SE = 
Self-Efficacy to Comply; SETA = Security, Education, Training and Awareness; SN = Subjective Norms; TA = 
Security Awareness. 
Diagonal elements in bold display the square root of AVE. 
 
To confirm the scale reliability and internal consistency, the composite reliability (CR) and 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated. A scale is deemed to be reliable if it has CR and Cronbach’s 
alpha above 0.70 (Gefen et al., 2000). Table 5.6 shows that all composite reliability values are 
more than 0.982, and Cronbach’s alpha, as shown in Table 5.3, are higher than 0.896, 
demonstrating that all constructs had adequate reliability assessment scores and all construct 
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measures were considered to be reflective as all indicators satisfy the recommended criteria 
specified by Petter, Straub, and Rai (2007). These items will be used in future studies for 
testing the proposed theoretical research model. 
Consequently, the results of the measurement model demonstrated adequate convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, and reliability required for further testing of our research 
hypotheses. 
Structural Model Testing 
Having established that the model demonstrated adequate factorial validity and reliability, a 
test of the structural model was conducted. As stated in the research methodology, PLS 
approach to structural equation modeling was used to estimate the measurement model. The 
PLS algorithm and the bootstrapping re-sampling method with 878 cases and 1756 re-samples 
were used to estimate the structural model. Figure 5 shows the results of the model 
estimation, path coefficients, paths significant level based on a two-tailed t-test, and the 
variance explained by the independent variables (R
2
). Together, path coefficients (loadings 
and significant) and R
2 
are indicators of the model performance , with R
2
 indicating the 
predictive power of the model, which is equivalent to the R2 in a regression model (Gefen et 
al., 2000). Path coefficients are significant and directionally consistent with the assumptions 
of the study. 
As shown in figure 5, the structural model could explain 17.8 percent of the variance for the 
intention to comply, where 26.6 percent of the variance could be explained for perceived 
complexity, and 44.1 percent of the variance for perceived usefulness of protection. In the 
variance explained by the original TAM constructs (PC and PUOP), and SN, perceived 
complexity accounts for 12.2 percent of the variance explained in intention to comply, 
perceived usefulness of protection accounts for 18.7 percent, and subjective norm accounts 
for 31.6 percent of the variance. All of these figures are greater than the minimum value of a 
10 percent criterion that was suggested by Falk and Miller (1992) as an indicator of 
substantive explanatory power.  
Consistent with hypotheses 1 through 4 (H1 – H4), perceived usefulness of protection was 
found to have a significant impact on intention to comply (β = 0.188, P < 0.001); therefore H1 
is supported. Perceived complexity was found to have significant impact on intention to 
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comply directly (β = -0.085, p < 0.01) and a significant impact on perceived usefulness of 
protection (β = -0.197, p < 0.001); therefore, both H2a and H2b are supported. Subjective 
norm was found to have a significant impact on intention to comply (β = 0.278, P < 0.001) 
and a significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.201, P < 0.001); 
therefore, H3 and H4 are supported. 
 
Figure 5: The Results of the Structural Model Testing 
Consistent with H5 – H8, self-efficacy has a significant impact on perceived usefulness of 
protection (β = 0.57, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β = -0.200, P < 0.001); 
therefore, H5 and H6 are supported. However, controllability was not found to have a 
significant impact on either perceived usefulness of protection or perceived complexity: 
therefore, H7 and H8 are not supported. For H9a – H10b, general information security 
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awareness was found to have a significant effect on perceived usefulness of protection (β = 
0.157, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β = 0.-176, P < 0.001); therefore, H9a and 
H9b are supported. Regarding technology awareness, it was found to have significant effect 
on perceived usefulness of protection (β = -0.468, P < 0.001) and on perceived complexity (β 
= -0.224, P < 0.001), however, the direction of the relationship with perceived usefulness was 
opposite to that hypothesized; therefore, H10a is not supported while H10b is supported. 
Consistent with H11 – H16, users’ awareness of security policy was found to have a 
significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = -0.260, P < 0.001) and on 
perceived complexity (β = -0.466, P < 0.001), however, the direction of the relationship with 
perceived usefulness was opposite to that hypothesized; therefore, H11 is not supported while 
H12 is supported. SETA program was found to have a significant effect on perceived 
usefulness of protection and on perceived complexity (β = 0.128, -0.131, P < 0.001, 
respectively); therefore, H13 and H14 are supported. Monitoring practices was not found to 
have a significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.079, P < 0.10), and 
therefore H15 is not supported. On the other hand, it was found to have a significant impact 
on perceived complexity (β = 0.155, P < 0.001), and therefore H16 is supported. Table 5.7 
summarizes the results of the hypotheses testing. 
Table 5 7: Main Effect Path Coefficient (Structural Model Results) 
H# Hypothesis (Direction) Path 
Coefficient 
t-value Significance Supported? 
H1 PUOP → IC (+) 0.187 4.414 P < 0.001 Yes 
H2a PC → IC (-) -0.085 2.270 P < 0.01 Yes 
H2b PC → PUOP (-) -0.197 5.487 P < 0.001 Yes 
H3 SN → IC (+) 0.278 6.223 P < 0.001 Yes 
H4 SN → PUOP (+) 0.201 4.811 P < 0.001 Yes 
H5 SE → PUOP (+) 0.157 3.718 P < 0.001 Yes 
H6 SE → PC (-) -0.200 5.145 P < 0.001 Yes 
H7 Cont. → PUOP (+) 0.049 1.188 NS No 
H8 Cont. → PC (-) -0.059 1.670 NS No 
H9a GISA → PUOP (+) 0.157 3.815 P < 0.001 Yes 
H9b GISA → PC (-) -0.176 4.751 P < 0.001 Yes 
H10a TA → PUOP (+) -0.468 14.313 P < 0.001 No 
H10b TA → PC (-) -0.224 7.007 P < 0.001 Yes 
H11 ISPA → PUOP (+) -0.260 5.561 P < 0.001 No 
H12 ISPA → PC (-) -0.466 13.792 P < 0.001 Yes 
H13 SETA → PUOP (+) 0.128 3.158 P < 0.001 Yes 
H14 SETA → PC (-) -0.131 3.848 P < 0.001 Yes 
H15 MPA → PUOP (-) -0.079 1.872 NS No 
H16 MPA → PC (+) 0.155 3.952 P < 0.001 Yes 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Overview of the Study and Findings 
Compliance with information security policies became a main concern for organizations since 
ISP violations have significantly increased information security threats and vulnerabilities, 
and contribute significantly to information security breaches. Employees who are aware of the 
information security policies of their institutions and deliberately violating the policy, are 
considered a big problem and a hidden threat, since awareness and training programs will 
have little impact on their behavior. Information security policy violation varies from 
behaviors that are unethical (such as inappropriate use of e-mail, and shopping or selling 
using the company’s network), to ones that are criminal or illegal (such as sabotage, data 
theft, and data destruction), to ones that are unintentional or accidental (forgetting to change a 
password or the careless discarding of sensitive information rather than shredding it). Such 
acts are often known as information security non-compliance behavior. This study focused on 
all types of policy violation by employees or users; intentional or unintentional, inappropriate 
or illegal, and considers any act of violating the ISPs as a noncompliance problem. 
Employees can impose excessive damage to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
IS through deliberate activities (espionage), or they may present a potential threat through 
passive noncompliance with security policies (laziness, poor training, or lack of motivation to 
adequately ensure information security) (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). In order to foster 
employees’ rule adherence, different approaches have been adopted to investigate and explain 
employees’ rule following behavior (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Some studies adopted the 
command-and-control approach, which is linked to extrinsic motivational models of human 
behavior, such as the external contingencies of reward (e.g. Siponen et al., 2010) and 
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punishment (e.g. D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub, 1990), and breaking the rules (Hu et al., 2010; 
Posey et al., 2010). Other studies have employed a self-regulatory approach, which is linked 
to intrinsic motivational models, emphasizing individuals follow the rules as connatural 
drivers of behavior. Intrinsic motivational models of human behavior were found to explain 
employees’ rule-following behavior better than extrinsic motivational models which have 
been built on GDT, RCT, PMT, and other extrinsic behavioral theories (Son, 2011). 
From the extensive review of systems abuse literature, it was obvious that the command-and-
control model symbolizes a conventional approach to animate rule-following; it is based on 
the idea that people abide by the rules as a function of the costs and benefits they associate 
with doing so. This approach is well represented in different theories such as GDT (e.g. 
D'Arcy & Hovav, 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990), RCT (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 
2010a; Hu et al., 2010; Li, Zhang, et al., 2010), and PMT (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009b; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen et al., 2007). The approach contends that employees 
are materialistically motivated, and are basically interested in the resources and outcomes they 
obtain from their organizations. Therefore, in order to enforce policies, rules, and procedures, 
organizations must take an active role by providing incentives (to encourage desired behavior) 
and sanctions (to discourage undesirable behavior) (Tyler et al., 2007). 
The question to ask at this point is “do such techniques work?” The analysis of the literature 
and the results of this study indicate that these strategies often help shape employees’ 
behavior. But such strategies also come with significant cost because in order for sanctions 
and deterrence systems to work, organizations must be able to dedicate substantial resources 
to the surveillance needed to make the detection of systems misuse or abuse likely enough 
that people are deterred. 
This study focused on the self-regularity approach, which represents an alternate approach to 
encouraging rule following behavior, since it is concentrated on employees’ intrinsic 
motivations. This method identifies rule following as initiated with an individual’s innate 
desire to follow organizational rules, and not with external contingencies in the environment 
that are linked to rule following, such as rewards, penalty, fear, outcomes, or social pressure 
(Tyler & Blader, 2005). Therefore, the technology acceptance model (TAM) was found 
appropriately fit to investigate employees’ innate behavior toward complying with 
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organizations’ ISPs since it concentrates on employees’ desire and willingness to follow rules 
as described in the ISPs, for the sake of protecting the organization information systems, and 
not to maximize any outcomes for themselves. Utilizing TAM and TBP, this study developed 
a Security Acceptance Model (SAM), analogous to the TAM, to explain compliance intention 
behavior among bank employees. The model explained users’ compliance behavior with ISPs 
in terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of protection afforded by 
ISPs, and user awareness of information security issues and countermeasures. It was posited 
that among different factors, information security awareness likely plays a major role in 
shaping user compliance behavior with ISPs. 
The model was tested in Jordan for several reasons. First, Jordan became a target for hackers 
due to the absence of governmental legislation and a delayed interest by institutions in 
security and data protection. As well as the absence of security policies to these banks, beside 
the novelty of the concept of security awareness among employees and their belief that they 
are immune from security threats. Second, Jordan is the researcher’s home country, giving 
him access to information there. Third, Jordan is considered one of the largest users of 
computers in the Middle East after the UAE. Finally, Jordan has a strong banking system that 
has been using technology for some time. 
Data was collected via a self-reported questionnaire from a sample of 878 bank employees. 
The resulting data was analyzed by two main statistical techniques; exploratory factor 
analysis and component-based partial lease square approach. The validity and reliability tests 
indicated that the designed model SAM fit the data well. Perceived complexity (PC) and 
perceived usefulness of protection (PUOP) were significantly related to employees’ intention 
to comply with ISPs. These findings provided strong statistical support that SAM is a useful 
theoretical framework for predicting users’ intention behavior with ISPs. The downstream 
effect of the SAM is evident not only in the significance of the paths linking perceived 
complexity and perceived usefulness of protection with compliance behavioral intention, but 
also in the significant relationships between employees’ awareness of security 
countermeasures (structured and unstructured) with PC and PUOP. 
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Discussion of Findings 
 This study presented a Security Awareness Model (SAM) that underscores the user 
dimension in addressing ISP compliance issues. This user focus, along with consideration of 
ISPs as a system, is a novel approach as compared to extant theoretical frameworks such as 
GDT, PMT, TRA, and TPB, among others. The model tries to explain user compliance 
behavior with ISPs in terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of 
protection afforded by ISPs, and the user awareness of information security issues and 
countermeasures. It is posited that among different factors, information security awareness 
likely plays a major role in shaping user compliance behavior with ISPs. The results of this 
study supported the validity of the SAM as a useful theoretical framework to predict 
employees’ behavioral compliance intention with ISPs. The model explained about 18 percent 
of the total variance in the dependent variable, and the casual structural paths of the main 
predictors (PC and PUOP) were statistically significant (β = -0.085, t = 2.270, and β = 0.187, t 
= 4.414, respectively). These results refute the assumptions of some researchers (e.g. Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010) that technology adoption theories do not have the ability to explain the 
acceptance and use of security policies because they do not include the concept of thread as 
productivity-based applications. 
Consistent with the predictions of SAM, perceived complexity (PC) and perceived usefulness 
of protection (PUOP) both had a significant impact of behavioral intention to comply with 
ISPs. These results are consistent with TAM literature (e.g. Davis & Venkatesh, 1996; 
Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Perceived complexity was found to have 
a significant negative effect on behavioral intention to comply and on perceived usefulness of 
protection. The importance of perceived complexity was further explained by its indirect 
impact on intention to comply through perceived usefulness of protection. This suggests that 
if employees perceive ISPs to be easy to use and not complex, they will perceive their security 
compliance behavior to have a favorable impact on their performance to protect an 
organization’s information assets, and they are more likely to use it. Further, compared to 
productivity-based software tools such as spreadsheets, emails, and word processors, which 
can improve job performance and productivity, compliance with ISPs to secure the working 
environment impede performance (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). These findings are 
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consistent with the recommendations of Whitman and Mattord (2008) that when designing 
ISPs, they should be easy to use. Moreover, these results are consistent with a number of 
studies which used perceived complexity instead of perceived ease of use, and found that 
perceived complexity negatively affected behavioral intention (Chang & Cheung, 2001; 
Igbaria et al., 1996; Thompson et al., 1991). In the security domain, these results were 
different than the results of Dinev and Hu (2007) and Xue et al. (2010), which found that PU 
and PEOU had no significant impact on behavioral intention. 
As compliance with ISPs is mandatory, subjective norm is a significant factor that predicts 
behavioral intention. Under this assumption, if a superior suggests that a particular system is 
useful, a person might believe it is actually useful and then form an intention to use it. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) refer to the casual mechanism underlying the impact of 
subjective norm on behavioral intention as compliance. Consistent with TAM results in 
mandatory environments (Hartwick & Barki, 1994; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & 
Davis, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2003), subjective norm was found to have a significant effect 
on intention to comply with ISP, which is also consistent with the results of studies in the 
same field of security compliance (e.g. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; 
Herath & Rao, 2009a; Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2009). Subjective norm accounts for 
the highest percent (31.6%) of the variance explained in intention to comply. This suggests 
that employees will form favorable perceptions toward compliance through the social 
influence of superiors, managers, or colleagues, more than any other reason. The implication 
of this highest effect on intention to comply could be due to cultural issues since the study 
sample was from Jordan, where it is very unorthodox and shameful for an employee’s peers 
and superiors to discover that s/he did not comply with ISPs. What confirms this assumption 
is the effect of subjective norm on PUOP, where it was found to have the highest percent 
(20%) of the variance explained in PUOP; meaning if peers and superiors perceive it as 
useful, and then an employee will perceive it to be too. 
To overcome situations where behavior is nonvolitional, Ajzen (1991) introduced the concept 
of perceived behavioral control (PBC) that consists of two components; self-efficacy and 
controllability. The results of this study found that self-efficacy has a significant effect on 
PUOP and PC (β = 0.157, p < 0.001, and β = -0.200, p < 0.001, respectively), while 
controllability was not significant. Self-efficacy was found to have a positive impact on 
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PUOP, which is consistent with TAM studies in both voluntarily and mandatory 
environments (e.g. Ong et al., 2004; Ong & Lai, 2006; Venkatesh et al., 2003), and also with 
the results of security compliance studies which have investigated its impact on intention to 
comply (e.g. Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen 
et al., 2010). This result suggests that if employees perceive ISPs as relevant to their work and 
important for protecting information assets, they will comply with the policies. Inconsistent 
policies and procedures can lead to frustration, confusion, and potential non-compliance. The 
results also showed that self-efficacy had a negative significant impact on PC. This result was 
consistent with TAM studies in both voluntarily and mandatory sittings (e.g. Ong et al., 2004; 
Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 1996; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Wu, Chen, & 
Lin, 2007), as well as with the results of security compliance studies which investigated its 
impact on intention to comply (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010a; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; 
Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2010). According to self-efficacy theory, 
this suggests that in order for employees to comply with ISPs, they must understand these 
policies. This also confirms the recommendations of different studies on the importance of 
designing clear and easy to understand policies (Hone & Eloff, 2002; Whitman et al., 2001). 
As for controllability, the non-significant impact was inconsistent with the previous literature 
(Dinev & Hu, 2007; Kim et al., 2008), while it was consistent with (Dinev et al., 2009). A 
plausible explanation is that the adoption and use of the technology and resources to protect 
information assets to a large extent is mandated by the bank. 
In terms of the research model, findings demonstrated that perceived complexity and 
perceived usefulness of protection are key prevailing variables linking information security 
awareness to compliance behavior with ISPs.  
General information security awareness was found to have a positive significant impact on 
perceived usefulness of protection (β = 0.157, p < 0.001). The result suggests that an 
employee’s perceived usefulness of the ISP toward compliance can be enhanced by his/her 
general security awareness. This result was consistent with the findings of Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010a) and Bulgurcu et al. (2009). The results also showed that general information security 
awareness has a negative significant impact on perceived complexity (β = -0.176, p < 0.001). 
This result suggests that higher general security awareness increases employees’ confidence 
in overcoming the complexities and hurdles toward compliance with the requirements of the 
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ISPs. This result is also very consistent with the findings of Bulgurcu et al. (2010a) that 
employees’ perception that compliance impedes job-related functions can be reduced by 
information security awareness. As for employees’ knowledge and understanding of security 
related technologies, it was found that it has a negative significant impact on perceived 
usefulness of protection. The negative direction suggests that employees think they are savvy, 
encompass enough knowledge, and have enough resources (e.g., magazines, discussion 
forums, and online help) about security issues which make ISPs obsolete to their work 
compared to the size of knowledge they possess. This result was inconsistent with the 
findings of Dinev and Hu (2007) which showed that technology awareness has a positive 
impact on employees’ attitude toward intention to use protective technologies. On the other 
hand, the negative impact of technology awareness on employees’ perceptions of complexity 
of ISPs was consistent with the theoretical base. The result suggests that an employee’s 
perception of the complexity of the ISP toward compliance can be enhanced by the 
knowledge s/he generates about security issues from different resources, such as magazines, 
online help, and discussion forums. This result is consistent with previous studies that 
investigated the effect of ISA on intention to comply (Bulgurcu et al., 2009, 2010a; Dinev & 
Hu, 2007). 
Users’ awareness of information security policies had a negative impact on their perception of 
the usefulness of ISPs in protecting information resources. This suggests that information 
security policies at these banks are not defined clearly and lack the processes that will help to 
ensure system security. This is confirmed by Whitman et al. (2001, p. 13) where he stated that 
“if security procedures unnecessarily inhibit employees’ use of the information system, they 
will be less productive or will bypass the procedure”. Moreover, Straub (1990) emphasized 
the necessity to develop detailed policies defining proper and improper use of information 
systems. This result was not consistent with the prior research that found clearly defined 
security policies will reduce the behavioral intention of system misuse (D'Arcy, 2005; D'Arcy 
& Hovav, 2007, 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2009). Another suggestion for the negative effect that 
comes with (Finch, Furnell, and Dowland (2003) line of thinking, is that employees might not 
be fully aware of the existence of security policy within their banks. On the contrary, users’ 
awareness of information security policies had a negative impact on their perception of the 
complexity of complying with ISPs. This suggests that high awareness of information security 
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policies will reduce employees’ complexity perception in complying with ISPs. This result is 
consistent with (Lee et al., 2004) and with the results of studies adopted from GDT (D'Arcy, 
2005; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2004) which found that awareness of information 
security policies enhances users’ perception and understanding of punishment for systems 
misuse, which will decrease misuse behavioral intention. In general, these two results suggest 
that when designing ISPs, banks should emphasize the ease of understanding the policy more 
than its usefulness in protecting the bank’s information systems and resources. 
Users’ awareness of SETA programs had a significant positive impact on perceived 
usefulness of protection, while it was found to have significant negative impact on perceived 
complexity. This suggests that proper cognitive education, and awareness and training for 
employees on security issues, such as threats, technologies, and compliance, are effective in 
enhancing their perceptions of the usefulness of ISPs for protecting information and 
technology resources, which eventually will increase compliance behavioral intention with the 
rules and requirements of the ISPs. These programs will also decrease employees’ perceptions 
about the complexity of compliance with the ISPs. Previous literature emphasized the 
importance and benefits of SETA programs in altering users’ behavior in a positive direction 
(e.g. Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Schultz, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998; von Solms & von 
Solms, 2005), but little empirical work has been put into practice (D'Arcy et al., 2009; 
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Posey et al., 2010; Straub, 1990). This study provides empirical 
evidence that SETA programs are effective mechanisms for enlightening employees about the 
importance of complying with ISPs by improving their perceptions about the usefulness of 
ISPs in protecting information and technological resources, and by reducing perceived 
complexity of compliance. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) emphasized the quality of training 
programs by utilizing methods and learning tasks that stimulate learners to complete 
organized cognitive processing of information. 
Users’ awareness of monitoring practices had an insignificant negative impact on perceived 
usefulness of protection, while it had a positive significant impact on perceived complexity. 
This suggests making employees aware that they are electronically monitored increases their 
perceived complexity in compliance with ISPs, and although not significant, decreases their 
satisfaction with usefulness of protection. These results are consistent with Urbaczewski and 
Jessup (2002) findings that reported when employees were aware of electronic monitoring 
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“policing”, their focus was more on task and they were less satisfied. These findings are 
applicable to this study, because when employees are aware of monitoring “policing” 
practices, they concentrate literally on compliance more than on work, and that impacts their 
perception about the usefulness of compliance negatively, since they see it as an impediment 
of their performance, making it more complex to comply since they will be very cautious not 
to make mistakes. This result was also consistent with prior research which found monitoring 
to lower employee satisfaction and increase turnover in some cases (Alder et al., 2008; 
Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; George, 1996). However, it is still important to note that 
monitoring can play a key role in protecting an organization from employee abuse (e.g. Ariss, 
2002; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998). 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that each of the information security awareness 
countermeasures plays an important role in enhancing users’ perception about the usefulness 
of protecting information and technology resources and lowering the degree of complexity of 
compliance, which in turn increases intention to comply with ISPs. Awareness of information 
security policy seems to have the highest impact on intention to comply, followed by 
technology awareness, with monitoring practices having the least impact. 
Theoretical Contribution 
Different behavioral theories have been adopted in the information security domain to 
investigate either compliance intention or to deter misuse behavior, and others have been 
adopted to deploy preventive and protective technologies. Theories such as TRA, TPB, RCT, 
PMT, GDT, SCT, RCT, TAM, and others were adopted as the theoretical foundation for their 
studies, since each of them has the potential to predict behavioral intention. Much of the 
previous literature concentrated on the deterrent effect of sanctions or incentives to encourage 
employees’ desirable behavior, but none of the studies addressed this problem as a system 
that employees must accept first. Accordingly, this study is the first to develop a model, the 
Security Acceptance Model (SAM), to investigate the users’ perceptions about complying 
with ISPs, motivated only by intrinsic desire, and a willingness to follow rules as described in 
the ISPs for the sake of protecting the organization’s information systems, and not to 
maximize any outcomes for themselves. 
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Another important contribution this study makes to the behavioral aspects of the information 
security body of knowledge is being the first study to present empirical support that 
technology adoption theories have the ability to explain the acceptance and use of security 
policies as they were found to include the concept of thread as productivity-based 
applications. This study demonstrated that employees’ intrinsic desire and willingness to 
follow rules as described in the ISPs can be traced back to normative beliefs, and perceived 
behavioral control. 
Third, the field of security awareness is lacking research which views this concept from a 
behavioral perspective and that employs behavioral theories, such as TRA, TPB, TAM, and 
others, to help understand its effect on shaping compliance intention or deterring misuse 
intention. Thus, this study is the first to assess the impact of structured and unstructured 
information security awareness on compliance intention. The findings showed that 
information security awareness (ISA) exerts a significant impact on users’ perceived 
usefulness of protection and perceived complexity, which shapes users’ intentional behavior 
to comply with ISPs. Accordingly, this study will contribute to the library of security 
awareness research.  
Finally, this study is the first to investigate the complexity of complying with ISPs. Most of 
the previous studies adopted TAM, and investigated the role of PEOU, which has not been 
found to be an appropriate or significant predictor of intention to comply. Due to the nature of 
ISPs which involve compliance rather than using, and are mostly described as difficult, it is 
more appropriate to utilize this factor than the PEOU.  
Practical Contribution 
The results of this study will help senior management to understand the factors that encourage 
behavior toward the adoption of security countermeasures, which will help to elicit positive 
behaviors from employees, leading to a decrease in human errors and reducing the cost of 
security. The subjective norm had the highest impact on employees’ intention to comply with 
ISPs. This means that employees’ intention to comply with the ISPs is greatly affected by 
opinions and by significant others. Thus, when developing security awareness programs, 
management and practitioners need to be aware that perceived social pressure is an important 
factor that helps enhance compliance with ISPs by concentrating on social and organizational 
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matters. Puhakainen (2006) proposed a framework for analyzing employees’ motivation to 
comply with ISPs and noted that the subjective norm is one of the main factors that helps us 
to understand the reasons for compliance and non-compliance with the instructions. Most of 
the literature on ISP compliance or misuse investigated the impact of subjective norm (e.g. 
Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2009), and 
showed the importance of significant others and opinions in the compliance process. 
Accordingly, management should take compliance with ISPs seriously and emphasize to 
employees firmly that they should comply. Management can do that through day-to-day 
activities such as brochures, emails, and posters, or by other means, such as training or during 
meetings. 
The results of this study provide significant evidence that users’ awareness of the existence of 
security policies, SETA programs, and monitoring practices are each a significant factor in 
improving users’ intention to comply with the ISPs. Therefore, each of these countermeasures 
should be an essential component of a bank’s security management program. Some previous 
studies found that managers did not believe that the role of these countermeasures is 
significant in changing users’ behavior toward compliance or in deterring systems misuse 
(Hoffer & Straub, 1989; Straub & Welke, 1998). The results of this study prove otherwise, 
and suggest that organizations can help improve compliance behavior by (1) developing 
comprehensive detailed policies that define appropriate and inappropriate use of the 
resources; (2) conducting special educational, training, and awareness programs that instruct 
employees in different security issues, such as why security policies are important, security 
technology, security threats and controls, cost of compliance and non-compliance, legitimate 
and illegitimate use of IS resources, consequences of non-compliance, and how to enforce 
information security policies; and (3) building an effective monitoring program designed to 
control and provide feedback at the same time, and conducting periodical audits on all 
employee activities. 
In designing security policies, management should develop clear, concise, detailed, direct, and 
easy to understand security procedures that do not obstruct employees’ use of the information 
system. The policy should be available for all employees on paper or electronically. 
Acceptable and unacceptable, and legal and illegal use of information resources must be 
clearly defined in the policy and instructed to all users. Management should also try to make 
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use of international security standards as guidelines when developing ISPs, and periodically 
assess security policies, procedures, and guidelines. 
In designing SETA programs, a training program targeting top management about the 
necessity of security awareness programs must be developed and presented first. Then a 
security awareness committee can be established that will be responsible for reviewing and 
recommending training needs and tools. Next, evaluations regarding employees’ training and 
awareness needs must be conducted, and based on this assessment, development of 
educational and awareness programs. Overall, SETA programs must be designed based on the 
roles and responsibilities defined in an employee’s job description since some educational 
programs are not suitable for certain jobs and some users may have more knowledge on 
certain issues than the designed program itself. Ethical ideology is an important factor in 
security, and especially in compliance with ISPs; therefore, a special ethical program should 
be delivered to all employees aimed at influencing their morals toward compliance with ISPs.  
Monitoring employees’ practices to ensure compliance with rules and requirements as 
described in the ISPs is important. Studies found that users believe that monitoring their 
practices is a kind of violation of their privacy, and it can lower their job satisfaction, and in 
some cases, increase the turnover rate (e.g. Alder et al., 2008; Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989; 
Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002). Therefore, when designing monitoring systems it is important 
to educate all employees about the program, and explain to them its purpose, which must be 
control and providing feedback. Policing the users’ activities must be removed from their 
minds through training and awareness programs, and by empirically providing them with 
feedback when necessary, such as when violation is unintentional. Interestingly, monitoring 
practices were found to have no significant impact on perceived usefulness of protection. This 
has a practical implication; a training program about the importance and usefulness of 
monitoring in protecting information resources and its role in confirming compliance with 
ISPs could be given to all employees. 
As the results show, employees’ personal education and knowledge about security issues 
(unstructured awareness) was found to have a significant effect on compliance behavior. 
Therefore, management must provide employees with training sessions about the different 
resources and their reliabilities for solving security issues. Further, management can leverage 
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this by having a special room with PCs to be used for self-education purposes, which define 
and specify certain websites and forums for employees to help them solve specific security 
issues. 
Perceived behavioral control was partially (self-efficacy) found to have a significant impact 
on intention to comply with ISPs. This suggests that employees perceive that they are capable 
of complying with the rules and requirements of ISPs . Therefore, management should 
enhance and strengthen this perception by giving limited controlled privilege for employees 
that will increase their confidence in their abilities to handle security issues and to comply 
with ISPs. 
Limitations 
As with any other study, this study had some limitations. The first limitation is related to the 
self-reported measure and cross-sectional design. A common method bias and social 
desirability bias were important problems to this study. In the common method bias, several 
procedures were adopted to contain and minimize its effect, and these procedures were 
effective in showing that this bias was not a threat for this study. With the social desirability 
bias threat, anonymity of respondents was confirmed to respondents, there were not any signs 
or indicators of who the respondents were, and a pilot study was conducted to ensure no 
significant differences between the respondents. 
A second limitation is also related to the measurement tool (the questionnaire). This tool was 
developed in English and distributed in an Arabic speaking country. Some interpretation and 
translation problems occurred with some respondents, who had some difficulty understanding 
some questions. The researcher considered translating the questionnaire into Arabic, but by 
doing so, many of the questions would lose their intended meanings. To overcome these 
limitations, a question was added about the number of years the respondent had been speaking 
English. Those who spoke no English at all were excluded from the sample, and those whose 
English was not proficient enough to answer the questionnaire, did not participate in the 
survey.  
The third limitation is also related to the measurement tool. Items and factors were validated 
and tested in the United States and other countries, but to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, they had never been tested in an Arabic speaking country. Thus a pilot study was 
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conducted to validate the instrument before collecting the final study sample. Results of the 
pilot study showed valid and reliable results of the instrument. 
The fourth limitation is related to the administration of the data collection. A friend of the 
researcher administered the distribution of the questionnaire, working with a designated 
contact person from each bank. To make sure that the sample collected was representative, the 
researcher informed the friend and the designated contact people about the purpose of the 
study, explained the questionnaire, and gave instructions for survey distribution and sample 
representation. Regarding the sample representation, these individuals were specifically 
instructed on the concept of random sampling and asked to randomly select a sample which 
took into consideration demographic variables to ensure a representative sample. Related to 
the data collection limitations, a paper-based survey was used since it was impossible to 
conduct an electronic survey for the various reasons explained in Chapter Four. This created a 
problem of cost and time. To make sure that data was collected in a short timeframe, the 
researcher and data collection administrator kept following up with the designated contact 
person at each bank and collected completed questionnaires on weekly basis. In the data entry 
process, initially professional people were used to enter the data; however, later the researcher 
entered the data to ensure data accuracy and integrity. Future Research 
The aforementioned limitations can establish a base for future studies. First, to lower the 
threat of social desirability biases, Siponen and Vance (2010) proposed using scenarios with a 
full description of a hypothetical situation, and indirectly asking the study participants about 
their perception of the situation. Scenarios also help capture detailed explanations about 
specific policies, rules, and guidelines. Therefore, we recommend future research develop 
hypothetical scenarios to measure users’ perceptions about the usefulness and complexity of 
compliance with ISPs. 
This study focused on the self-regularity approach, concentrating on employees’ intrinsic 
motivations, and as Myyry et al. (2009) argued, moral and ethical values play an important 
role in shaping users’ compliance behavior. Knowing that ethical ideology in the security 
domain is rarely investigated, this stream of research will be very fruitful and promising. 
This study was the first to investigate users’ perceptions of the complexity of compliance with 
ISPs. No study was found to investigate the impact of compliance complexity except maybe 
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Bulgurcu et al. (2008) who investigated the perceived burden of compliance as time 
consuming and hindering work progress and personal productivity. This factor is totally 
disregarded in spite of its importance, and therefore, there is an urgent need for studies in this 
fruitful and important research stream. 
An in-depth investigation of subjective norm and perceived behavioral control is 
recommended, since they show significant impact on compliance behavior. These factors 
should be investigated in the context of ethical ideology and perceived complexity 
respectively, as the theoretical base of these factors shows that they are correlated to the 
proposed research domain. 
Finally, this study focused on information security awareness (ISA) as a container or 
motivator for the compliance behavioral intention, but future research might investigate the 
impact of other factors such as rewards, cost of compliance and non-compliance, or 
deterrence, on employees’ perceptions of complexity and usefulness of protection toward 
compliance. 
Conclusion 
This study presented a Security Awareness Model (SAM) that underscores the user dimension 
in addressing ISP compliance issues. This user focus, along with consideration of ISPs as a 
system, is a novel approach as compared to extant theoretical frameworks such as GDT, PMT, 
TRA, and TPB, among others. The model explained user compliance behavior with ISPs in 
terms of perceived complexity of ISPs, perceived usefulness of protection afforded by ISPs, 
and user awareness of information security issues and countermeasures. It is posited that 
among different factors, information security awareness likely plays a major role in shaping 
user compliance behavior with ISPs. The findings were consistent with previous studies 
which utilized TAM and TBP to explain information security policy compliance behavior or 
to deter system misuse. Results of this study revealed astonishing findings regarding 
subjective norm which was found to account for the highest percentage (31.6%) of the 
variance explained in intention to comply. 
Of the security countermeasures, the results also show that information security policies had 
the highest path coefficient impact, which suggests that developing clear and comprehensive 
information security policies is the most effective and important factor in changing users’ 
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behavior toward compliance with ISPs. Unstructured information security awareness (general 
information security awareness and technology awareness) was also found to be an essential 
factor in shaping behavioral intention to comply. This suggests that organizations should 
motivate their employees to educate themselves with different security issues. 
Overall this study presents a significant contribution by explaining the impact and 
relationships between information security awareness and intention to comply with ISPs. 
Most importantly, the study confirms the applicability of technology adoption theories in the 
security compliance domain, and highlights the concept of perceived complexity as a better 
predictor of compliance behavior than perceived ease of use. 
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Appendix A 
Cover Letter 
 
Dear Banks' employees 
Thank you for participating in this survey. I am conducting a research project entitled 
"Information Security Policy Compliance: A user Acceptance Perspective" as part of a 
dissertation at Dakota State University. 
The purpose of the study is to examine users' behavioral intention to comply with 
Information Security Policies (ISPs). You as an employee are invited to participate in the 
study by completing the attached survey. We realize that your time is valuable and have 
attempted to keep the requested information as brief and concise as possible. It will take you 
approximately 20 minutes of your time. Your participation will contribute significantly to the 
successful completion of this study. Your participation in this project is voluntary and 
anonymous. You may withdraw from the study at any time without consequence. 
There are no known risks to you for participating in this study. Your responses are strictly 
confidential, you are not required to provide your name or what bank you are working at or 
other information that may reveal your identity. The collected data will not be used for any 
purposes other than research purposes. When the data and analysis are presented, you will not 
be linked to the data by your name, title, place of work or any other identifying item. 
If you have any questions regarding this study, please feel free to contact us  
 
Ahmad Al-Omari Dr. Omar El-Gayar  
Dakota State University Dakota State University 
College of Business & Information Systems College of Business & Information Systems 
Dept of Management of Information Systems Dept of Management of Information Systems 
aaal-omari8026@pluto.dsu.edu Omar.El-gayar@dsu.edu 
+605-270-1215 +605-256-5799 
  
 Dr. Amit Deokar 
 Dakota State University 
 College of Business & Information Systems 
 Dept of Management of Information  
 Amit.Deokar@dsu.edu 
 +605-256-516 
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Appendix B 
Survey Instrument 
1. Has your bank establish Information Security Policy 
  Yes  No 
 
2. Gender  Male  Female 
 
3. Age   20-29 years  30-39 years 
  40-49 years  ≥ 50 years 
 
4. Education level  High School  Collage 
  Bachelor's Degree  Master's Degree 
  Doctoral Degree  Other (____________________) 
 
5. Experience  1-5 years  6-10 years 
  11-15 years  16-20 years 
  > 20 years 
 
6. Years with the Bank  Less than 6 months  6 months to 1 year 
  1 to 2 years  2 to 4 years 
  4 to 6 years  6 to 10 years 
  10 to 15 years  More than 15 years 
 
7. Functional area of work  Teller   Administration/Clerical 
  Information Technology  Audit 
  Marketing and Sales  Credit Department 
  Treasury & investment  Other (____________________) 
 
8. For how long you have been using the computer  _______________ years. 
 
9. For how long you have been speaking English  _______________ years. 
 
10. How many hours a day do you use the computer at work  _______________ hours? 
 
11. Organizational level (managerial) put others 
  Non-management 
  Line management (supervising non-management personnel) 
  Middle management 
  Senior management 
  Executive/Senior Vice President 
  CEO/President 
 
12.  Please indicate whether you use, or have used in the past, any of the following computer software for job-
related work: (check all that apply) 
  Spreadsheets (e.g., Microsoft Excel) 
  Word processing (e.g., Microsoft Word) 
  E-mail 
  Programming languages (e.g., C++, Java, Visual Basic) 
  Application packages (e.g., accounting or payroll software) 
  Database applications 
  Bank’s special tailored software 
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1 I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I intend to protect information resources according to the requirements of the ISP of my 
organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I intend to protect technology resources according to the requirements of the ISP of my 
organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I 
use information resources. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I 
use technology resources. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I intend to recommend that others comply with ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I intend to assist others in complying with ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Usefulness of Protection        
1 My job would be easier to perform without complying with my organization’s ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Complying with my organization’s ISP gives me greater control over my work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Complying with my organization’s ISP does not hinder my job performance.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Complying with my organization’s ISP addresses my job-related security needs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Complying with my organization’s ISP saves me time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 Complying with my organization’s ISP enables me to accomplish tasks more securely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 Complying with my organization’s ISP supports critical security aspects of my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Complying with my organization’s ISP reduces unproductive activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Complying with my organization’s ISP enhances my effectiveness on the job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Complying with my organization’s ISP improves the quality of the work I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Complying with my organization’s ISP improves my productivity. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Complying with my organization’s ISP makes it easier to do my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Overall, I find complying with my organization’s ISP useful in my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Complexity        
1 I often become confused when complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I make errors frequently when complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Complying with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is often frustrating. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Learning to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP is hard for me.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Compliance with the requirements of my organization’s ISP requires a lot of mental effort. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I find it easy to recover from errors encountered when complying with my organization’s 
ISP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 The compliance requirements of my organization’s ISP are rigid and inflexible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 I find it easy to comply with my organization’s ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I find it hard to comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 It is easy for me to remember how to perform tasks while complying with my 
organization’s ISP. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 My organization’s ISP provides helpful guidance in performing tasks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Overall, I find my organization’s ISP easy to use. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Self-Efficacy        
1 I have the necessary skills to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I have the necessary knowledge to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I have the necessary competencies to fulfill the requirements of the ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I would feel comfortable following my organization’s ISP on my own.        
5 If I wanted to, I could easily comply with my organization’s ISP on my own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I would be able to follow most of the ISP even if there was no one around to help me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Items 6, 7, 9, and 12 load low on Perceived Complexity so they are removed from the final analysis. 
Items in Italic are reversed coded. 
130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controllability 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e 
D
is
ag
re
e 
S
o
m
ew
h
at
 D
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 a
g
re
e 
n
o
r 
d
is
ag
re
e 
S
o
m
ew
h
at
 a
g
re
e 
A
g
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 a
g
re
e 
1 I have the resources (like antivirus, firewall, brochures) to help me comply with the 
requirements of my organization’s ISP. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I have the resources to protect my organization’s information and technology assets from 
potential threats.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Threats to information security in my work are under control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 In general, technology used at my organization is advanced enough to prevent 
information security threats. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
User Awareness of General Information Security        
General Information Security Awareness        
1 Overall, I am aware of the potential security threats and their negative consequences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I have sufficient knowledge about the cost of potential security problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I understand the concerns regarding information security and the risks they pose in 
general. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Technology Awareness        
4 I follow news and developments about the security related technologies.        
5 I discuss Internet security issues or anecdotes with friends and people around me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I read about the problems of malicious threats attacking users’ computers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I seek advice about security issues through online discussion forums, magazines, and 
other media sources  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
User Awareness of Information Security Policies        
1 I am aware of my organization’s rules of behavior for use of computer resources. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use of 
information systems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
installing their own software on work computers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I am aware that my organization has specific guidelines that govern what tasks 
employees are allowed to perform on their work computers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I am aware of my organization’s specific guidelines that describe acceptable use of 
computer passwords. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I am aware that my organization has a formal policy that forbids employees from 
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 I understand the rules and regulations prescribed by my organization’s ISP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I understand my responsibilities toward enhancing my organization’s information 
system security as prescribed in the organization’s ISP. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
User Awareness of SETA Program        
1 I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees comply with the 
organization’s ISP. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I am aware that my organization provides training to help employees improve their 
awareness of computer and information security issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I am aware that my organization provides employees with education on computer 
software copyright laws. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of 
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I am aware that my organization educates employees on their computer security 
responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I am aware that employees in my organization are briefed on the consequences of 
accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to use. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I am aware that employees in my organization are instructed in the appropriate usage of 
information technologies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8 I am aware that my organization educates employees on their responsibilities for 
managing computer passwords. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I am aware that my organization educates employees on appropriate use of information 
technology resources (e.g. email) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
User Awareness of Computer Monitoring        
1 I am aware that my organization monitors any modification or altering of computerized 
data by employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I am aware that employees’ computing activities are monitored by my organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I am aware that my organization monitors computing activities to ensure that employees 
are performing only explicitly authorized tasks. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I am aware that my organization reviews logs of employees' computing activities on a 
regular basis.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I am aware that my organization conducts periodic audits to detect the use of 
unauthorized software on its computers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I am aware that my organization regularly monitors employee access to sensitive 
computerized information. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I am aware that my organization actively monitors the content of employees' work e-
mail messages. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Subjective Norm        
1 Upper level management thinks I should comply with the requirements of my 
organization’s ISPs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 My boss thinks that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 My colleagues think that I should comply with the requirements of my organization’s 
ISPs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 The information security/technology department in my organization thinks that I should 
comply with the requirements of my organization’s ISPs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Other computer technical specialists in the organization think that I should comply with 
the requirements of my organization’s ISPs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Cross Loadings 
  CMA Cont. GISA IC ISPA PC PU SE SETA SN TA 
CMA1 0.863 0.267 0.309 0.291 -0.399 -0.168 0.272 0.371 0.326 0.259 0.303 
CMA2 0.864 0.322 0.314 0.287 -0.409 -0.233 0.262 0.370 0.332 0.251 0.336 
CMA3 0.853 0.278 0.308 0.312 -0.375 -0.191 0.303 0.355 0.313 0.242 0.313 
CMA4 0.876 0.237 0.255 0.268 -0.330 -0.229 0.257 0.346 0.265 0.272 0.274 
CMA5 0.878 0.255 0.284 0.276 -0.341 -0.196 0.283 0.348 0.283 0.265 0.224 
CMA6 0.875 0.273 0.363 0.250 -0.350 -0.222 0.301 0.349 0.296 0.296 0.271 
CMA7 0.876 0.274 0.347 0.267 -0.353 -0.219 0.306 0.344 0.279 0.304 0.246 
CONT1 0.268 0.895 0.242 0.178 -0.331 -0.098 0.179 0.350 0.280 -0.081 0.204 
CONT2 0.250 0.886 0.244 0.198 -0.337 -0.167 0.213 0.352 0.294 -0.042 0.215 
CONT3 0.303 0.874 0.196 0.210 -0.356 -0.123 0.192 0.354 0.299 -0.048 0.222 
CONT4 0.278 0.837 0.245 0.185 -0.306 -0.138 0.182 0.327 0.274 -0.079 0.206 
GISA1 0.335 0.231 0.885 -0.025 -0.270 -0.224 0.288 0.211 0.178 0.207 0.193 
GISA2 0.338 0.281 0.916 -0.069 -0.377 -0.171 0.348 0.243 0.230 0.263 0.230 
GISA3 0.319 0.221 0.955 -0.018 -0.295 -0.200 0.328 0.243 0.215 0.223 0.157 
IC1 0.261 0.149 -0.052 0.890 -0.257 -0.148 0.266 0.193 0.287 0.323 0.221 
IC2 0.266 0.140 -0.037 0.890 -0.259 -0.140 0.284 0.202 0.285 0.315 0.238 
IC3 0.296 0.209 -0.050 0.891 -0.285 -0.146 0.278 0.241 0.298 0.320 0.250 
IC4 0.295 0.162 -0.028 0.880 -0.277 -0.184 0.257 0.240 0.308 0.343 0.261 
IC5 0.267 0.206 -0.042 0.880 -0.277 -0.199 0.276 0.258 0.323 0.316 0.261 
IC6 0.259 0.216 -0.029 0.853 -0.251 -0.226 0.258 0.272 0.333 0.305 0.327 
IC7 0.311 0.268 -0.010 0.830 -0.282 -0.195 0.275 0.325 0.364 0.326 0.290 
ISPA1 -0.394 -0.329 -0.340 -0.296 0.874 -0.078 -0.292 -0.317 -0.296 -0.325 -0.391 
ISPA2 -0.379 -0.357 -0.298 -0.288 0.887 -0.112 -0.253 -0.309 -0.297 -0.282 -0.386 
ISPA3 -0.361 -0.343 -0.297 -0.246 0.901 -0.120 -0.270 -0.313 -0.298 -0.301 -0.383 
ISPA4 -0.388 -0.347 -0.319 -0.287 0.906 -0.090 -0.284 -0.334 -0.339 -0.334 -0.425 
ISPA5 -0.387 -0.339 -0.315 -0.261 0.883 -0.085 -0.267 -0.320 -0.322 -0.332 -0.404 
ISPA6 -0.360 -0.305 -0.321 -0.282 0.868 -0.061 -0.267 -0.345 -0.325 -0.355 -0.429 
ISPA7 -0.343 -0.310 -0.266 -0.251 0.869 -0.077 -0.268 -0.287 -0.299 -0.307 -0.374 
ISPA8 -0.330 -0.338 -0.256 -0.253 0.858 -0.066 -0.270 -0.334 -0.317 -0.287 -0.362 
ISPA9 -0.371 -0.345 -0.293 -0.279 0.862 -0.092 -0.287 -0.285 -0.348 -0.295 -0.381 
PC1 -0.185 -0.112 -0.202 -0.154 -0.070 0.937 -0.204 -0.202 -0.168 -0.192 -0.181 
PC10 -0.217 -0.119 -0.193 -0.145 -0.095 0.950 -0.231 -0.227 -0.199 -0.224 -0.173 
PC11 -0.227 -0.127 -0.188 -0.174 -0.105 0.805 -0.253 -0.214 -0.196 -0.222 -0.173 
PC2 -0.205 -0.139 -0.136 -0.188 -0.069 0.872 -0.208 -0.290 -0.219 -0.189 -0.254 
PC3 -0.224 -0.165 -0.192 -0.224 -0.124 0.941 -0.240 -0.301 -0.226 -0.265 -0.195 
PC4 -0.243 -0.167 -0.197 -0.217 -0.134 0.938 -0.262 -0.325 -0.244 -0.277 -0.186 
PC5 -0.196 -0.117 -0.208 -0.171 -0.069 0.785 -0.219 -0.209 -0.181 -0.208 -0.195 
PC8 -0.180 -0.122 -0.211 -0.124 0.011 0.803 -0.144 -0.202 -0.180 -0.157 -0.182 
PU1 0.252 0.108 0.249 0.220 -0.215 -0.200 0.768 0.244 0.223 0.240 -0.120 
PU10 0.251 0.220 0.321 0.233 -0.264 -0.226 0.836 0.355 0.303 0.282 -0.071 
PU11 0.239 0.203 0.315 0.202 -0.262 -0.227 0.827 0.303 0.251 0.302 -0.067 
PU12 0.275 0.179 0.289 0.261 -0.255 -0.240 0.814 0.358 0.272 0.320 -0.052 
PU13 0.294 0.187 0.266 0.279 -0.300 -0.228 0.810 0.325 0.250 0.314 -0.031 
PU2 0.296 0.202 0.299 0.281 -0.309 -0.201 0.850 0.339 0.299 0.317 -0.081 
PU3 0.256 0.177 0.305 0.261 -0.248 -0.228 0.823 0.314 0.275 0.307 -0.078 
PU4 0.261 0.183 0.286 0.260 -0.221 -0.205 0.850 0.291 0.294 0.293 -0.096 
PU5 0.260 0.160 0.282 0.263 -0.220 -0.206 0.846 0.278 0.255 0.284 -0.080 
PU6 0.273 0.194 0.309 0.261 -0.281 -0.170 0.831 0.317 0.283 0.336 -0.077 
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Table C1. Cross Loadings (Continued) 
  CMA Cont GISA IC ISPA PC PU SE SETA SN TA 
PU7 0.295 0.197 0.260 0.294 -0.254 -0.176 0.850 0.347 0.281 0.303 -0.086 
PU8 0.298 0.177 0.295 0.269 -0.274 -0.228 0.838 0.328 0.281 0.335 -0.097 
PU9 0.266 0.188 0.299 0.248 -0.242 -0.207 0.831 0.325 0.238 0.291 -0.063 
SE1 0.335 0.328 0.189 0.249 -0.319 -0.250 0.322 0.862 0.388 0.308 0.281 
SE2 0.338 0.344 0.214 0.230 -0.335 -0.254 0.334 0.887 0.357 0.301 0.283 
SE3 0.350 0.361 0.233 0.216 -0.310 -0.260 0.303 0.881 0.351 0.270 0.261 
SE4 0.354 0.341 0.227 0.272 -0.321 -0.223 0.361 0.891 0.367 0.336 0.238 
SE5 0.385 0.334 0.227 0.232 -0.296 -0.277 0.333 0.872 0.370 0.314 0.237 
SE6 0.377 0.373 0.238 0.288 -0.306 -0.235 0.359 0.860 0.376 0.327 0.262 
SETA1 0.311 0.294 0.196 0.335 -0.319 -0.214 0.298 0.363 0.865 0.285 0.279 
SETA2 0.327 0.320 0.194 0.335 -0.311 -0.199 0.284 0.392 0.875 0.264 0.273 
SETA3 0.284 0.272 0.161 0.321 -0.283 -0.197 0.298 0.355 0.881 0.258 0.231 
SETA4 0.291 0.280 0.203 0.321 -0.313 -0.187 0.272 0.382 0.887 0.275 0.299 
SETA5 0.263 0.272 0.188 0.306 -0.310 -0.227 0.287 0.364 0.880 0.279 0.270 
SETA6 0.312 0.266 0.216 0.326 -0.286 -0.245 0.293 0.361 0.889 0.300 0.278 
SETA7 0.274 0.275 0.211 0.280 -0.349 -0.191 0.256 0.357 0.873 0.283 0.308 
SETA8 0.311 0.296 0.216 0.298 -0.345 -0.154 0.279 0.359 0.865 0.271 0.280 
SETA9 0.332 0.323 0.206 0.311 -0.327 -0.198 0.299 0.385 0.867 0.268 0.303 
SN1 0.302 -0.058 0.251 0.327 -0.314 -0.243 0.331 0.301 0.282 0.893 0.261 
SN2 0.284 -0.053 0.266 0.299 -0.312 -0.217 0.352 0.320 0.298 0.894 0.239 
SN3 0.260 -0.076 0.183 0.322 -0.298 -0.256 0.324 0.299 0.257 0.896 0.273 
SN4 0.267 -0.063 0.213 0.349 -0.335 -0.209 0.332 0.337 0.264 0.900 0.241 
SN5 0.275 -0.063 0.208 0.344 -0.329 -0.193 0.289 0.320 0.305 0.875 0.271 
TA1 0.270 0.210 0.149 0.267 -0.403 -0.171 -0.128 0.238 0.284 0.267 0.893 
TA2 0.296 0.216 0.226 0.231 -0.373 -0.215 -0.074 0.289 0.266 0.241 0.902 
TA3 0.273 0.228 0.185 0.300 -0.401 -0.186 -0.059 0.259 0.291 0.264 0.888 
TA4 0.310 0.216 0.189 0.288 -0.421 -0.205 -0.070 0.273 0.300 0.259 0.889 
 
